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He lied about everything .... He said his father was
Cuban, that he lived in Miami ... that he had attended
American University [that] he was twenty-two when he was
only seventeen, and that the girl at his place who was
slamming everything around was his cousin when she was
only his girlfriend.
-Anonymous

medical records technician'

The words "I'll love you till the day I die,"
The self-deception that believes the lie....

1. Quoted in DORY HOLLANDER,

101 LIES MEN TELL WOMEN AND WHY WOMEN

BELIEVE THEM 3 (1995).
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The faint aroma of performing seals
The double crossing of a pair of heels.
I wish I were in love again!
-Lorenz

Hart2

I. INIRODUCTION

Woman to man or man to woman: "Are you married?" Answer:
"No." Q: "How many women (men) have you been with?" A: "You
would be the second." Q: "Tell me about yourself." A: "I am Catholic;
I graduated from Cal Tech; I make into the six figures; I don't do drugs;
I have never had an abortion." "Of course we are going to get married."
Q: "Where were you all day? I tried to reach you." A: "I was at a
meeting."
Let us suppose that all of these assertions are outright lies, that in
fact the liar in the last example had been intimately involved with a
lover. Later, the truth comes out. As a result the relationship collapses
and the innocent party is badly hurt. Is there-should there be-a cause
of action?3
A great deal is surely at stake here. A serious jolt to a sexual
partnership, psychologists say, can lead to restlessness, panic attacks,
sleeplessness, loss of appetite, and deep depression.' "A Song of Love
Is a Sad Song" indeed.' If we accept the proposition that being duped
in or into a sexual relationship magnifies these effects, and if reports of
the ex-govemor of Arkansas' infidelities are true, it is easy to see why
no measure of damages could fully recompense Hillary for her pain;
why a woman presumably without Hillary's extraordinary survival skills,
say, Adrienne Rich, might be driven crazy;6 why for Susan Estrich
sexual fraud can be rape.7

2. LORENZ HART, I Wish I Were in Love Again, THE COMPLETE LYRICS OF LORENZ
HART 228 (Dorothy Hart & Robert Kimball eds., 1995).
3. A growing number of commentators believe there is, or at least should be. See infra
note 63.
4. See CARL G. HINDY ET AL., IF THIS IS LOVE WHY Do I FEEL SO INSECURE? 200-03

(1989).
5. Lili (MGM 1953).
6. ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE 186 (1979) ('To discover that one

has been lied to in a personal relationship.. . leads one to feel a little crazy.").
7. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 102-03 (1987) ('The 'force' or 'coercion' that negates
consent ought to be defined to include extortionate threats and misrepresentations of material
fact.").
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It is difficult to even imagine the other side of this story. And yet,
picture Cyrano standing behind the trees under Roxane's balcony, not
far from the man she has her eyes on and who has eyes for her,
Christian.8 Christian is somewhat anxious as he starts wooing Roxane
because she has made clear her principal requirement in a man, that he
possess a poet's sensibility, and this is precisely the quality that he
lacks. Things do not go well for Christian. The harder he tries, it seems,
the worse it gets and, as he sees his chances slipping away, he panics.
In the face of the impending disaster-and because of his own love for
Roxane which leads him to seek her happiness even at the cost of his
own-Cyrano comes to the rescue. He summons the words to express
his feelings for Roxane giving them to Christian for his use; then, in
frustration, takes control of the courtship, addressing Roxanne directly
while mimicking Christian's voice. So exquisite are Cyrano's words, so
moving his passion, that at the end of the latest film version of this
scene, when we (men and women alike) see him slinking home after
Christian has gained welcome to Roxane's bedroom, our hearts simply
break.
Does or should Roxane now have a cause of action against Cyrano
and Christian for fraud? Going by the pain and number of Roxane-like
figures and other victims of sexual fraud, yes, absolutely. Who among
us has not suffered for inviting a poet to bed only to discover a clod?
On the other hand, who among us has not also, like our love-crazed
heroes, misrepresented himself in love?9 "Do you think," asks columnist
Art Hoppe, "Prince Charming would have been swept off his feet for
one minute by a cleaning lady? '. ° "Don't ... feminists know," asks
Camille Paglia, "that everything in romance is lying and delusion and
that judgment goes out the window in sexual matters?"... "SEX
FRAUD! What's Professor 1 2Larson trying to do-" sums up Hoppe,
"wipe out the human race"?
This Article evaluates the desirability of a tort action for misrepresentations designed to secure sexual benefits (often called a sex fraud

8. EDMOND ROSTAND, CYRANO DE BERGERAC (Anthony Burgess trans., 1971) (1897).
9. See, e.g.. Picket Fences (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1994) (involving a
Cyrano-type fraud in which Judge Bones dismisses charges of rape, explaining that everybody
lies a little in courtship).
10. Arthur Hoppe, Free Sex, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 20, 1993, Sunday Punch

section, at 1. Cinderella may not have lied in the ordinary sense of the word, but by going to
the ball dressed as the most beautiful princess of all, she can be charged with trying to mislead.
The deception seems to have worked, as the prince certainly treated her as a princess. For a
general discussion of the relationship between lying and deception, see infra Part II.G.
11. Quoted in Shulamith Gold, Don Juan in Court, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1993, at NI.
12. Hoppe, supra note 10.
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action herein). 3 The Article consists of ten parts. Part II provides a
legal, historical, and philosophical framework for assessing the sex fraud
action. In so doing it focuses special attention on a new article by sex
fraud tort proponent Professor Jane E. Larson.14 Part 111, The World of
Lies, examines the place of lying generally in our dealings with others
and in our private, mental lives. Part IV, Sex, Lies, and Audiotape,
extends the discussion of lying to the sexual setting. Part V, Men vs.
Women as Victims, compares the damage suffered by men and women
in sexual relationships. No explanation is necessary for the Part VI,
Women vs. Men as Liars. Part VII, The Mind Game, briefly lays out
some communication theory and then highlights the implications for
sexual partners. Part VIII, Is a Sexual Fraud Regime Workable?,
examines the administrative problems that a sex fraud regime would
bring. In part IX, The People Speak, two recent opinion surveys are
presented and evaluated. The Article ends with a brief summary and
some conclusions.' 5

13. For a more complete definition of the tort, see infra text accompanying notes 70-80.
14. Jane E. Larson, "Women UnderstandSo Little, They Call My GoodNature 'Deceit' ":
A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 374 (1993).
15. A few words about the Article's method and style. Where the subject matter of an
essay elicits strong reactions, as it does here, thoughtful writers will want to tightly control their
own sentiments so as to preserve their fair-mindedness. This is precisely what Stendhal's
narrator intended in an analogous context: "I am making every possible effort to be matter-offact. I want to impose silence on my heart, which wants to say too much. I am always afraid
of only having put down a sigh, when I imagine myself to have recorded a truth." STENDHAL,
ON LOVE 27 (H.B.V. trans., 1927).
At the same time, wise writers will understand the limitations of intellectual work that does
not get under their skin. Cornel West has complained about this "bourgeois" model of
scholarship in one of his own fields, black studies. CORNEL WEST, KEEPING FAITH: PHILOSOPHY
AND RACE IN AMERICA 82 (1992). To shake loose from the grip of stultifying and disembodied
scholarship, West urges black scholars to reject this model in favor of "a new 'regime of
truth' ... permeated by... kinetic orality and emotional physicality... rhythmic syncopation ... protean improvisation [and] rhetorical and antiphonal repetition." Id.
Neither the Stendhalian nor the Westian approach can exclusively provide the kind of
perspective that is needed here. Both, therefore, will be used. If one approach undermines the
other, readers should at least be able to distinguish between them and adjust their thinking
accordingly.
As for style, readers should note that I have allowed most of the authors cited herein to
speak in their own voices. This is because the subject of sexual conversation has attracted so
much attention from the very best thinkers and writers that many times, when I began to
paraphrase their ideas and manner of expression, I was left with a sense of dread.
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II. THE LEGAL, HISTORICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL,
AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND

Any man who, by means of temptation, deception, arts,
flattery, or a promise of marriage, seduces any unmarried
woman in this state, shall, on conviction, be imprisoned in
the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than ten
years....
-Code

of Alabama (1940)6

[A] male [may] make promises that will not be kept, ...
indulge in exaggeration and hyperbole, or ... assure any
trusting female that ... the ugly frog is really the handsome prince. Every man is free, under the law, to be a
gentleman or a cad.
-People v. Evans 7
A. The Law of the Lie
For most of American history the law has allowed an action against
a man who misrepresented himself for purposes of seducing a woman.'" Early on, such an action could be brought by a parent of the
deceived woman on grounds of loss of the daughter's services. 9
16. ALA. CODE § 419 (1940) (repealed 1977).
17. 379 N.Y.S.2d 912. 922 (1975) (holding that since penal sanctions for seduction are
no longer enforced, the defendant's conduct could not be characterized as criminal).
18. See M.B.W. Sinclair, Seduction and the Myth of the Ideal Woman, 5 LAW & INEQ.
J. 41-64 (1990); see also Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817
(1996) (highlighting the obstacles for plaintiffs).
19. See, e.g., Franklin v. Hill, 444 S.E.2d 778, 781 (Ga. 1994) (stating that the rationale
behind Georgia's seduction statute was to hold men accountable for corrupting young women);
Kendrick v. McCrary, 11 Ga. 603, 606 (Ga. 1852) (stating that the statute protected fathers from
being disgraced by their daughters). Only the slightest loss of services needed to be shown by
parent plaintiffs, as courts explicitly based the seduction action on emotional and social harm
to the parent. See, e.g., id. at 605-06.
In upholding a verdict for the father, which included $49 in-actual damages and $1000 in
punitive damages, the court pointed out that the action exists "for the wisest and most
benevolent of purposes, to preserve his domestic peace, by guarding from the spoiler the purity
and innocence of his child." Id. at 603-04. The court went on to explain:
Never, so help me God, while I have the honor to occupy a seat upon this bench,
will I consent to control the jury, in the amount of compensation which they may
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Because the victim had no property rights in herself, she had no claim
on her own behalf." However, beginning in the second half of the
nineteenth century, in a climate that allowed passage of the married
women's property acts,2 parents' claims slowly became disfavored,22
with the right of action passing to the victim.23 Two actions were
available to plaintiffs: seduction,24 our primary focus here, and breach
of promise to marry.' The tort of seduction imposed a chastity
requirement which often meant that a married woman could not
recover.26 A woman might recover in seduction for her damages
see fit to render a father for the dishonor and disgrace thus cast upon his family;
for this atrocious invasion of his household peace. There is nothing like it, since
the entrance of Sin and Death into this lower world. Money cannot redress a parent
who is wronged beyond the possibility of redress; it cannot minister to a mind thus
diseased. Give to such a plaintiff, all that figures can number, it is as the small dust
of the balance. Say to the father, there is $1049, embrace your innocent daughter,
for the last time, and let her henceforth become an object for the hand of scorn to
point its finger at! What mockery! And yet this is the identical case we are
considering.
Id. at 606.
The court may have been influenced by the Bible which holds that "[I]f a man entice a maid
that is not betrothed, and lie with her, he shall surely endow her to be his wife. If her father
utterly refuse to give her unto him, he [the seducer] shall pay money according to the dowry of
virgins." Exodus 22:16-17 (King James).
20. See Larson, supra note 14, at 382-84.
21. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsToRY OF AMERICAN LAW 184-85 (1973).
22. Larson, supra note 14, at 384-87. Just a few years ago, a woman brought an action
under a statute (Georgia Code 51-1-16) which allowed parents to sue the seducer of their unwed
daughters. Franklin, 444 S.E.2d at 781. The Georgia Supreme Court denied relief, holding the
statute unconstitutional. Id.
23. Larson, supra note 14, at 384-87; Sinclair, supra note 18, at 48-50, 60-64.
24. 70 AM. JUR. 2D Seduction § 1 (1987).
Seduction is the act of persuading or inducing a woman of previously chaste
character to depart from the path of virtue and submit to sexual intercourse with
the seducer [by] the use of any species of arts, persuasions, or wiles calculated to
result in illicit sexual intercourse between the woman and the seducer and in fact
having that result.
Id.
25. Two other torts paralleled these. The tort of "Alienation of Affections" arose where
there was "willful and malicious interference with marriage relation by third party, without
justification or excuse"--more specifically, where a defendant's actions led to a plaintiff's "loss
of affection or consortium of spouse." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 72 (6th ed. 1990). The tort
of "Criminal Conversation" is defined as "[s]exual intercourse of an outsider with husband or
wife, or a breaking down of the covenant of fidelity.' Id. at 373. It is a "[t]ort action based on
adultery, .. . a civil injury to the husband or wife entitling him or her to damages." Id.
26. See Weinlich v. Coffee, 176 P. 210, 211 (Colo. 1918) (cited with approval in
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"where the act or acts of seduction are induced by false or fraudulent
representations. 27
Yet even without fraudulent representation, a suitor could be at
risk.28 " '[U]rgent importunity' as well as 'professions of attachment'
are included within the purview of the meaning of enticement or persuasion. ,2 While pregnancy was not a formal element of the seduction
action," in most of the cases the union produced a child.3 If the
woman was productive, of course, this circumstance would have most
immediately produced a "loss of services" either to the parent or the
daughter, or perhaps both. 2
As might be expected in settings where breathtaking ingenuity has
been displayed, courts have been unable or unwilling to define
prohibited artifice.33 One important message, however, regularly came
through: "What might be seduction in one case might, with an older
woman, more mature mentally, of greater intelligence, education, and
experience, and under different circumstances, not constitute seduction.
The disparity of the ages of the parties is always proper to be considered."34 Once seduction was established, damages could be awarded for
Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 282 (Colo. 1988)). But see Fulgham v. Gatfield, 241 P.2d
824 (Idaho 1952) and Haeissig v. Decker, 166 N.W. 1085 (Minn. 1918) (stating that "seduction
presupposes chastity, but it would not do to hold that chastity once lost can never be regained").
27. Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Wis. 1974).
28. See, e.g., Seamons v. Spackman, 341 P.2d 442 (Idaho 1959) (upholding the
defendant's conviction based on his persuading a woman of previously chaste character to
engage in sexual intercourse).
29. Id. at 444.
30. Id. at 443.
31. See Sinclair, supra note 18, at 37, 47 (discussing seductions resulting in pregnancy).
32. See Piggott v. Miller, 557 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that while
a seduced woman could not recover from a married defendant for breach of promise to marry,
she nevertheless stated a viable cause of action in damages for seduction based on her reliance
on his fraudulent promise to marry).
33. See, e.g., Angie M. v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(reversing lower court's determination that minor plaintiff's cause of action for seduction was
not defined under California's civil law). Although the Angie M. court recognized the minor
plaintiff's seduction action, it declined to define seduction itself, but instead implicitly
recognized seduction as a related claim where the defendant also was criminally charged with
rape of a minor and child sexual abuse. Id. at 1224-25.
34. Kralick v. Shuttleworth, 289 P. 74, 81 (Idaho 1930) (upholding verdict for plaintiff
where, among other things, she was 21 years old while defendant was 61). This guideline was
cited with approval in Seamons, 341 P.2d at 446 (upholding verdict for plaintiff; plaintiff was
19 and defendant 35 when they began a sexual relationship). See also Opitz v. Hayden, 135 P.2d
819 (Wash. 1943) (discussing whether in a breach of contract case, a purported settlement of
a seduction case could be based on consideration). Holding for the plaintiff, in Opitz the court
noted that at the point of meeting defendant, the plaintiff was a girl of 19 years, "of unblemished
virtue" from a Christian family, who attended Sunday School. Id. at 821. She had no contact
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pain and suffering experienced in pregnancy and childbirth,35 for the
mental anguish produced by the seduction,36 and for loss of social
standing.37
The breach of promise action was born of contract-and paradox. 8
"What is strangest of all," Plato notes in his Symposium, "is the popular
conviction that a lover, and none but a lover can forswear himself with
impunity-a lover's vow, they say, is no vow at all."3 9 Recognizing
this legal inconsistency and the serious harm done, the common law
came to provide a remedy." The action did not require fraud; that is,
a remedy was available even if the promise was intended to be kept at
the time it was made.4 Damages caused by the breach might include
loss of the pecuniary and social advantages of the promised marriage,

with boys and did not go to parties. Id. The seducer, by contrast, was 40 years old, tall, slender,
and genial. Id. He was also her employer and, though married, maintained a relationship with
still another woman. Id.
Anderson started writing love notes and addressing Opitz affectionately. Id. Then came
dinner invitations, shows, and automobile rides. Id. In 1920 they began a sexual relationship that
lasted 13 years. Id. In 1921 Opitz became pregnant and, at defendant's insistence, had an
abortion. Id. During the long "courtship," Anderson told plaintiff he wanted children with her
and wanted to marry her as soon as he settled affairs with his wife. Id. at 822. Thereafter
plaintiff on two occasions moved away, but was persuaded to come home by defendant who
continually professed his deepest affection for her. Id. Three days after finally obtaining a
divorce from his wife, defendant married another who was completely unknown to plaintiff. Id.
at 824.
35. Gemill v. Brown, 56 N.E. 691, 695 (Ind. 1900).
36. Id.
37. Hawn v. Banghart, 39 N.W. 251, 253 (Iowa 1888); Piggot, 557 S.W.2d at 694.
38. See 12 AM. JUR. 2D Breach of Promise §§ 26-27 (1964). While the focus of this
Article is fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of promise will be given some attention because
in its classic form it also allows recovery for emotional damages. Id. In doing so, of course,
breach of promise imports the same problems as fraudulent misrepresentation with regard to
proof and measurement of damages. Compare id. with 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud& Deceit §§ 47-48
(1964).
39. Quoted in SHOSHANA FELMAN, THE LITERARY SPEECH ACT 23 (Catherine Porter
trans., 1980).
40. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Piggot, 557 S.W.2d at 695 (upholding plaintiff's seduction cause of action
even though married defendant's promise to marry plaintiff was legally void). But fraud on a
woman plaintiff's part could defeat her claim. Thus, when a defendant could prove that his
affianced was not the innocent he could rightfully have expected, the defendant could get the
plaintiffs claim dismissed. See, e.g., Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Pa. 401 (1854). Though early in the
nineteenth century, the breach of promise action was gender-neutral, thereafter recovery was
virtually always limited to women. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW
AND THE FAMILY INNINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 32-49 (1985) (providing a comprehensive
account of breach of promise in the last century).
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mental anguish, humiliation, and injury to health and psyche. 42 Expenditures made in preparation of marriage also were recoverable.4 3
Seduction, i.e., the use of artifice to gain sexual favor, also was a
crime4 (as was breach of promise). The legal test for both civil and
criminal liability was the same, at least in principle,45 though a number
of states made a promise of marriage a necessary element of the
crime.46 Where the victim was deceived as to the nature of the act
being performed (fraud in the factum), a charge of rape might arise. 4"
Doctors, for example, were not infrequently convicted of rape where,
under the guise of conducting a physical examination, they had
intercourse with their patients. 48 Rape was rarely chargeable, however,
in the much more common case where the victim consented to the act
of intercourse, though the consent was obtained through artifice (fraud

in the inducement).49
Beginning in the 1930s, in the wake of the first, and now almost
forgotten, sexual revolution of the twentieth century, a "heartbalm" (also
paradoxically called "anti-heartbalm") movement was launched to
abolish the torts of seduction and breach of promise (as well as
alienation of affections and criminal conversation). Among its
42. Bradley v. Somers, 332 S.E.2d 665, 666-67 (S.C. 1984).
43. See 12 AM. JUR. 2D Breach of Promise §§ 26-27 (1964), cited with approval in
Bradley, 322 S.E.2d at 667. But see Bruno v. Guerra, 549 N.Y.S.2d 925, 926 (1990) (upholding
state statute prohibiting recovery of prepaid wedding expenses).
44. See Mitchell v. State, 151 So. 2d 752, 754 (Ala. 1962).
45. See supra note 18 and accompanying text and Mitchell, 151 So. 2d at 754 (finding
defendant guilty under ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 419 (1940), which criminalized seduction as
"tempting a chaste woman through deception, arts, flattery or a promise of marriage").
46. See, e.g., Mitchell, 151 So. 2d at 754.
47. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 964-66 (2d ed. 1969).
48. See, e.g., Eberhart v. State, 34 N.E. 637, 638 (Ind. 1893) (affirming phony, intinerant
doctor's rape conviction for sex act with 13-year-old girl under pretense of treatment despite no
evidence of resistance); Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96, 102 (1883) (holding that defendant
physician's sex act with mentally deficient patient under the guise of a medical examination
constituted rape); State v. Atkins, 292 S.W. 422, 426 (Mo. 1926) (holding that non-consensual
vaginal penetration of plaintiff by defendant doctor's penis during physical examination was rape
notwithstanding her consent to the examination); State v. Ely, 194 P. 988. 991 (Wash. 1921)
(affirming physician's conviction for rape perpetrated during physical examination of female
patient).
49. See, e.g., Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 916-19. Under the guise of conducting a sociological
experiment, the accused induced the complainant to accompany him to his apartment, and where
after additional artifice on his part, the two had sex. Id. at 916-17. In finding the defendant not
guilty, the court cited the "prevailing view in this country is that there can be no rape which is
achieved by fraud, or trick or strategem." Id. at 919.
50. See Mary Coombs, Agency and Partnership:A Study of Breach of Promise Plaintiffs,
2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM I (1989); Larson, supra note 14, at 398 (discussing the historical
background of feminist reforms).
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founders and leaders were early feminists who took the position that the
heartbalm torts were infantilizing them by implying that women could
not manage their own social and emotional lives." Whatever influence
such women had, however, it was men who guaranteed the movement's
success by insisting that, far from protecting innocent women, the
actions were all too frequently used by experienced and unscrupulous
women to extort money from their less sophisticated male admirers. 2
The movement continued for over forty years, with the result that
today seduction actions are preclided by statute in all but seventeen
states. 53 Approximately twenty-one states have extended these antiheartbalm statutes to prohibit breach of promise. 4 Thus, the seduction

51. See Larson, supra note 14, at 393-401. Of special importance in this movement was
Roberta West Nicholson, the Indiana legislator who introduced the first heartbalm bill. See
Coombs, supra note 50, at 12 n.71.
52. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Manning, 166 N.Y.S. 760 (1917) (breach of promise). Here
plaintiff was 29 years old. Id. at 761. Defendant was 84, partially palsied, and worth well over
$10 million. Id. The engagement was extremely short-lived, lasting only a few days. Id. Though
plaintiff admitted that she did not love defendant (thus there were no wounded affections), the
court held that she was entitled to damages for "mortification and wounded pride and the loss
of benefits she would have had," awarding her $125,000. Id. at 761-62.
Former § 61-a of the New York Civil Practice Act articulated the rationale for the State's
heartbalm statute:
The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of actions based
upon allege[d] ... seduction.., having been subjected to grave abuses, causing
extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many
persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the victims
of circumstances, and such remedies having been exercised by unscrupulous
persons for their unjust enrichment, and such remedies having furnished vehicles
for the commission or attempted commission of crime and in many cases having
resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as the public policy of
the state that the best interests of the people of the state will be served by the
abolition of such remedies. Consequently, in the public interest, the necessity for
the enactment of this article is hereby declared as a matter of legislative
determination.
1935 N.Y. LAWS 732-33 (repealed 1963). New York's original statute abolishing seduction and
breach of promise was enacted in 1935. Id. While omitting the New York legislature's rationale,
the current statute continues to prohibit these causes of action. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 80-A
(McKinney 1994). Now we can fully understand that Nathan Detroit's mock protest of
powerlessness to control himself as expressed in the primary title to this Article, which is how
the line is simply understood today, also serves to taunt Adelaide for her real powerlessness
(short of dumping him) to find a remedy. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. This aspect
would not have been lost upon Guys and Dolls' Broadway audiences 40 years ago, when the
play was first performed.
53. See Larson, supra note 14, at 401 n.1 18.
54. See Coombs, supra note 50, at 5 & n.25.
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action still theoretically exists in about one-third, and breach of promise
in more than half, of our
state jurisdictions. Nevertheless, almost no
"pure" seduction cases55 and very few breach of promise cases are
brought today. 6 Also as a result of the heartbalm movement, criminal

55. By "pure" I refer to kinds of cases referred to on pp. 316-20, supra. See also supra
note 51 and accompanying text (discussing seduction in abuse of patient and other unusual
cases).
56. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 834 (1988). Professor Martha Chamallas makes a compelling case for
the suspended animation, if not death, of breach of promise. Id. "One good reason for refusing
to afford a cause of action for a breach of promise," she writes, "is that, regardless of any
emotional harm caused, it is desirable to permit everyone the opportunity to extricate themselves
[sic] from unwanted intimate relationships." Id. Professor Chamallas goes on:
[P]erhaps the most common risk in any sexual relationship is the risk that one party
will end the relationship unilaterally, against the wishes of the other party. Given
this pervasive risk, the judgment may be that people (especially women) should
assume the risk that the other party might some day break off the relationship. If
this is the implicit moral judgment, then the only damages properly cognizable...
would be those for insult or indignity traceable to the deception, omitting any
damages flowing from the relational loss. When so pared down, the claim for a
breach of promise to marry ... loses much of its apparent monetary value.
Id. at 834-35.
Potential breach-of-promise plaintiffs should take note of Wildey v. Springs, 840 F. Supp.
1259 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev'd, 47 F.3d 1475 (7th Cir. 1995), a case discussed in some detail by
Gretchen Reynolds in A Breach of Promise, CHI. MAG., Apr. 1994, at 63. In April 1992, at the
end of a short, but intense courtship period of nine weeks, Richard Springs and Sharon Wildey
became engaged to be married. Wildey, 840 F. Supp. at 1262. Both parties were in their fifties;
Sharon was an attorney, while Richard was a wealthy cattle rancher. Id. Shortly thereafter,
Sharon wanted to renegotiate a retainer arrangement with her sole cash-paying client and
Richard agreed to help with cash flow if problems arose with the client. Reynolds, supra, at 65.
In fact, the client balked and Sharon lost the account. Id. At about this time Richard decided
things were not working out to his satisfaction and broke off the engagement. Id.
In October 1992, Sharon brought an action for breach of promise claiming recompense for
medical costs (she was seeing a psychiatrist for $125 per hour), pain and suffering, as well as
profits lost in her law practice. Wildey, 840 F. Supp. at 1263. A jury found in her favor for
$178,000, which amount was subsequently reduced by $60,000, representing the lost profits
which the court held were not recoverable given her claim for breach of promise to marry (as
opposed to a claim for breach of financial promise). Id. at 1263, 1268. Wildey was subsequently
overturned on the grounds that the complaint was insufficiently specific. Wildey, 47 F.3d at
1486; see also Jilted Woman Keeps Ring, Not Jury Award, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at B6.
This brings us to the heart of the case and why the trial court opinion in Wildey is not likely
to have much application outside Illinois. Under the Illinois Breach of Promise Act, damages
are "limited to the actual damages sustained as a result of the injury complained of." ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 740, para. 15/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Thus, there is no provision for recovery of lost
profits. The Act continues: "[n]o punitive, exemplary, vindictive or aggravated damages shall
be allowed .. ."Id. para. 15/3. In short, then, unlike the great majority of jurisdictions with
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seduction statutes have been either swept away or ignored." The last
heartbalm statues, Illinois law contemplates that some recoveries will be allowed as a result of
breach of promise, and the principal issue is whether pain and suffering is within the category
of "actual damages." Id. para. 15/2.
One of the defenses raised in Wildey was that the defendant was excused from performing
the contract because the plaintiff was suffering from an "obsessive compulsive personality
disorder." Wildey, 840 F. Supp. at 1266. Defendant argued that this was a sufficient basis for
allowing him to break the engagement. Id. In rejecting this claim, the court held that "only if
[a] disease is fairly permanent and would truly interfere with the physical relations between the
parties" might the defendant be excused from performance. Id. (citing Shackelford v. Hamilton,
19 S.W. 5, 7-8 (Ky. 1892)). Finding that the disorder in question was probably curable through
therapy, the court stated that in any event the putative disorder would not render the plaintiff
unable to " 'discharge the duties of the marital relation' " and that Springs could not have
realistically overlooked this characteristic in the four months of courtship. Id. at 1266.
Ultimately, the trial court held for plaintiff. Id. at 1266-67.
Barry Schatz, a prominent Chicago practitioner in a family-practice law firm, commented
on the decision: "You once had to have a lawyer handle your divorce; then you started to need
one to draw up your prenuptial agreement. Will you need one now to handle the terms of your
engagement? I don't believe that is progress." Reynolds, supra, at 63.
57. People v. Hough, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1994) (highlighting the extent of
the criminal law's distaste for sex fraud actions). In this case the accused was charged under a
New York statute which defines sexual misconduct as "engag[ing] in sexual intercourse with a
female without her consent." Id. The complaint alleged that the accused, impersonating his twin
brother, Lenny, slipped into Lenny's girlfriend's bed very late one night and had sex with her
while she was not fully conscious. Id. at 885. Holding that the victim had consented under the
statute, both because she had the capacity to consent and because no forcible compulsion had
been applied, the court dismissed the information. Id. at 886-87. In so doing the court granted
the People leave to bring other charges against the accused. Id. at 887. Thereafter, the People
charged the accused with criminal impersonation, but in the second action the jury found the
accused not guilty. See Maureen Fan, Twin Clearedin Sex with Brother's Girl,NEWSDAY, Oct.
28, 1994, at A24.
The result might be different under a Tennessee statute which provides, in part, as follows:
"Rape is unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by a
victim accompanied by any of the following circumstances: ... (3) The sexual penetration is
accompanied by fraud." TNN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503 (1991).
Also notable is a story reported recently by the Associated Press:
NASHVILLE, Tenn.-The phone rings late at night. In a sexy whisper, a man
persuades a woman to unlock her door, undress, put on a blindfold and wait for
him in bed.
At least three women did so, thinking he was their boyfriend, and had sex with
the so-called Fantasy Man--one woman twice a week for two months.
Blindfolded Women Seek Rape Charges Against Fantasy Man, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 3, 1995,
Nation/World, at 2. Raymond Mitchell III, the Fantasy Man, was recently sentenced to a prison
term of 15 years for his crime. News: Blindfolded Sex, USA TODAY, June 20, 1996, at 3A.
One English court has extended criminal responsibility for sex fraud to conduct with
prostitutes. In R v. Linekar, 2 W.L.R. 237 (C.A. 1994), the defendant had negotiated a contract
with a prostitute for £25. Id. The latter performed her part of the bargain but the defendant left
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seduction conviction seems to have been recorded in 1967. 58 However,
rape statutes have some continuing effect in this area.59
The heartbalm movement, then, has left us powerless against sex
fraud by our partners.6" How have we managed? Largely by inhaling
the nicotine-inspired wisdom of Bizet's cigarette girls passed down by
generations of mothers: "Words of love, how oft they prove Nought but
smoke. Warmest sighs, fondest ties, All end in-smoke. ' 6' And it is
not only, as some might think, daughters who have been the objects of
their mothers' concern. "My mama done tol' me, when I was in
knee-pants," notes Louis Armstrong, "a woman'll sweet talk, and give
ya the big eye, but when the sweet talkin's done, a woman's a two-face,
a worrisome thing who'll leave you to sing the blues in the night."62
Appalled by what they perceive as the coarsening of the spirit that
our courtship games have come to exhibit, and the continuing, if not
without paying. Id. While the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, overturned a conviction for
rape, a recent commentator noted that had the charge had been brought under England's Sexual
Offences Act of 1956, the Queen would have prevailed since, under the statute, " 'it is an
offence for a person to procure a woman, by false pretences or false representations to have
unlawful sexual intercourse in any part of the world.' "Alan Reed, ContraBonos Mores: Fraud
Affecting Consent in Rape, 145 NEW L.J. 174, 176 (1995) (quoting the Sexual Offenses Act
1956, 4 & 5 Eliz.2 ch. 69, § 3(1) (Eng.)).
No analogous case seems to have been brought in this country for many years. Thankfully
so, according to one commentator, because "the notion that rape, one of the gravest possible
infringements of human integrity, should be expanded to include situations where the woman
attempts to sell her body and fails to receive the bargained-for price simply makes a mockery
of women's long efforts to achieve autonomy, respect, and equality." Vivian Berger, Review
Essay, Not So Simple Rape, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1982, at 76.
58. See Amburgey v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1967) (victim was under the
age of 21).
59. See, e.g., McNair v. State, 825 P.2d 571, 574 (Nev. 1992) (holding that defendant
physician's penile penetration of female patients during physical examinations constituted rape).
60. In all my research I have found no society that allows victims of sex fraud to sue.
61. Georges Bizet (librettists Henri Meilhac & Ludovic Halevy) CARMEN, act I, sc. 4
(1875).
62. Louis ARMSTRONG, BLUES IN THE NIGHT, on Louis ARMSTRONG MEETS OSCAR
PETERSON (Venue Records 1957). The success of this song may attest to its psychological
acuity. Blues in the Night has parallel lyrics which warn daughters of the untrustworthiness of
men. Id.; see also SMOKEY ROBINSON, SHOP AROUND (Motown Records 1960) (recounting a
son's recollection of his mother's advice on relationships with women).
For many, of course, cynicism is learned not through parents or culture, but through the
crucible of experience, as when Madame Bovary cries to her lover, Rodolphe, " 'You're my
king, my idol,' " seeking to reverse the course of his fading interest. GUSTAVE FLAUBERT,
MADAME BOVARY 215 (Francis Steegmuller trans., 1957). " 'You're beautiful! You're wise!
You're strong!' " Id. Rodolphe is stone-hearted. Id. "Since he had heard those same words
uttered by loose women or prostitutes, he had little belief in their sincerity when he heard them
now: the more flowery a person's speech, he thought, the more suspect the feelings, or lack of
feelings, it concealed." Id.
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increasing, pain of the players, a number of writers in the last few years
have complained that the abolition of the heartbalm actions went too
far.63 To protect women by ensuring that sexual activity is preceded by
true consent, reformers have proposed punishing sexual fraud.'
B. A Remedy for an Injury
"There is a slowly growing recognition that the law should play a
role in sexual relations between adults," says Northwestern University
law professor Jane E. Larson. 65 "For many years, we had this attitude
that sex was either a uniformly positive experience, or that it didn't
matter much anyway so was outside the interest of the law. Neither, 66I
think, is true. Sex can hurt. And it does matter to people, a lot.,
Larson argues that "the law should be available to those who are
damaged because of their sexual relations with someone else."'67
Driving her point home, Larson adds that "[i]t's only when a person
feels he or she has no other option that you have something like the
Lorena Bobbitt case. "168
To ensure fair dealings between sexual partners, Professor Larson
wants the sex-motivated lie to be considered not only a sin, 69 but also
a tort.7" She spells out her position in an elaborate article entitled,

63. See ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 102-03 (postulating that sex fraud can be rape). Cardiff
Law School Professor Peter Alldridge regards consent "as vitiated by mistake [if] the mistake
is one without which the consent would not have been given; and ...the person to whom the
consent is given knows this." Peter Alldridge, Sex, Lies and the CriminalLaw, 44 N. IR. LEGAL
Q. 250, 267 (1993). Professor Stephen J.Schulhofer would punish "[m]isrepresentations about
pecuniary advantages" and other statements "intended to create feelings of isolation, physical
jeopardy, or economic insecurity." Stephen J.Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously:
Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 93 (1992). Since criminal liability ordinarily
implies civil liability, it is reasonable to suppose that these authors would support the tort in
question. Martha Chamallas, while apparently not supporting criminalization, welcomes civil
liability for sex fraud. See Chamallas, supra note 56.
64. See supra note 63.
65. Quoted in Reynolds, supra note 56, at 114.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. Lorena Bobbitt, it will be recalled, achieved notoriety when she severed her
husband's penis as he slept.
69. This is a good place to start thinking about the moral obligation to tell the truth in the
sexual setting. Consider a recent letter in Dear Abby. Abigail Van Buren, Dear Abby, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 10, 1995, at 2D. A woman whose husband of 18 years had left her
for a "silicone princess" decided to remedy her perceived faults. Id. Soon thereafter she met and
married a man who admitted that he was first attracted by her bosom. Id. Now ten years
married, she wonders whether she should tell him. Id. Announces Abby: "If he asks, tell him
the truth." Id. Is the moral issue so clear?
70. See Larson, supra note 14, at 379-81.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

fVol. 47

Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit': A

Feminist Rethinking of Seduction.7 The title is borrowed from a line
uttered by Don Giovanni, the notorious lecher and eponymous character
in Mozart's opera.72 For Larson, Don Giovanni-Don Juan in the
Spanish tradition-is the Everyman who uses romantic dialogue for the
purpose of overcoming the natural diffidence of women and who is
utterly without scruple about what he says or promises in order to secure
his objectives.73

To put a damper on these Great Deceivers, Larson proposes adding
the following language to the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "One who
fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or
law, for the purpose of inducing another to consent to sexual relations
in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for serious
physical, pecuniary, and emotional loss caused to the recipient by his or
her justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation."74 Under this
definition of sex fraud, which is adopted here, the misrepresentations
hypothesized at the outset of this Article might well be actionable.75
Building a system which discourages sex fraud is only one benefit-and maybe a minor one at that-held out by Larson who writes,
"My argument in this Article is not simply that sexual fraud would
advance feminist ends, but also that creating and supporting expectations

71. See Larson, supra note 14.
72. See id. at 375 & n.1. Leporello, Don Giovanni's servant, boasts that his master has
seduced no less than 1003 women in Spain alone. WOLFGANG AMADEUS MOZART, DON
GIOVANNI act 1, sc. 2 (Libretto by Lorenzo Da Ponte, Ellen H. Bleiler trans., 1964) [hereinafter
DON GIOVANNI].
73. See Larson, supra note 14, at 376 n.3. Donna Elvira, his most piteous victim in the
opera, claims that Don Giovanni called her "[his] wife." DON GIOVANNI, supra note 72, act 1,
sc. 2.
74. See Larson, supra note 14, at 453. Note that while Larson's article focuses primarily
on seduction games of the unmarried, misrepresentations by spouses also would be covered by
the tort. Note also that the sexual payoff sought need not be immediate for a false statement to
be actionable. See id. at 465 (discussing Perry v. Atkinson, 195 Cal. App. 3d 14 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987)).
75. See Perry, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 14. Perry met Atkinson, a married man, in 1976 and
the two began an affair which lasted for more than a year. Id. at 17. In August 1977, Perry
discovered that she was pregnant. Id. Unhappy with the news, Atkinson persuaded her to have
an abortion. Id. According to Perry, he did so by assuring her that he wanted a child with her,
though not at that point, and by promising that he would conceive a child with her the following
year, either directly, or if the relationship did not last that long, through artificial insemination.
Id. (To fit the case comfortably within the definition of sexual fraud, we need to assume that
Atkinson's motivation was to keep the sexual relationship going, a goal he thought would be
jeopardized by pregnancy and childbirth.) Larson argues that if the court had adopted her sex
fraud theory it would not have granted summary judgment to Atkinson, but would have let the
case go to the jury. See Larson, supra note 14, at 465.
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of fairness and honesty between sexual partners would increase the
quality (and perhaps even the quantity) of sexual interaction."76
Larson's legal argument can be stated simply: Recognizing that lying
can be harmful in business settings, the law has long provided victims
with a cause of action.77 Through the establishment of the (relatively)
new tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm, society now
recognizes that psychic injury is both real and serious.78 Since it is
clear that, say, a false representation about marital status, can be even
more harmful than, say, the promise of a green car by a seller who
actually intends to, and does, deliver a red one, a fortiori sexual fraud
should also be actionable.79 That sex fraud is usually not actionable is
the puzzle of what Larson calls the "sex exception to fraud."80
For Larson the tort emerges organically from "A Feminist Rethinking
of Seduction" (the subtitle of her article); her sources are largely
feminist and her illustrations exclusively depict innocent female victims
and male predators.8 ' "As 'emotional workers,' " she emphasizes,
"traditionally held responsible for nurturing the personal qualities
conducive to emotional intimacy and relational trust, women are more
likely to be exposed to (and hence suffer) emotional injury than

76. See Larson, supra note 14, at 438.
77. Id. at 412.
78. See, e.g., id. at 406-10. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been
widely adopted in the United States. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Buell, 480 U.S.
557, 568 (1987).
79. "[W]e [should] prohibit fraud to secure sex," writes Susan Estrich, "to the same extent
we prohibit fraud to secure money .... " See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1120
(1986). However, the sex-as-contract argument turns at least one feminist argument on its head.
Consider, for example, the issue of the enforceability of an agreement between a man and a
woman under which the latter will carry a fetus to term or, alternatively, under which the man
will be released from obligations to support resulting offspring. Peter D. Feaver and others have
argued in favor of giving effect to such agreements. See Peter D. Feaver et al., Sex as Contract:
Abortion and Expanded Choice, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Winter 1992-93, at 213. Martha
Fineman denounces this view, arguing generally that it has led to the oppression of women and,
in particular, that it would lead to a transfer back to men of the reproductive decisionmaking
power hard-won by women. See Martha A. Fineman, A Legal (and Otherwise) Realist Response
to 'Sex as Contract,' 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128 (1994). For more on Fineman's view, see
infra note 488 and accompanying text.
80. Larson, supra note 14, at 412. Larson's logic would surely have been lost on the great
French novelist, Stendhal. Writing about Americans 175 years ago, he noted, "I can see no trace
of the passions which make for deeper joy.... It is as if the sources of sensibility have dried
up among these people. They are just, they are rational, and they are not happy at all." Quoted
in Kay S. Hymowitz, The L Word: Love as Taboo, CITY JOURNAL, Spring 1995, at 30. The cost
of eliminating sex-based pain in relationships is explored further below. See infra notes 124-26
and accompanying text.
81. See Larson, supra note 14, at 381-412.
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men."82 Accordingly, it does not seem unfair to conclude that Larson
makes her tort gender neutral only to help sell it to males. 3
The economic/commercial model (the sale of the car) is an interesting one, and we shall come back to it. However, it exposes a serious
weakness in Larson's case, since no matter how much legal systems
circumscribe commercial fraud, they recognize that commerce requires
selling-the conscious shaping of self-serving messages. For Larson, by
contrast, the function of communication is only to serve the listener's
interests.84 Under Larson's model, any benefit to the speaker is thus
highly suspect.8 This being the case, Larson cannot and does not
address such arguments as: we crave to tell and hear lies; the lie can be
a force for good, as well as evil; indeed, it is a sine qua non to
understanding social life at all times and in all societies; women
manipulate men through lies to offset the latter's economic and social
powers; 6 one person's lie is another's truth; and, perhaps most telling,
as a result of the foregoing factors, a sex fraud regime is both unworkable and largely unwelcome.87 These are some of the themes that will
be explored herein.
Setting the tone for her argument and putting aside questions of what
exactly was said to whom and what it meant, Larson surveys
nineteenth-century European and American literature describing

82. Id. at 448-49 (emphasis in original). Larson continues: "Conversely, men, who...
own and manage property, are more likely to incur ... economic injury. Shaped by this
gendered division . . . , formal legal rules and informal biases disfavoring emotional injury
recovery tend to marginalize women and their injuries." Id. at 444.
While these views will have an allure to some, a certain cynicism quickly sets in, for one
has to wonder about the degree to which Larson believes them herself. That is, if these views
were offered in testimony before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on the subject
of employment discrimination, would she let them go unanswered? Or would she not likely
argue, like most of the rest of us, that having the same interests, talents, and goals as men,
women are interchangeable with men in the marketplace? For a discussion of the relative
vulnerability of the sexes to sex-based emotional harm, see infra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
83. Susan Estrich holds that men are victimized by fraud as well as women. See ESTRICH,
supra note 7, at 81.
84. See Larson, supra note 14, at 456. "The meaning to be given to particular words or
conduct is determined by their effect on an ordinary person." Id.
85. See id.
86. This claim actually is being promoted by women. See RICH, supra note 6, at 186.
87. The analysis of language, from analytic philosophy through structualism and
deconstruction, can perhaps be considered the main preoccupation of twentieth-century
philosophy. In particular, J.L. Austin's Speech Act Theory has had substantial influence in
broadening our conception of the function of language. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do
THINGS WITH WORDS 148-64 (J.0. Urinson & Marina Sbisa eds., 2d ed. 1975). Obviously only
a comer of this realm can be discussed here.
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conditions for women, that from our perspective, are appalling. From
Tess of the d'Urbervilles to The Scarlet Letter, from George Eliot to
Leo Tolstoy, she writes, "[s]eduction leads to public exposure of the
liaison (often because of a pregnancy), and quickly thereafter to the
lover's abandonment of the woman he has seduced. This betrayal,"
Larson continues, "seals her fate. The seduced woman is exiled from
respectable society," she concludes, "left alone to face the often
devastating consequences of sexual relations."8 For Larson, this state
of affairs
was and is only part of a pattern of relentless male patriar89
chy.
Few, if any, would want to recreate these conditions today. But if
there is a feminist case to be made for regulating seduction, Larson does
not do it justice. Of course the story of Don Giovanni's seduction spree
reflects-and stimulates-men's fantasies (and, we can imagine,
produces a kind of smugness in the women who know how to resist his
blandishments). But also it is true that in the end Don Giovanni is, to
his own disgrace and to the other characters' satisfaction, if not delight,
dragged down to hell in a sulfurous abduction.' Don Giovanni, then,
is more fiend than personal hero. 91 As for nineteenth-century social
conditions, is it not also true that women's economic situation has vastly
improved, that virginity is no longer a valued attribute, that birth control
and abortion are widely available and thus women are in a stronger
position than ever to protect themselves in the case of sexual relationships gone bad? Finally, are we so sure that the story of the nineteenth
century centers on women's powerlessness? The story of women's
influence on social life, notwithstanding their exclusion from the
smoke-filled rooms, has only begun to be told.92

88. Larson, supra note 14, at 377.
89. See id.
90. DON GIOVANNI, supra note 72, act 2, sc. 2.
91. The fate of the Don Juan character is no better in the contemporary setting, such as
in the 1971 morality movie, CarnalKnowledge, where the Don Juan character (played by Jack
Nicholson) receives a punishment exquisitely fitting his crimes. CARNAL KNOWLEDGE (Embassy
Pictures & Icarus Productions, 1971). For other screen portrayals of the emptiness of the Don

Juan lifestyle, see SATURDAY

NIGHT FEVER

(Paramount Pictures, 1977),

DANGEROUS LIAISONS

(Warner Bros. Inc., 1988), and ALFIE (Paramount Pictures, 1966).
In a short but insightful (and as yet unpublished) paper, Professor Paul Heald argues that
in the nineteenth century Byron and others transformed the Don Juan character into a superhero
who seeks not sex but general transcendence. See Paul Heald, Don Juan, Feminism and the Tort
of Seduction (unpublished, on file with author). But how useful is this for our purpose? The only
Don Juan we know is Mozart's.
92. For evidence of women's social and political power before the modera era, see NANCY
ARMSTRONG, DESIRE AND DOMESTIC FICTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE NOVEL (1987) and
ANN DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1977). For a stunning account of
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C. An UnreconstructedMale Speaks

If Larson's account of women's history did not color her entire
argument, we could simply continue with her sex fraud proposal here.

Accepting Larson's premises even tentatively, however, would temper
any inclination we might have to demur. Accordingly, the other side of
women's history must now be told before we return to the presentation
and evaluation of Larson's work.
For better and for worse no one has told that story as crisply and
starkly as Jean Baudrillard, contemporary French philosopher, social
theorist, and surely the best-known writer on the psychology of
seduction.93 Reconstructing the historical record construed by Larson
and so many others, he would consider Larson's position at best
naive.94 Baudrillard, whom Larson seems to completely ignore, writes:
The "traditional" woman's sexuality was neither repressed
nor forbidden. Within her role she was entirely herself; she
was in no way defeated, nor passive, nor did she dream of
her future "liberation." It is the beautiful souls who,
retrospectively, see women as alienated from time immemo-

rial, and then liberated....
It is easy to paint a picture of woman alienated through
the ages ....
It is all so simple, so obscene in its simplici-

ty-worse, it implies the very essence of sexism and
racism: commiseration.
Fortunately, the female has never fit this image. She has
always had her own strategy ....
There is no need to

lament the wrongs she suffered, nor to want to rectify them.
No need to play the lover of justice for the weaker sex....
women's power at work, see RUTH HARRIS, MURDER AND MADNESS: MEDICINE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY INTHE FIN DE SIECLE 208-42 (1989), in which she catalogs and analyzes the wholesale
acquittals of women in turn-of-the-century France crime-of-passion cases. It is hard to imagine
an "all-powerful" judicial establishment composed of Don Juans declaring open season on itself.
We could ask another question here. If nineteenth-century men played a major role in
imposing nineteenth-century conditions, something we surely can all agree on, is it not possible
that women were complicit in the oppression of their own kind? It does not seem farfetched to
hypothesize that, despairing over their husbands' tendency to stray, married women (who surely
had the most power within the female population) sought to limit illicit relationships by placing
a heavy burden on the other woman. We do not have to assume a giant conspiracy of the
majority of women against the minority to underscore this point. If a great divide exists among
women today-if each of two large groups of women today believes that the other is
undermining the very foundations of women's well-being--can we not imagine an equally
divided female population one hundred years ago?
93. See, e.g., JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SEDUCTION (Arthur Kroker & Marilouise Kroker eds.,
Brian Singer trans., 1990) (describing the history and mythology of seduction).
94. Compare id. at 19 with Larson, supra note 14, at 378-79.
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At each moment of the story the game was played with a
full deck, with all the cards, including the trumps. And men
did not win, not at all.95
Baudrillard indeed wonders whether there has ever been a true phallic
power:
This entire history of patriarchal domination, of phallocracy,
the immemorial male privilege, is perhaps only a story....
The opposite hypothesis is just as plausible and, from a
certain perspective, more interesting-that is, that the
feminine sex has never been dominated, but has always
been dominant....
In this sense, the masculine has always been but a
residual, secondary and fragile formation, one that must be
defended by retrenchments, institutions, and artifices.96
What precisely, according to Baudrillard, is it that has functioned as
the counterweight to the routine, humdrum exercise of male power? The
strength of the feminine is the "artificial bluffing," the "systematic
simulation" of seduction.97 "The sovereignty of seduction," Baudrillard
concludes, "is incommensurable with [dwarfs] the possession of political
or sexual power."98
Baudrillard's account falls far short of being fully persuasive. Still,
for all his excesses,99 in his analysis of seduction, Baudrillard poses a
challenge to the all-and-nothing feminist enterprise largely assumed by
Larson, and it is through his writing that the one-dimensional nature of
her article comes clearly into perspective. But as will be seen throughout
this Article, there are many theoretical and practical conundrums,
contradictions, and stumbling blocks in the area of sex fraud. Most of
the remainder of this Article will be devoted to examining them.
D. Setting the Record Straight
In assessing prospects for her proposed tort, Larson finds encouragement in the legal precedents. She begins by citing cases from the 1960s

95. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 93, at 19.
96. Id. at 15-16. For more on this point, see infra note 338 and accompanying text.
97. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 93, at 7,91. While Baudrillard does not define" 'systematic simulation' "it seems fair to suppose that he is equating seduction and misrepresentation.
98. Id.at 8.
99. These excesses have been noted by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Andrew
Ross, Baudrillard's Bad Attitude, in SEDUCrION AND THEORY: READINGS OF GENDER,
REPRESENTATION AND THEORY 214-15 (1989).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

and 1970s for the proposition that, notwithstanding the heartbalm
movement, the seduction action continued to be viable." ° Her citations, however, do not support her conclusion.'' Larson next looks
over cases from the 1980s and early 1990s and finds an "emerging
theory of sexual fraud."'" But here as well, to the extent that Larson
is suggesting that the law currently provides redress for the misrepresentations hypothesized at the outset of this Article, she sacrifices good
judgment to hope.
As Larson shows, plaintiffs have sustained viable cases, sounding in
fraud where defendants knowingly suffered from a sexually transmitted
disease and, without disclosure of its nature, passed the disease to
plaintiffs. 3 In one case she cites, a woman successfully sued to
recover medical expenses for an ectopic pregnancy where the defendant
had falsely claimed sterility."° Larson also usefully points out a
100. Larson, supra note 14, at 401 n.117.
101. See id. Skousen v. Nidy, 367 P.2d 248, 250 (Ariz. 1962), was held not to be a
seduction case at all. Robinson v. Moore, 408 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), allowed
a minor to sue for seduction while making it clear the action was not available to adult plaintiffs
absent a promise to marry. In Hutchins v. Day, 153 S.E. 132 (N.C. 1967), the court rejected a
claim of seduction because no artifice was employed prior to the first sexual act. That the court
did not dismiss the claim for failure to state a cause of action, which for Larson is of great
import, may have been entirely without significance. The same can be said of McCraney v.
Flanagan, 267 S.E.2d 404, 405 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980), which also denied recovery for lack of
proof of artifice. To be sure, the courts in Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 18 (Wis. 1974),
Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696, 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) and Piggott, 557 S.W.2d at 695 held
that the cause of action for seduction existed. But such judgments in only two jurisdictions
hardly make that action viable.
102. See Larson, supra note 14, at 402. Writing five years earlier, Chamallas, supra note
56, at 810-13, also discerned a trend.
103. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1984) (upholding minor plaintiffs cause of action for fraud against minor defendant, who
misrepresented his herpes-infected status prior to intercourse); Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d
265 (Ohio 1989) (citing many veneral disease misrepresentation cases and providing historical
perspective); see also Larson, supra note 14, at 405 n.136 (citing numerous cases involving
claims for misrepresentation of herpes and HIV status). In the case of AIDS, plaintiffs may even
be able to prevail based on fear of infection. See, e.g., Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588
N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1991); Harris J. Zakarin, Comment, Scared to Death: A
Cause of Action for AIDS Phobia, 10 TOURO L. REV. 263 (1993) (citing Castro) (discussing
how a plaintiff's claim for emotional distress was upheld where the plaintiff is pricked by HIVinfected hypodermic needle improperly disposed of by defendant). But see Kaufman v. Physical
Measurements, Inc., 615 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509 (1994) (holding that "[i]n the absence of proof of
a likelihood of contracting AIDS, recovery for emotional distress will be denied as overly
speculative and remote").
104. Larson, supra note 14, at 406 n.137 (citing Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422,
425 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1983) (upholding pregnant plaintiff's fraud action against defendant
who misrepresented to plaintiff that he was sterile)); see also Alice D. v. William M., 450
N.Y.S.2d 350 (Small Claims Ct. 1982) (allowing recovery of a minimum sum to a victim of
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number of recent fraud cases involving abuse of a professional relationship-legal, psychiatric, pastoral, educational-where plaintiffs have
recovered. 5
The physical injury and abuse of professional relationship cases
aside, however, defendants in sex fraud cases have overwhelmingly
prevailed. 6 Indeed, the only recent case Larson adduces in support of

sexual fraud who underwent an abortion).
105. See Larson, supra note 14, at 154-64; Richard H. v. Larry D., 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, 810
(Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1988). But see Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988)
(holding that minister engaged in marital counseling who began affair with parishioner was "not
liable for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresentation or nondisclosure"); Weisbeck v.
Hess, 524 N.W.2d 363,366-68 (1994) (dismissing plaintiffs professional negligence suit against
defendant marriage counselor for affair with plaintiff's wife during the course of therapy on
grounds that wife's communications with defendant were privileged).
106. A frequent fact pattern in sex fraud cases is where one sexual partner falsely claims
to be infertile or to be using birth control. If a child is subsequently born, does the defrauded
party have a cause of action? I have found no cases holding for plaintiffs in these circumstances.
See, e.g., C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 563 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that
public policy precludes tort actions involving alleged misrepresentations about contraception);
L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 716 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that the defendant father's
constitutional right to decide whether or not to father a child does not entitle defendant to avoid
child support even if the mother misrepresented that she was using contraception); Douglas R.
v. Suzanne M., 487 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that
defendant's failure to inform plaintiff that she removed IUD constituted misrepresentation which
would vitiate her child support claim); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223, 225 (Wash. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that "the [child support] statute... does not contemplate whether one of the
parents may or may not have breached a contract to use contraceptive measures ... [but] only
those facts relating to the needs of the child"). To be sure, the stated basis for denying liability
in some of these cases is troubling: the protection of the privacy of sexual partners. See, e.g.,
DouglasR., 487 N.Y.S.2d at 245 (stating that "[c]ourts which have considered the question [of
sexual misrepresentation] have found it to be intertwined with an individual's right to privacy
and have declined to interject the state into an area as personal as the practice of birth control").
Why the law ought to protect privacy when one party is willing to waive it is never explained.
In some of these cases courts confuse a privacy notion in tort with constitutional privacy. See,
e.g., L PamelaP., 449 N.E.2d at 715-16 (holding that absent state action, father's constitutionally protected right not to beget a child falls short of a cognizable defense to a child support
claim). Other opinions have offered a more persuasive rationale for denying recovery to a
defrauded parent. In Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 429 (Ct. App. 1983), for
example, the court explained that "it is not sound social policy to allow one parent to sue the
other over the wrongful birth of their child. Using the child as the damage element.., could
seldom, if ever, result in benefit to a child." Presumably the court was concerned that a lawsuit
would create or aggravate adversarial relationships between the parties which would carry over
to relationships with their children.
Characterizing an action as intentional infliction of emotional harm does not seem to help
plaintiffs. See Sanders v. Rosen, 605 N.Y.S.2d 805, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that "[t]he
public policy of this State now looks with disfavor on actions for seduction ... ."); Snider v.
Keenan, No. 92-J-39, 1994 WL 45308, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (holding that there is no
recognized cause of action for breach of promise to marry); Jose F. v. Pat M., 586 N.Y.S.2d
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734, 736 (Sup. Ct. 1992) ("It is inappropriate for the court to intrude into an intimate
relationship in an attempt to substantiate what is tantamount to an action for seduction."); see
also Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1242 (finding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is not
a proper cause of action when asserted within a marital context).
Singh v. Singh, 611 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), a case alleging fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, responds most directly to Larson's complaint about the "sex
exception to fraud." See Larson, supra note 14, at 412. Dr. Kuldeeph Singh advertised the
availablity for marriage of his sister-in-law, Satinder. Singh, 611 N.E.2d at 348. Harbhajan Singh
(no relation then) responded and subsequently married Satinder. Id. The marriage failed. Id.
Harbhajan sued Dr. Kuldeeph for failing to disclose that he had "performed surgery on
[Satinder] for 'an incurable disease which adversely impairs her ability to have normal sexual
relations.' " Id. (quoting plaintiff). In upholding dismissal of the complaint, the court held that
"as a [matter of] public policy ... this state cannot recognize a cause of action which treats
female persons as goods and subjects others to suits if the women themselves are found
unacceptable." Id. at 350. It would be easy to distinguish this case from one where, say, Satinder
had advertised herself as available for marriage, however, the Singh court's market metaphor
could be read to mean that in this court, at least, the result would have been the same.
One could imagine that the combination of economic and emotional harm might combine
into a potent plaintiff's brew when he claims that his wife misrepresented his paternity of
children and there was no basis for suspecting otherwise at the time. There are many cases of
this nature where plaintiffs seek to free themselves from support obligations. See, e.g., Pinter v.
Pinter, 641 N.E.2d 101, 105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that father was released from future
obligations but not arrearages). But see Campbell v. Campbell, 540 N.Y.S.2d 556, 557 (App.
Div. 1989) (quoting Matter of Ettore I. v. Antela D., 513 N.Y.S.2d 733, 738 (Sup. Ct. 1987)
(ruling against plaintiff because "his" children, ages 16 and 10, grew up believing the plaintiff
was their natural father and stating, " '[T]he unequivocal trend and evident purpose of these
decisions has been to zealously safeguard the welfare, stablity and best interests of the child by
rejecting untimely challenges affecting his or her legitimacy.' "). In Nagy v. Nagy, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 787 (Ct. App. 1989), a plaintiff sued his ex-wife for damages alleging that she had
misrepresented his paternity of her child: "In our opinion, allowing a non-biological parent to
recover damages for developing a close relationship with a child misrepresented to be his and
performing parental acts is not a damage which should be compensable under the law. Id. at
791. But in a sex fraud world, Mr. Nagy would presumably prevail, and maybe even recover for
prior support as well as for emotional harm. See Reynolds, supra note 56, at 114. To the best
of my knowledge, however, no plaintiff has yet succeeded in such a case.
Where defendant goes through a bigamous marriage, courts occasionally have provided
relief. See Friedman v. Libin, 157 N.Y.S.2d 474,485 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (quoting Snyder v. Snyder,
14 N.Y. Supp. 2d 815 (1939): "[Ain action to recover damages because of a consummated
bigamous marriage is not one which is subject to abuse or manipulation by unscrupulous
persons. It is neither within the letter or the intendment [sic] of the [heartbalm] law"), aff'd, 161
N.Y.S.2d 826 (1957). Friedman also held that the right to sue is not waived by continued
cohabitation after the prior marriage is revealed, although such action may mitigate damages.
Id. at 483. But see Buckley v. Buckley, 184 Cal. Rptr. 290, 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that the plaintiff husband's breach of promise claim against defendant wife, who was already
legally married at the time of plaintiff and defendant's wedding, was barred by California's
"heart balm" statute, notwithstanding the fact that the marriage constituted bigamy).
Plaintiffs' lack of success in seduction cases is largely matched by their experience in breach
of promise cases. See Zaragoza v. Capriola, 492 A.2d 698 (N.J. 1985) (holding that to recognize
plaintiffs action for breach of promise to marry as a basis for exacting child support payments

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss3/1

24

Subotnik: "Sue Me, Sue Me, What Can You Do Me? I Love You": A Disquisition
LAW, SEX AND TALK

her proposed new tort is Parker v. Bruner,"°7 a case which produced
a vigorous dissent at both the appellate and Supreme Court level. Here
the court upheld a verdict for the plaintiff where the defendant, a
prosperous, 34-year-old dentist, coaxed a 23-year-old naff into a lengthy
sexual relationship that resulted in two unwanted pregnancies and one
abortion. 8 The court pointed out that there was evidence that the
defendant had misrepresented his affection for her and had promised
marriage, which obligation he had no intention of keeping." 9 That this
case cannot fairly be understood as the basis for an "emerging theory of
sexual fraud" is obvious when we recall that it arose in Missouri, the
10
only state which had regularly held for plaintiffs in sex fraud cases.
If there is only one plaintiff victory in a pure seduction case"'
since 1980, what shall we make of it? It could be argued that the
absence of reported cases suggests that defendants are settling. But in

from a defendant not related to plaintiffs children would "make a mockery of the institution of
marriage and personal relationships"); Snider, 1994 WL 45308, at *1 (holding that there is no
cause of action in Ohio for breach of promise to marry); Vrabel v. Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d 1298
(Ohio 1983) (holding that the plaintiffs claim for breach of promise to marry is statutorily
barred). But see Bradley v. Somers, 322 S.E.2d 665, 666 (S.C. 1984) (holding defendant liable
for waiting until the moment of signing of the marriage license to inform his intended that he
would not go through with the wedding). See also Wildey, 840 F. Supp. at 1266, rev'd, 47 F.3d
at 1486 (overturning plaintiffs favorable trial court ruling on her breach of marriage promise
claim due to lack of specificity of the complaint).
Larson has welcomed the trial court's decision in this latter case, which came down after
her article was published. While suggesting that she does not want individuals to be forced to
marry where promises have been made, she goes on to say, "But if you make promises to
someone, gain your objective, especially if it's sexual, and then don't follow through on those
promises, that should be actionable. I hope and expect," Larson adds, "that the Wildey verdict
will serve to inspire many other people, men and women, to consider a similar course of action."
Id. Larson's expectations appear ill-founded, however, in light of the reversal of the Wildey
verdict on appeal. Wildey, 47 F.3d at 1486.
Recovery for financial harm still may be within reach. In the context of breach of promise
cases, see Wilson v. Dabo, 461 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (holding that plaintiff may
recover property transferred in reliance upon promise of marriage because of equitable principle
of unjust enrichment) and In re Marriage of Heinzman, 596 P.2d 61, 62 (Colo. 1979) (holding
that a man may recover real property conveyed to common-law wife when such conveyance was
in reliance upon her failed promise to wed in actual ceremony). But see Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d at
1299, 1303 (holding that ex-husband's breach of promise to remarry plaintiff was not actionable
under the state heart balm statute even though the defendant ex-husband induced plaintiff to give
up her job and move back to Cleveland where he resided).
107. 686 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), af'd, 683 S.W.2d 265 (en banc), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 827 (1985).
108. Parker, 686 S.W.2d at 485.
109. Id. at 485-86.
110. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
I11. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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this tell-it-all era of ours, is it likely that the prospect of a public record
would shame a shameless generation of defendants into capitulation? Or
is it not more likely that plaintiffs, having read the older cases in the
light of contemporary social conditions, have simply given up?
The sexual fraud issue comes up in two other settings: alimony/equitable distribution and annulment. In the former, one spouse is
asking for damages from the other on account of some egregious
behavior by the other spouse. Here again, however, the courts have put
up strong resistance."' Plaintiffs have fared better where they have
112. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that marital misconduct that does not
reduce the value of marital assets is not grounds for departing from general equitable distibution
rules (although the court suggested that for alimony purposes such fault might be taken into
account). Smith v. Smith, 331 S.E.2d 682, 687 (N.C. 1985). In New York, the Domestic
Relation Law requires that consideration for both alimony and equitable distribution purposes
be given to "any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper." N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(13) & 236(B)(6)(a)( 1) (McKinney 1986). Blickstein v.
Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113-14 (Sup. Ct. 1984) gives meaning to this commonly used
language.
[W]e conclude that, as a general rule, the marital fault of a party is not a relevant
consideration under the equitable distribution law in distributing marital property
upon the dissolution of a marriage. This is not to deny, however, that there will be
cases in which marital fault, by virtue of its extraordinary nature, becomes relevant
and should be considered. But such occasions, we would stress, will be very rare
and will require proof of marital fault substantially greater than that required to
establish a bare prima facie case for matrimonial relief. They will involve situations
where the marital misconduct is so egregious or uncivilized as to bespeak of a
blatant disregard of the marital relationship-misconduct that shocks the conscience
of the court thereby compelling it to invoke its equitable power to do justice
between the parties.
id. at 113-14.
New York courts have found such extraordinary circumstances where a defendant raped his
minor stepdaughter, Vazquez v. Vazquez, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 1987, at 16 (reciting an
unpublished opinion), and where defendant attempted to engage a person to murder his wife and
dispose of the body, Brancovenu v. Brancovenu, 535 N.Y.S.2d 86, 90 (Sup. Ct. 1988). Adultery
is not such a circumstance. See LeStrange v. LeStrange, 539 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (1989) (finding
that wife's adultery was not conduct so agregious or uncivilized as to warrant deprivation of her
share of the marital property); Nolan v. Nolan, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1985) (holding that
wife's adultery was insufficiently egregious to justify divestiture of her marital property interest);
Pacifico v. Pacifico, 475 N.Y.S.2d 952, 955 (1984) (holding that defendant husband's alleged
illicit relationship had no bearing on the issue of property distribution). But see Givens v.
Givens, 599 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming a Missouri trial court's determination
that wife should get marital residence because of adultery of husband which, the court
concluded, had led to marital breakdown).
Two cases highlight the current state of the law in this area. In McCann v. McCann, 593
N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1993) in the context of an in limine motion, plaintiff alleged that
defendant had misled her into thinking he would undertake medical procedures to make him
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limited their objectives to seeking an annulment. ' Thus, an annulment
was granted to a sick and old man because defendant represented herself
as a virtuous woman whereas, in fact, she had run a house of prostitution for years" 4 and to another man where his wife represented that
she was a widow when, in fact, she was a divorcee." 5 In more modem
times, annulments have been granted where a defendant could not
engage in normal sex" 6 and where a defendant misrepresented a desire
to have children." 7 The test in-annulment cases is whether the fraud
goes "to the very essence of the marital relation."". Notwithstanding
fertile after she had expressly made that a condition of her marriage to him. Id. at 919. The court
held that the Blickstein standard, under which the issue of marital fault is irrelevant in
determining marital property distribution, had not been satisfied. Id. at 923. In Askew v. Askew,
28 Cal. Rptr. 284, 299 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1994), a trial court award for plaintiff on the ground
of misrepresentation of affection was reversed on appeal.
In a distinguishable fact pattern, a Michigan plaintiff met with somewhat more success.
Gubin v. Hodisev, 494 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). Here, where a nonresident alien went
through a marriage ceremony with plaintiff, but showed he was interested only in entering the
country, the court held that the fault clause in the Michigan equitable distribution statute could
be used to allow plaintiff to recover for her time and out-of-pocket medical expenses. Id. at 78586. In another case which might also be considered a sham marriage, the wife was entitled to
recover under the fault clause of an alimony statute where three weeks into the marriage, the
husband, who had had another relationship prior to the marriage, announced that he had made
a mistake despite the fact that the wife had given up alimony from a former husband and had
left her home and job for him. Bridgeman v. Bridgeman, 391 S.E.2d 367, 370 (W.Va. 1990).
113. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text. With the proliferation of no-fault
divorce statutes, fewer marriages are undone through annulment in our times. Nevertheless,
because an annulment may produce financial consequences that are different from those brought
on by divorce, annulment cases are still numerous.
114. Etsminger v. Etsminger, 161 P. 607, 609 (Kan. 1916). For an out-of-date, but full
annotation on this subject, see H.D. Warren, Annotation, Concealed Premarital Unchastity or
Parenthoodas Ground of Divorce or Annulment, 64 A.L.R. 742 (1959).
115. Minner v. Minner, 144 N.E. 781, 783 (N.Y. 1924).
116. See, e.g., Kshaiboon v. Kshaiboon, 652 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming
wife's annulment of marriage on grounds that prior to marriage, husband concealed his physical
and mental incapacity to engage in normal sexual relations).
117. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Wolfe, 389 N.E.2d 1143, 1145 (Ill. 1979) (granting an annulment
based on fraudulent misrepresentation prior to marriage that former husband was still alive when
disclosure of this information would have precluded marriage on religious grounds); Jordan v.
Jordan, 35 A.2d 168, 169 (N.H. 1975) (holding annulment was proper based on nondisclosure
of prior marriage to one for whom such revelation would have precluded marriage and where
health would have been endangered by continuation of the marriage); V.J.S. v. M.J.B., 592 A.2d
328 (N.J. Super. CL Ch. Div. 1991) (holding that husband's concealment of intent to have
children was fraud warranting annulment where husband expressed contrary intent in pre-nuptial
agreement); Kober v. Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 364, 369 (1965) (holding that concealment of prior
membership in the Nazi party was grounds for annulment); Potter v. Potter, 275 N.Y.S.2d 499,
500 (App. Div. 1966) (affirming annulment based on concealment of affliction of voyeurism).
118. In re Marriage of Johnston, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis
in original). As can be imagined, this standard cannot be defined except by illustration.
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the above holdings, it seems fair to conclude that most plaintiffs have
failed the test."9
F. Different Voices
Since it should now be clear that the law does not ordinarily
compensate victims of sexual fraud, we can return to the question of
whether it should. While no academic response to Larson yet has been
attempted, a number of commentators have raised relevant and serious
questions. Speaking of misrepresentation as a basis for a criminal
prosecution, for example, Vivian Berger questions the desirability of a
rape charge where a man represents that he is rich and famous when he
is not. 2 Also speaking of a possible criminal statute for sexual fraud,
Donald Dripps writes that "the theft-of-services statutes only punish
representations made in bad faith when the representation is a necessary

119. "The concealment of 'incontinence, temper, idleness, extravagance, coldness, or
fortune inadequate to representations' " cannot be the basis for an annulment." Marshall v.
Marshall, 300 P. 816, 818 (Cal. 1931) (quoting 16 CALIF. JUR. 967). For example, a shoe
salesman's false representation that he owned his shoe store is not sufficient grounds for
annulment. Mayer v. Mayer, 279 P. 783, 787 (Cal. 1929). Similarly, a court has held that, even
if it were to believe plaintiff wife that she did not know of husband's drunkenness, laziness, and
slovenliness prior to marriage, an annulment could not be granted. Johnston, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 355. In the same vein, neither premarital false declarations of love and affection nor the fact
that one party married for money is sufficient for an annulment. See Woronzoff-Daschkoff v.
Woronzoff-Daschkoff, 104 N.E.2d 877, 880 (N.Y. 1952) (citing Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 144
N.Y.S. 744 (N.Y. 1913) and Feig v. Feig, 249 N.Y.S. 695, 700 (N.Y. 1931)). Likewise,
misrepresentations regarding age were held not to be actionable. Pankiw v. Pankiw, 256
N.Y.S.2d 448, 450 (N.Y. App. 1965).
In the recent case of Woy v. Woy, 737 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), the wife had not
informed her future husband prior to marriage that she used drugs and had engaged in
homosexual activities. Id. at 771. In an action for annulment by the husband, the court held that
in view of the fact that for the ten-year period of cohabitation-including five years before
marriage-their sexual relations were "fine" and that wife was not addicted to drugs, there was
no affirmative duty to disclose. Id. at 773-74. Denying the husband's petition, the court noted
that had the subject of the nondisclosure been more serious, for example a venereal disease, a
different decision might have resulted. Id. at 774. The court also noted that under the
circumstances of this case, the decree of annulment would have left the wife with nothing. Id.
In another recent case, plaintiff sought an annulment of his marriage to defendant when he
found out that the latter's mother was having an illicit intercaste relationship. Patel v. Navital,
627 A.2d 683, 686 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992). Plaintiff argued that because he was a
practicing Hindu, the actions of his mother-in-law brought shame upon him. Id. at 685-86.
Rejecting plaintiff's petition, the court held that while "[p]ublic policy encourages full disclosure
of pertinent facts especially in contemplation of entering a bond as significant as marriage ...
[it] imposes a duty to investigate in matters affecting character," which obligation was not
satisfied by plaintiff in this case. Id. at 688.
120. See Berger, supra note 57, at 76-77. This issue will be taken up. at some length in Part

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss3/1

28

Subotnik: "Sue Me, Sue Me, What Can You Do Me? I Love You": A Disquisition
LAW. SEX AND TALK

and sufficient condition for obtaining the service."'' Holding that it
is difficult to know the effect of specific misrepresentations in the
context of sexual fraud, Dripps is dubious about imposing criminal
sanctions."
Focusing on sexual harassment in the workplace, George Mason
University law professor Lloyd Cohen points to difficulties in sexual/romantic communication, which he ascribes to differences in speaking
styles based on gender, class, ethnicity and the like." The law, he
121. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence
of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1803 (1992) (emphasis
omitted).
122. See id. This argument would, of course, carry over into the civil field. Dripps also
points out that criminalizing sex fraud would recriminalize adultery. Id. Since it seems
reasonable to suppose that most adultery is committed in secret, Dripps is surely right here. The
sexual fraud would inhere in the future sexual benefits sought from the victim of the lie. See
Larson, supra note 14, at 466-67.
Richard Posner has attempted an explanation of why victims of sex fraud have not received
thd protection accorded to rape victims:
The thinking may be that if [a] woman is not averse to having sex with a particular
man, the wrong if any is in the lies (and we usually do not think of lying in social
[as opposed to economic] settings as a crime) rather than in an invasion of her
bodily integrity. It is otherwise if the man is impersonating the woman's
husband ... [in which case] the act itself, were the true facts known to the woman,
would be disgusting as well as humiliating, rather than merely humiliating as in the
case of the common misrepresentations of dating and courtship.
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 392-93 (1992).
The first distinction Posner draws-between economic and social lies-is not helpful. For
example, if a man lies to get money, claiming that you have already won $10 million, and now
need to reserve payment with a $5000 deposit, he surely has committed larceny, if not criminal
fraud, when he keeps the $5000 without turning over the advertised winnings. See 32 AM. JUR.
2D. False Pretenses § 78 (1995). While not actionable by itself, the lie is essential in
establishing the case. Id. To say that this conclusion does not extend to sex fraud because the
lie is social rather than commercial in character is merely to state a money-isn't-sex conclusion.
See Larson, supra note 14, at 412 n.168. The disgusting versus humiliating distinction is more
useful in explaining current law, but it too, however, has limitations. See id. at 420-21. A
woman who links up with a man who misrepresents his past is likely to be sickened by the
revelation that her partner is a convicted pederast. See id. On the other hand, a woman who has
willingly had sex with a particular male can reasonably be thought to have consented in some
sense to the action. See id. It is perhaps for this reason that Posner argues that the adult "who
has acted the fool is likely to feel slightly less offended at having been fleeced" than other
victims of sexual abuse. POSNER, supra,at 393. Larson, however, would almost surely reject this
view on the grounds that the breach of trust implict in the former would make it even more
painful. See Larson, supra note 14, at 420 n.203 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Orlando Patterson, Gender andLiberal Fallacies,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991,
at E15 (recounting how Clarence Thomas' background might have led him to make the remarks
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suggests, could come down hard on communicators who gave offense.
But in doing so, he cautions, lawmakers would be making a common
mistake. "[S]ince the transaction costs of law are generally not explicitly
modeled, discussion of legal reform is often carried on with the implicit
assumption that costs are negligible and may be ignored."' 24 What is
that cost? Romantic communication, a social preliminary to romantic
union, might never take place in a legally charged atmosphere.' 25
This would especially be the case if the problem of accurate
communication were compounded by a drive to deliberately
miscommunicate, i.e., to lie. Indeed, if this drive is as powerful as the
evidence herein will suggest, Larson's proposed
tort would lead to
126
nothing short of a revolution in mating customs.
G. Deception
Again, we will deal with these matters in greater detail below. For
now, recall Don Giovanni's complaint in Larson's title phrase: "They
Call My Good Nature, 'Deceit."'127 Deceit is the general classification

of behavior that encompasses lies.'28 We can determine its importance
in daily life by focusing on our manners.'29 We feign interest in
others' thoughts and problems; we still ourselves when we ought to
speak; we flirt; i.e., we "behave amorously without serious intent."'"
We do all this to create, or at least emphasize, good qualities and hide
bad ones."'

"The practical value of appearances, albeit hypocritical or deceptive,
is too great to ignore," Ludwig writes. "The disguise which appearance
affords allows us to ...

communicate to others that we are one of

them," he continues, "that we are not enemies or strangers to their ways
of thinking or behavior ....

Appearance becomes our passport to travel

alleged by Anita Hill).
124. Lloyd R. Cohen, Sexual Harassmentand the Law, SOCIETY, May/June 1991, at 8, 11.
125. That working in a "safe" environment-an environment free from all sexual pressure
from those in power-is not the highest goal for either men or women was made clear to me
through responses to a brief questionnaire I distributed to one of my classes several years ago.
I had asked whether students would approve of a blanket rule prohibiting romantic relationships
between supervisors and supervisees and had pointed out that this would mean in the best of
cases that if there was any interest in courtship one of the parties would have to seek a transfer
to another department. Ninety percent of both men and women said no.
126. See infra Part III.
127. Larson, supra note 14, at 374-75.
128. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 329 (1988).
129. See generally ARNOLD M. LUDWIG, THE IMPORTANCE OF LYING 27-90 (1965).
130. WEBSTER'S, supra note 128, at 473.

131. LUDWIG, supra note 129, at 27-90.
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it grants us diplomatic license to travel about
in circles we choose, and
1 32
without fear of harm."
Hardly anyone complains about this behavior today. But how far
should we be able to travel on a hot passport? Is misrepresentation
beyond the realm of the foregoing social graces also part of the bedrock
of our culture? One thing is sure. If from an early age we start off our
relationships as deceivers, and we become adept at the practice, only a
clear and convincing argument will induce us to legislate against the lie.
III. THE WORLD OF LIEs
Now it is evident that speech was given to man, not that
men might therewith deceive one another, but that one man
might make known his thoughts to another. To use speech,
then, for the purpose of deception, and not for its appointed
end, is a sin.
-St.

33

Augustine1

It is questionable whether the language of humanity lends
itself perfectly to the expression of truth; it derives from the
cries of animals and has kept some of their characteristics.
It expresses emotion, passions, needs, joy and sorrow, hate
and love. It was not meant to tell the truth. There is no
truth in [our] souls and.., the metaphysicians who have
described it are lunatics.
-Anatole

France" 4

To evaluate a new cause of action for sexual misrepresentation we
must contextualize truth-telling. Is lying morally defensible? Is
truth-telling? Is lying so widespread that any attempt at regulation is
doomed? Larson lets us down by providing none of these perspectives.
What, then, are the normative and the descriptive dimensions of
truth-telling?

132. Id. at 64-65.
133. SAINT AUGUSTINE, FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY 29 (Louis A. Aravel trans., 1947).
134. Anatole France, La Vie en Fleur, DIAL, Dec. 1921, at 692.
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A. To Lie or Not to Lie
As suggested by the above epigraphs, the question of whether we
ought to tell the truth has evoked the strongest and most eloquent
sentiments. A review of a veritable feast of works on the subject is
obviously not possible here; we shall have to be content with but a few
choice morsels. "The lie in its mere form is man's crime against his
own nature," announces Kant, "and is a vice which must make a man
' "It would be impossible to declare
disreputable in his own eyes."135
more fully what a vile, detestable and outrageous thing [a lie] is," writes
Montaigne.'36 How can we understand these teachings? Augustine
spells out the consequences of their rejection: "When regard for truth
has been broken down or even slightly weakened, all things will remain
doubtful."' 37
But must we mean what we say? Is truth-telling all it is cracked up
to be? Truth leads to facts and "[flacts," laments Oscar Wilde through
one of his characters, "have invaded the kingdom of Romance. Their
' 38
chilling touch is over everything. They are vulgarizing mankind."'
Presumably reacting to the wild success of the scientific ethos in his
age, Wilde urges the author to look forward to the time when "[flacts
will be regarded as discreditable, Truth will be found mourning over her
fetters, and Romance, with her temper of wonder, will return to the
land." 39 Francis Bacon brought the message down to earth while
demonstrating its historical roots. "Doth any man doubt," he asked, "that
if there were taken out of men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes,
false valuations, imaginings as one would, and the like, but it would
leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things, full of
melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves?"'" More
135. See LUDWIG, supra note 129, at 3. No reference to the original is provided. Consistent
with this thought and his epigraphic comment above, Augustine believed that lying was wrong
even to protect chastity. See R.J. DeFerrari ed., Lying, in TREATISES ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS
68-70, 105-07 (1952).
136. See LUDWIG, supra note 129, at 3.
137. Quoted in SISSELA BOK, LYING at xv (1989). Bok herself turns an elegant phrase. "As
lies spread ... trust is damaged. Yet," she goes on, "trust is a social good to be protected just
as much as the air we breathe or the water we drink. When it is damaged the whole community
suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies falter and collapse." Id. at 26-27.
138. Oscar Wilde, The Decay of Lying, in THE PENGUIN BOOK OF LIES 261 (Philip Kerr
ed., 1991).
139. id. at 264.
140. Francis Bacon, Of Truth, in ESSAYS, CIVIL AND MORAL 1-2 (1910). Wilde might be
excited by some tentative progress along the lines he suggests. A well-regarded member of the
Narrative School acknowledges that: "Although I have a preference for storytelling in my
scholarship, I like to have 'facts' at my disposal to prove my points." Deborah W. Post, Critical
Thoughts About Race, Exclusion, Oppression, and Tenure, 15 PACE L. REV. 69, 74 n. 14 (1994).
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343

contemporarily-and, like Bacon, focusing on the humdrum lives most
of us lead rather than on the Life of the Artist-philosopher David
Nyberg holds that "a healthy, livable human lifetime
141 of relationships
with others is ...inconceivable without deception."
With all these conflicting views, how shall we lead our lives? The
issue is, of course, complicated by the myriad of settings that present
themselves in which we are tempted to lie. Feminist poet and
MacArthur Fellow Adrienne Rich tries to help here. "[T]o have an
honorable relationship with you," she writes, "means that most of the
time I am eager, longing for the possibility of telling you ... [t]hat
we ... are trying, all the time, to extend the possibilities of truth
between us. '1 42 Surely this graceful conception is one that almost all
of us can subscribe to. But how useful is it really? "Most of the time"
may leave a lot of time unaccounted for and Rich does not tell us when
either the general rule or the exception applies. There being no solution
at hand to our first question, i.e., the extent to which the lie is morally
defensible, we turn to the pattern our lying actually takes. Who knows?
Maybe some moral and even legal conclusions will emerge.
B. Why People Lie
From a sizable literature on the subject, we can construct a short but
useful taxonomy of the reasons people lie. These categories can overlap
under some conditions, but for analytical purposes we will keep them43
separate. For one thing, we lie to protect ourselves from harm.
Second, we lie "to satisfy selfish motives for manipulation,. . . to attract
attention [to ourselves], even love, or to impress others with exaggerated
abilities or accomplishments. . . ."' Third, we lie for the sake of
141. DAVID NYBERG, THE VARNISHED TRUTH 2 (1993). Nyberg does not want to be
misunderstood: "I repudiate all harmfully exploitative deceptions such as consumer fraud, insider
trading, the misuse of public office. ... husbands and wives cheating on each other,...
cigarette advertising, and so on." Id. at 10-11.
142. RICH, supra note 6, at 194.
143. See NYBERG, supra note 141, at 57-59.
144. See id. at 48. The descent into falsehood is beautifully captured by Tolstoy's epic, War
and Peace, in which the character Rostov, when asked about a wound he received in battle,
responds by embellishing the facts:
He began with the intention of telling everything precisely as it had happened,
but imperceptibly, unconsciously, and inevitably he passed into falsehood .... He
could not tell them simply that they had been charging full gallop, that he had
fallen off his horse, sprained his arm, and run with all his might from the French
into the copse. And besides, to tell everything exactly as it had happened, he would
have had to exercise considerable self-control in order to tell nothing beyond what
had happened. To tell the truth is a very difficult thing and young people are rarely
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preserving privacy.'45 Last, we lie in the interests of civility and
altruism to protect others from our true sentiments and ourselves from
the consequences of expressing them.'46
These categories are, for the most part, self-evident; the last two,
however, probably require some elaboration. Perhaps nothing more
succinctly captures the fierce drive for privacy, the third category of
lies, than this familiar colloquy: "Where did you go?"-"Out"-"What
did you do?"-"Nothing."' 47 Nyberg expounds on our shrewd use of
mumbling, miswording, foreshortening, misplaced emphasis, nonchalant
nodding and the like:
The magnitude of [our] effort to mislead others cannot be
understood or explained if we assume that the primary
purpose of language is to discover and share the truth. Our
actual use of language [shows a] vital purpose of equal if
not greater importance [i.e., to protect our separateness] .... While it is clear that language serves a universal

desire to achieve and protect intimacy with a small number, .

.

. it is less obvious that in order to achieve closeness

with a few "insiders," a wary distance must be kept from
the majority. Language can be understood as one of the arts
of privacy. 4
The last category of lies-lies to avoid giving offense-is well
illustrated by Philip Roth in an account of his last meeting with his
friend, the venerable author, Bernard Malamud, a frail old man at the
time.'49 Malamud had asked Roth to look over a manuscript and tell

capable of it. His listeners expected to hear how he had been on fire with
excitement, had forgotten himself, had flown like a tempest on the enemy's square,
had cut his way into it, hewing men down right and left: how a saber had been
thrust into his flesh, how he had fallen unconscious, and so on. And he described
all that.
LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 219 (Constance Garnett trans., 1931).

Rostov, to be sure, was not seeking career advancement through the story; yet if his superior
could have been deceived in these matters, Rostov surely would have accommodated him. See
id. Rostov lives on today as a job-seeker. See Julie A. Lopez, The Big Lie: Job Applicants
Rarely Tell the Truth About Their CurrentSalaries; and the Deception Usually Pays Off, WALL

ST. J., Apr. 21, 1993, at R6.
145. See NYBERG, supra note 141, at 128-34.
146. Id. at 134-36.
147. Id. at 128-34.
148. Id. at 113.
149. Philip Roth, Pictures of Malamud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1986, § 7 (Book Review),
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him what he thought."s Roth read the work and was disappointed.' 1
But what to say? Roth could only bring himself to give a tepid
review.' Malamud, Roth sensed, "wanted to be told that what he had
painfully composed while enduring all his burdens was something more
than he himself must have known it to be in his heart."'5 He was
suffering so," continues Roth, "I wished I could have said that it was
something more, and that if I'd said it, he could have believed me. ' ' "M
Asks Nyberg: "Was Malamud really asking for Roth's candid critical
opinion of his draft or was he asking for some kind of assurance to help
him endure a crumbly end to his life?"'55 Answering the question,
Nyberg writes:
We can never know for sure what is in other people's
minds, and it is presumptuous to assume to know what
other people "really" need. Nevertheless, it's a fair gtess
that Roth did do the right thing when he varnished the truth
he had to tell, and that what passed between the two friends
was an understanding more valuable and constructive than
the unequivocal truth would have been.'56
How can anyone possibly arrive at even a "fair guess" of what someone
else is thinking? "No normal human being wants to hear the truth,"
remarked Mencken, "lilt is the passion of a small and aberrant minority
of men, most of them pathological."'5 7 A story told by Roy
Mottahedeh nicely illustrates the point:
Every Iranian knows the story of the mullah, who on the
way to mosque for morning prayers, was splashed by a dog
shaking itself in a drainage ditch. The mullah, who knew he
did not have time to change his clothes before prayers,
refused to look squarely at the animal that had sprayed
water on him and rushed on, muttering, "God willing, it's
a goat." (Water from dogs is polluting while water from
goats is not.) "God willing, it's a goat" is shorthand in

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NYBERG, supra note 141, at 139.
Id.
LUDWIG, supra note 129, at 18.
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Persian conversation for "Let's let things pass and not look
'
too closely."158
Nyberg highlights the depths of our deliberate self-delusion--our
need to hear lies-for skeptics: "Your two closest friends offer to tell
you, with unchecked candor and without regard to your feelings,
159
everything they think about you. Would you want them to do it?'
"A society in which all truths were bluntly exposed," he responds,
quoting Marcel Eck, "would be more of a hell than a paradise. ''"" °
But now we relax our assumptions; our friends are allowed to
package the truth in an appropriate manner. Even so, how often would
we ask our friends what they think of us? Here is the point. We cannot
allow ourselves to be defined by even our wisest and most discreet
friends, for even the most delicately revealed truth can be destructive.
"Once he finds out who he is, what can [c]onsole him," writes Spanish
poet, Calderon, "for on earth [e]veryone who lives, lives in a
dream."'' Can we help but conclude with Nyberg that "[h]uman
self-deception is one of the most impressive software programs ever
devised?"'62
This fact of mental life leads to a serious question for those trying
to understand the human condition. Can we at least rely on our thinkers
and writers to overcome their natural biases through education and
self-consciousness and describe the world as it really is? Ernest Becker
writes of the problem of acquiring knowledge:
One of the ironies of the creative process is that...
usually, in order to turn out a piece of work the author has
to exaggerate the emphasis of it, to oppose it in a forcefully
competitive way to other versions of truth; and he gets

158. RoY P. MOTIAHEDEH, THE MANTLE OF THE PROPHET: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN

IRAN 181 (1985).
The reader may have noted that all the liars in the stories thus far have been men. Are men
bigger liars than women? (I do not speak here of lying between sexual partners, the subject of
a later part.) Not according to the latest, albeit still very sketchy, research on the subject, though
women may lie more to protect others' egos while men may be more inclined to embellish in
their story-telling. See Bella M. DePaulo et al., Sex Differences in Lying: How Women and Mean
Deal with the Dilemma of Deceit, in LYING AND DECEPTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 126-47

(Michael Lewis & Carolyn Saarni eds., 1993).
159. See NYBERG, supra note 141, at 8.
160. See ROBERT L. WOLK & ARTHUR HENLEY, THE RIGHT TO LIE 4 (1970). Thus, two

of my colleagues will not read their student evaluations directly, but rather screen them for each
other.
161. Quoted in NYBERG, supra note 141, at 81.
162. Id.
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carried away by his own exaggeration, as his distinctive
image is built on it. 63
If Becker is right up to this point-and experience tells us that he
is-far from offering balanced and disinterested viewpoints, even the
best of our writers are models of unreliability.' 64 Thus, when after
deluding themselves, they go on to delude us with endless footnotes,
baroque ornamentations, and other devices to trump up claims to
omniscience, we have excellent reason to dismiss their works as just
highfalutin jive. 6 Becker, however, does not let readers off the hook
so easily. "[E]ach honest thinker who is basically an empiricist has to
have some truth in his position, no matter how extremely he has
formulated it. The [readers'] problem is to find the truth.... ."" So,
for example, when we read Larson, we are first obliged to understand
her in her own terms. But when Larson interjects into the discourse an
Edenic vision of not only more but also better sex-and when she
grounds that vision on the ability of people to be ruthlessly honest with
themselves-must we not incline towards incredulity?
We turn now to the psychological dimensions of lying: How did
humankind come to lie? At the heart of the matter, suggests Nyberg, is
the need of people "to think well of themselves.... Our common
ground is a need to appear to be better than we think we really are....
It is the craving to be appreciated that motivates much deception of
others and deception of self."' 67
If one takes this drive as a given, then far from being maladaptive
and dangerous, self-delusion is efficient. 68 In the extreme, of course,
self-deception takes us on the low road whose eventual destination is
self-destruction. 169 But if, on the other hand, we were to dwell on our
anxieties, guilt, embarrassments, failures, lusts, and aggressions, would
not paralysis ensue? How would we attend to what had to be done?
Self-delusion allows life to go on. 7°

163. ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH at xi (1973).
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See NYBERG, supra note 141, at 86. The fact that self-deception and deception of
others are related in origin does not, of course, mean that they are moral equivalents. See infra
note 170 and accompanying text.
168. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
170. Self-deception and deception of others are "in our nature, and [they are] there for some
reason," writes Nyberg, "the mind does not evolve in ways harmful to itself." See NYBERG,
supra note 141, at 2.
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But are we ready to publicly concede an honorable place for lying?
Hardly. We hold that only Truth is Beauty. 7 ' Mind you, that Truth is
Beauty is O.K.-as far as it goes. But when we go on to posture that it
is also "all [we] know" and, even worse, "all [we] need to know," no,
not by a long shot.'72 "Truth is beautiful, without doubt;" reports
Emerson, "but so are lies."' 73

If lying is pervasive and (socially) purposive, indeed, if George
Steiner is right that "[t]he human capacity to utter falsehood, to lie, to
negate what is the case, stands at the heart of speech and [culture],' 74
does it make any sense for the law to even try to abolish the lie?'
But in asking this question, we are getting ahead of ourselves. For in
focusing on the lie as a generally useful survival skill, we have ignored
the one area of interpersonal relations that needs to be addressed here.
And so the question arises: Do we also lie for sex and love?

IV. SEX, LIES, AND

AUDIOTAPE

Sex is a way of creating closer emotional ties to one
another. There is nothing about it that ordinarily requires
lying and manipulation.
-Jane

Larson

76

It is frightening to think that social science is in the hands
of professionals who are so deaf to human nuance that they
believe that people ...

have no interest in manipulating the

171. John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, in ENGLISH ROMANTIC WRITERS 1186 (David
Perkins ed., 1967) (1820).
172. Id. Bill Carmel, an English literature scholar, suggests that in addressing his poem to
the urn, rather than to the reader, Keats is acknowledging a difference between the needs of art
and those of "life."
173. Quoted in NYBERG, supra note 141, at I 11.
174. GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION 214
(1975).
175. Asks a colleague: "Why do we not ask this question in relation to perjury, slander,
commercial fraud etc.?" This entire Article, of course, serves as a response. In short, we have
determined, presumably like George Steiner, that social life (whether with members of one's
family or otherwise) and mental health would be seriously impaired without room to maneuver
in the domain of speech. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. There being no comparable
generalized and deep-seated need to misrepresent in the other cases hypothesized, society can
demand truthtelling. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 14, at 412 (comparing the societal demand for
truthtelling in commercial versus sexual contexts).
176. See Gold, supra note 11, at Ni.
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impression that [others] have of them ...about the most
freighted aspects of their lives.
-R.C. Lewontin"
A. All Roads Lead to Rome
Look in your local bookstore and you will find a swath of books on
how to make and keep a sexual/romantic connection. Look in your local
library and all these books will be checked out or missing. You should
not be surprised. Acquiring the right partner is rarely easy and we need
all the help we can get. Indeed, the subject has received considerable
attention for the last two thousand years in western tradition, dating all
the way back to the Roman poet Ovid.
Ovid produced three satirical yet serious-minded works dealing with
the subject: The Art of Love, The Cure for Love and The Amores.
Those who wish to find mates, Ovid suggests, should go to the circus
and sit close to their targets. 178 Then, in advice that can hardly be
improved upon today, he tells his readers to make their moves: "[F]ind
occasion to begin discourse; Enquire whose chariot this, and whose that
horse; To whatsoever side she is inclin'd suit all your inclinations to her
mind; Like what she likes; from thence your court begin; And whom
she favors, wish that he may win.' 179
No advocate for fair play--except in the sense that a free-for-all is
fair-Ovid was interested only in the score. 8 He urges his fellow men
who meet resistance:
Make promises. What harm in promising/In promises a
pauper can be rich./IHope has staying power once instilled;/she's a tricky goddess, but she fits./Once you've
made a gift, she can drop you with good reason:/she'll carry
off past profits and leave without a loss./The trick is not to
give, but to dangle hoped for gains/like a barren field that
often fools its owner./She'll be like a gambler losing on to
cut his losses,/the dice keep beckoning his greedy
palms./'This the task, this the toil": to bed her with no prior

177. R.C. Lewontin, Sex, Lies and Social Science, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Apr. 20, 1995,
at 24, 28 (Review of Sex in America and The Social Organizationof Sexuality, see infra notes

280 & 497).
178. Ovid, The Art of Love, in A

LITERARY GUIDE TO SEDUCTION

26 (Robert Meister ed.,

1963).

179. Id.
180. See id.
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keep giving so as not to lose what she already
outlay;/she'll
81
gave.1

Is Ovid to be dismissed as just another male chauvinist? Hardly.'
Among other things, he does not save his best counsel for men. How
should a woman act who wants her partner to come back for more?
Whisper seduction and whimper for joy/ and giggle and say
naughty words./ Even you who feel nothing, whom nature's
denied/ fake it and murmur sweet lies./... But when you
pretend, make sure you're not caught: move like you mean
it, look like you ought./ Show him you like it with panting
and sighs; Ah! But "that place" has its own secret
signs/.... Don't open the window to let in full light:/ Most
of your body looks better by night. 83
A thousand years later, the medieval world was still debating the
morality of Ovid's advice.'84 Finally, at the end of the twelfth century,
a monk named Andreas Capellanus produced what could be called the
first systematic and more or less well-received self-help book, The Art
of Courtly Love (The Art).' This serious yet humorous work, which
is based on the idea of love as an art, served for hundreds of years as
an authority on meeting and keeping sexual partners and then in various

ways as a prototype for most of the works on the subject that followed.' 86
181. MOLLY MYEROWITZ, OVID'S GAMES OF LOVE 121 (1985). A pro bono publico
dimension of Ovid's work begins to show here. Elsewhere it is starkly evident. "I'm not here
to teach the art of loving. Big spenders have no need of my technique.... A poet for the poor
am I, who loved, a pauper in my time. When I couldn't give gifts, I gave her a line." Id. at 181.
182. In his writings, Ovid "develops the unheard-of concept of equality between the
partners in a love affair." PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 440 (Alex

Presninger ed., 1974) [hereinafter PRINCETON POETRY ENCYCLOPEDIA].
183. See MYEROWITZ, supra note 184, at 183-84. What to do when the flush of excitement
fades? "When a new lover falls captive into your trap] let him hope that he's alone./ Later, let
him know that a rival shares your bed;/ omit these ploys and love grows old./ A bold steed races
well from the starting gate/ when he has horses to trail and to pass." Id. at 85. Whether they
choose to heed his advice or not, modem readers should be able to appreciate the wisdom in
Ovid's work.
Notwithstanding Ovid's insistence that being full of lies, his love columns were not meant
to be taken seriously, it is quite possible that these writings led to his banishment from Rome
by Emperor Augustus. Id. at 18-19.
184. See, e.g., PRINCETON POETRY ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 185, at 156-57 (discussing
the development of romantic poetry from Ovid's time up to the medieval period when
Capellanus wrote).
185. ANDREAS CAPELLANUS, THE ART OF COURTLY LOVE 37 (John Jay Perry trans., 1941).
186. PRINCETON POETRY ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 185, at 157. "The fact that

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss3/1

40

Subotnik: "Sue Me, Sue Me, What Can You Do Me? I Love You": A Disquisition
LAW, SEX, AND TALK

B. Wild Words
Capellanus perceived a profound inertia blocking development of
romantic relationships. What to do to get things going? Capellanus urges
a man of the middle class who is interested in a woman of the same
class to start in a low-key manner then let a little time pass in case the
woman wishes to speak."8 7 He should then attempt to make her laugh
at something or praise her home or family. The time has come for
business. Holding, as J.M. Keynes did three-quarters of a millennium
later that "[w]ords ought to be a little wild for they are the assault on
the thoughts of the unthinking,"' 88 Capellanus recommends the
following gambit:
When the Divine Being made you there was nothing that
He left undone. I know that there is no defect in your
beauty, none in your good sense, none in you at all except,
it seems to me, that you have enriched no one by your
love.... Oh if you should take service with Love, blessed
above all others will that man be whom you shall crown
with your love! Now if I, by my merits might be worthy of
such an honor, no lover in the world could really be
compared with me.'89
[Capellanus] obviously wrote with tongue in cheek ... does not reduce the value of his treatise
for the modem reader." Id.
187. Different dialogues are recommended in Tho Art for members of the nobility or for
those addressing them.
188. Quoted in Geoffrey D. Klinger, Painting by Numbers: Critically Exploring the
Economic Rhetoric of Alan Greenspan, SOC'Y OF CRITICAL EXCHANGE 1 (1994). No citation
to the original is provided.
189. CAPELLANUS, supra note 185, at 37. If the opening gambit seems extremely arch, if
you have trouble seeing its connection to contemporary discourse, consider the kind of
billet-doux which Larson's disclosure policy-also taken to extreme-might produce:
Dear John,
Although I aspire to self-sufficiency, experience has confirmed what I have
long suspected: the presence of sexual drives whose nature requires the participation of another for their satisfaction. We have known each other for a time
sufficient for me to extend you the following offer.
Pursuant to my need to satisfy erotic urges, I hereby request your participation
in an act of sexual intercourse on Friday, July 26, in my bedroom. As consideration
for your participation, I promise to satisfy your similar urges.
I hope that you will accept the terms enunciated herein. Please respond no later
than Wednesday, July 24, after which time my offer expires.
Yours in lust,
Mary
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But if plain speaking was not the best policy, if artistry and artifice
effected the transition from lovelessness to love, why should their use
be limited? After the first bloom of love, lovers would want to test the
affection of their partners. He who would do so, advised The Art, should
"with the greatest care and subtlety, pretend ...

that he desires the

embraces of some other woman, and he should be seen near this woman
more often than he has been."'" He will then know the truth from her
jealousy and the "inner suffering of her soul."''

Alternatively, perhaps for those less hard-hearted, lovers should
pretend "from time to time to be angry with one another ... for a true

lover is always in fear and trembling lest the anger of his beloved last
forever.... 9 "You must not think that by quarrels of this kind the
bonds of love and affection are weakened," The Art consoles the
squeamish, "it is only the clearing away of the rust."' 9 3

Hewing close to The Art's guidelines kept one out of social trouble.
For those concerned with their good standing, The Art suggested
recourse to what might be called the Court of Courtly Love. Should a
woman prefer an older suitor to a younger one?; Should a woman
deceived by a lover take him back when he returns penitent?; Should a
lady who "through no fault of her own" marries an "honorable man" be
thereafter permitted to deny her long-standing love his "usual solaces"?'94 (Marriage in The Art existed primarily for preserving the social
position of the family.) The Court would render a decision.'95 Thus,
Professor Larson has learned her history lessons well, because in
seeking to flatten amatory discourse, Larson would build up a new Love
Court and invest it with full civil powers.'96

See RAYMOND A. BELLIOTrI, GOOD SEX: PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL ETHICS 105-06 (1993).
Which of the two proposals would you want to receive?
190. See CAPELLANUS, supra note 185, at 158.

191. Id. The degree of freedom of action allowed lovers should not be exaggerated. A
number of provisions were quite restrictive. See Peter Goodrich, Law in the Courts of Love:
Andreas Capellanus and the Judgments of Love, 48 STAN. L. REV. 633, 667-68 (1996).
192. CAPELLANUS, supra note 185, at 158-59.

193. Id. at 159.
194. Id. at 171.
195. The ruling: "The later contracting of a marital union does not properly exclude an
early love except in cases where the woman gives up love entirely and is determined by no
means to love any more." Decision by Lady Ermengarde of Narbonne, later Viscountess of
Narbonne. Id.
196. See generally Larson, supra note 14 (advocating the courthouse as an appropriate
destination for women harmed by sexual fraud). And the court could pay for itself and probably
make a profit. Indeed, with all the power of a soap opera, an Ann Landers column and People's
Court, the new court's proceedings would probably be a media sensation.
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But on what moral basis would Larson's court operate? Raymond
Belliotti, in his exciting and comprehensive new study, Good Sex,
attempts a definition of moral sex."9 A liberal in these matters, he
writes: "[s]ex is morally impermissible if and only if it involves
deception, promise breaking, illicit force, or exploitation."'98 But
developing and maintaining relationships-as real estate brokers,
investment bankers, psychologists, clergymen, social workers, well
know-does not often come naturally or easily; relationships have to be
developed with art and artifice.'9 9 Perhaps this is because even before
it is applied, any advice they proffer must make us feel good. It should
not surprise anyone that this holds true for mating relationships as
well.' If loneliness is the worst curse, "[i]t simply does not make
good sense for people interested in acquiring a mate to blatantly
advertise their bad as well as their good qualities. ' 0 ' And if "a
woman's finery is ...
a strategic, a calculated display," asks
Baudrillard, "is not the seducer's strategy a display of calculation with
which to defend himself from some opposing force? A strategy of finery
vs. the finery of strategy." 2'
Consider just a few stories featured over the last few years in the
American media, the best mirror we have of American life. To try to get
197. See BELLIOTrI, supra note 189, at 104.
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
200. See Milton Fisher, Mergers of the Heart, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1994 (Valentine's
Day), at A18 (describing an investment banker's matchmaking skills, which consist primarily
of misleading individuals into thinking that another is specially interested in meeting them).
According to an old Jewish proverb, a person who can't lie can't be a marriage broker.
201. Id. "And here I'm lying through my teeth," writes Woody Allen. "I mean I can't tell
Louise that I was in jail and that I rob and steal and never did an honest day's work 'cause, you
know, some people hold these things against you." THE ILLUSTRATED WOODY ALLEN READER
86 (Linda Sunshine ed., 1993).
As reported by Professor David L. Chambers, the AIDS organizations seem to have seized
on the idea of the defensibility of lying. A Gay Men's Health Crisis publication pamphlet eases
the guilt for HIV infectees: "Ifyou follow these safe sex guidelines [primarily use of condoms]
you don't need to worry about whether your partners know you're positive. You've already
protected them from infection and yourself from reinfection." Similarly, Positive News, a
newsletter put out by the San Francisco AIDS Foundation, urges that whether or not to inform
is up to the individual. What should a person with HIV say when asked directly about his status
by a sexual partner? The San Francisco AIDS Foundation says that this is one of the many
questions that are difficult to answer. See Gay Men, AIDS and the Code of the Condom, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353-85 (1994). The last point has been confirmed to me in a private
communication by Professor Chambers. While Professor Chambers endorses the foregoing views,
id. at 379, and while I generally understand those who choose to conceal information in sexual
relationships (and am reluctant to criticize those who live a lifestyle different from my own),
given the effects of AIDS, I cannot go along with him.
202. See BAUDRILLARD, supra note 93, at 98.
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a relationship going, Arnie of L.A. Law tries to mislead his fundamentalist colleague, Jane, into thinking that he is interested in Bible
studies." 3 In the same episode one of the characters pretends to be a
cop because the woman he desires feels most secure when in their
company. °4 Anais Nin, it was recently reported, does not tell the man
she purports to wed that she is already married. 5 Similarly Katherine
Ann Porter lies to her husband (or husband-to-be) about a hysterectomy
she had had."°
203. L.A. Law (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 3, 1994).
204. Id.
205. Miranda Seymour, Truth Wasn't Sexy Enough, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Oct. 17, 1993,
at 18.
206. See Marty Gordon, The Angel of Malignity: The Cold Beauty of KatherineAnn Porter,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1995 (Book Review section), at 17.
Nothing captures the routine deception practiced in the earliest stages of courtship better
than this fictional commentary by Art Hoppe, who imagines himself as a eavesdropper and
generously offers commentary:
[At the gym,] "What's a svelte creature like you doing here?" he asks. "You don't
need to lose an ounce." (But what he thinks is: More like about eight pounds.)
"Thanks, I just come to listen to the music," she says. (And case all these guys'
buns of steel.)
"How about a platonic dinner together?" He says. "Nothing more. It's only that I
hate to eat alone." (Or go to bed that way, either.)
"Let me check my Memo Minder to see if I have a date tonight," she says
demurely. (Heck, I'm free in 1993.)
So they have a bite. "I just love pineapple pizza," she tells him, (if I don't throw
up).
"How about another Harvey Wallbanger Double Daiquiri?" he suggests. 'There's
hardly anything in it" (that won't lower your will to resist).
They chat about movies: "Yes, I, too, really want to see 'Les Champignons
Fous,' " she says, (when I'm short on sleep). And he hints of the future when he
says, "I love children," (preferably boiled).
When they reach her place, he puts his arms around her and says, "Believe me, this
won't be a one-night stand," (not if I can catch a bus home by midnight).
As she succumbs, she flutters her eyelashes demurely. "Honestly, I'm not the kind
of woman who does this often," . . . (enough).
Lastly, he delivers the ultimate misrepresentation. "I'll always respect you ......
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C. Stories to Make You Cry
Wait a minute, you might say, these are either peccadilloes or you
cannot resonate to them because of a lack of context. Fine, let us test
your response with a fully fleshed out whopper. How should the love
court resolve the following clinical case? Bryan and Joan were in love
and had engaged in some sexual play. Joan wanted to go further and
suggested as much to Bryan. Bryan wanted to wait until marriage so
"you can come to me a virgin." "Is that what you are going to be?"
asked Joan. "Heh, heh, me?" Brian laughs, "I'm afraid not. But I'll tell
you this... those other girls weren't anything like you." Joan then
confesses to Bryan that she is not the virgin he thinks, which acknowledgment Bryan scoffs at. "I don't believe it and I am not going to take
advantage of you until our wedding night. Believe me, sweetheart, I
promise you a night you'll never forget."2 "7
And so it was; for the wedding night, as your insides are probably
telling you by now, was a disaster. In fact, Bryan was the virgin in the
family who, as subsequently diagnosed, was lying about the fact to
boost his flaccid, self-image and to induce Joan to suppress any doubts
about marrying him."8 His insistence on waiting until marriage
stemmed from his fear of sexual intimacy. His refusal to believe that
Joan had other lovers was a necessary piece of self-deception to hide his
fear of being compared to other men. Eventually in this case the
marriage was annulled.2" Should a just and merciful legal system
(would Larson) allow Bryan's pain and humiliation to be compounded
by a tort action against him? Or does the very question suggest
patriarchal thinking that ignores the possibly devastating consequences
to Joan of allowing the relationship to develop, especially to the point
of marriage?210
Hoppe, supra note 10, at 1.
"Sex," suggests Larson, "is a way of creating closer emotional ties to one another. There is
nothing about it that ordinarily requires lying and-manipulation." See supra note 176 and
accompanying text.
207. This case was written up by Wolk and Henley. See WOLK & HENLEY, supra note 160,
at 162-64. I have made some modifications.
208. The future sexual benefits that such a union could be expected to produce makes the
case one of sex fraud.
209. Someone decided that sexual intercourse went "to the very essence of the marital
relation." See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
210. A critic wonders how Joan might be injured through Bryan's not being, as he claims,
a man of the world. She probably cannot be. But she most certainly can be hurt by Bryan's
withholding of information about his sexual problem.
A frequent variant of the Joan-Brian problem arises when a sexual partner does not tell a
companion of the opposite sex that he has gay tendencies. For a brief discussion of the pain and
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How might we understand this deception? Speaking of the need for
privacy, Ruth Gavison writes that "[p]rivacy enables individuals to
establish a plurality of roles and presentations to the world. The control
over 'editing' one's self, is crucial, for it is through the images of others
that human relations are conducted and maintained. 21 Bryan, we
could say, could not live with himself as a model for failed masculinity;
he needed a role as a success as well. Maybe if he thought only positive
thoughts, such as that he was sexually experienced while Joan knew
nothing, maybe if he waited until after marriage when on account of the
formalization of the union some of the pressure would have abated,
maybe because Joan, unlike all those ballbusters he used to hang around
with, was so special ...this time, Lord willing, it would be different.
To hold Bryan accountable for his lies also would be to trap him,
perhaps forever, in his past. With every new relationship he would await
with terror the almost inevitable question: "How many people have you
been with?" or "How many serious relationships have you had?" How
would he respond? In this society at least "None of your business," even
in its euphemistic form, "I don't care to talk about it," far from being
responsive under the circumstances, is wholly unacceptable. So the
question arises: Do human beings need room in the sexual domain to
reinvent themselves-to start with a clean slate-or, if they prefer, as
the king and queen of Sheba? Do we want a world in which, because
he must disclose his background as a petty thief, Aladdin can never win
the hand of the princess?212
Now consider the case of Eliot S., a successful attorney who has
been married for over twenty years.213 He has been faithful to his wife
throughout, or so he says.214 Eliot's wife develops Parkinson's disease
and loses much of her strength.1 5 Eliot is now caught between the
pressure of his work and of taking care of his wife who is declining on
a daily basis before his very eyes.2" 6 Laboring under this strain, he
occasionally finds an outlet with a call girl.2"7 On these nights, in order

disruptiveness caused by the withholding of such information, see Trip Gabriel, How Marriages
Unravel When One Spouse IsGay, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 1995, at Al.
211. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 450 (1980).
212. According to Disney, at least, an apology by Aladdin was sufficient to redress the lie.
Disney unfortunately does not tell us whether a sexual encounter has taken place.
213. This case also was written up by Wolk and Henley. See WOLK & HENLEY, supra note
160, at 173. Minor modifications have been made. See supra note 74 regarding applicability of
sex fraud tort to marrieds.
214. See WOLK & HANLEY, supra note 160, at 173.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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to be able to exit gracefully, he tells his wife he is going out to play
cards with the boys."' His wife finds out and, primarily because of her
fragile condition, becomes distraught. 19 Does she have a cause of
action?'
The foregoing discussion presupposes an ethical obligation on the
part of partners to tell the truth; for if that were not the case, on what
basis could the legal system attach significance to the lie? But is there
such a duty? One could argue, quite to the contrary, that far from being
based on truth-telling, romantic relationships are, at heart, mutual
feelgood societies. Shakespeare illustrates the point by writing of the
lover, fearful that his "days are past the best," who asks his partner and
" ' In return for this
is falsely told in response that he is still young.22
service the lover does not call the partner on what the former suspects
is a lie, happily concluding: "Therefore I lie with her, and she with me/
And in our faults by lies we flatter'ed be."' Should the Big Lie-the
lie about infidelity-produce a different result? Nyberg is dubious;223
Penny Vincenzi says no. 24 And, of course, "fessing up" to such an

218. Id. Once again in this illustration the liar is not lying to gain immediate sexual
advantage. He does, however, want to preserve the marriage-we can imagine-not only
because he does not want to hurt his spouse after they have been together for 30 years, but also
because intercourse is still an occasional feature of the marriage.
219. Here is how one presumably healthy wife described her life following discovery of
her husband's affair. "During the past ten years I have been through mental and physical
hell.... I am still unable to to come to terms with the fact that for eighteen years of our
thirty-year marriage my husband lived a lie to me, that is, a fifteen-year affair ...." See
ANNETTE LAWSON, ADULTERY 222 (1988). Is it not easily imaginable that a sick spouse-one
who has nothing else going for her-will take the news even harder?
220. Even if she does, Ovid suggests that exercising such rights is both childish and
churlish:
Oh, if only I could press charges in such a way that I could not win! Damn it, why
is my case so good? Fortunate is he who bravely dares defend the object of his
love-he to whom his girlfriend can say "I am not guilty!" Iron-hearted and
over-keen to indulge his own indignation, is the [person] who insists on his pound
of flesh when the defendant is beaten.
OVID, THE SECOND BOOK OF AMoRES 37 (Joan Booth trans., 1991).
221. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet 138, in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 1174 (G.
Blakemore Evans ed., 1974).
222. Id.
223. See NYBERG, supra note 141, at 8.
224. See Penny Vincenzi, The Lie in Adultery, in THE PENGUIN BOOK OF LIES, supra note
138, at 468-71. Writes Ovid: "If you are ever caught, no matter how well you've concealed it,
Though it is clear as day, swear up and down it's a lie." Quoted in DIANE ACKERMAN, A
NATURAL HISTORY OF LOVE 40 (1994).
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action defies every piece of street advice ever given to man and woman.
Where did we get this crazy notion that the truth will set us free?
Here we come to the nub and the rub of Larson's proposal. If sexual
partners have an obligation to speak the truth to one another in the early
stages of the relationship, is not the debt at least as great as the
relationship develops into marriage or long-term nonmarital commitment?225 And, correlatively, how much greater is the pain of sexual
disloyalty that comes with the deeper emotional engagement of the
parties? Yet if we are not ready for a tort action in these settings, can
we justify an action when the parties come to one another as virtual
strangers?
D. Intimate Enemies
Of course, as the previous hypotheticals reveal, the relationship
between sexual partners involves far more than the sharing of intimacies; it is a complex dynamic that a crude ideology of male exploitation
does not come close to addressing.226 Perhaps we can begin to usefully
think of male-female communication this way: Just as after sexual
connection lovers may not wish to be touched in certain places, so too
lovers will need relevant distance after other intense interactions.227
Indeed, it seems fair to say, the more closeness they have at any given
time, the more space they will later need. 8
But even this analogy is inadequate in describing the need for private
space. For it suggests a roseate and symbiotic equilibrium between

Ovid seems to have derived this principle through exegesis of the story of lo, a mortal
whom Zeus had taken a liking to. One day, when they were together, Zeus sensed his wife Hera
approaching. He quickly wrapped the earth in a dark cloud so she would not see them. Hera,
however, became suspicious and dispelled the cloud whereupon Zeus instantly changed lo into
a heifer. When confronted by his still mistrustful wife, he swore up and down that he had never
laid eyes on that creature before. This, says Ovid, shows that the lies lovers tell do not anger
the gods. See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 76-77 (New American Library 1969) (1942).
225. Beverly Balos & Marie L. Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nonstranger Rape,
75 MINN. L. REV. 599 (1991). The two authors raised this precise question, arguing among other
things, that the law inverts elemental logic when it presumes that the longer a confidential
relationship has been in existence, the less the likelihood that a defendant raped the complainant.
Id. at 605. These authors suggest that the law should impose a greater obligation of parties to
one another once the relationship is confidential. Id. at 606. Specifically, they urge that
"[s]ilence or other passive behavior by the victim [should] not constitute sufficient evidence of
consent between nonstrangers." Id. at 607.
226. See CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEXUAL PERSONAE: ACT AND DECADENCE FROM NEFERTITI TO
EMILY DICKINSON 13 (1991) (characterizing sexuality as "a murky realm of contradiction and
ambivalence").
227. Id.
228. Id.
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lovers, individuals who are at the same point in their emotional cycles
with respect to intimacy and space, concealment and disclosure. If so,
wonderful-assuming that is what they want. Yet surely that will not
always, or even usually, be the case; difference, often to the point of
opposition, will exist.
Much of the clashing will come when, perceiving threats to their
sense of self, which for some is always, the parties seek power for
themselves.2 9 And we should not imagine, as Larson's argument
might suggest, that it is only men who aspire to power in relationships." 0 The Wife of Bath tells the other side of the story.23 ' A young
knight whose rape of a woman threatens him with banishment from the
court is rescued at the last moment by some highly placed ladies.232
He can only be restored to the court if he sets out on a journey to
discover what it is that women most want.233 At great sacrifice to
himself he discovers the "right" answer (as determined by his saviors):
Women seek mastery over their husbands.2"
Our drive to power manifests itself most clearly perhaps through sex.
"Feminists, seeking to drive power relations out of sex," writes Camille
Paglia, (who devotes an entire book to this subject), "have set themselves against nature. Sex is power.""23 Baudrillard heartily agrees.236
But, ironically, if we seek power through sex, power is not ultimately
what seduces. "To seduce is to appear weak," writes Baudrillard. "We
seduce with our weakness, never with strong signs or powers .... [T]his
'
is what gives seduction its strength."237
Why, we might ask, is weakbecause
in showing weakness, we
ness so seductive? Might it not be
I
8
play into the other's need for power?"

229. See Larson, supra note 14, at 379.
230. See id.
231. GEOFFREY CHAUCER, The Wife of Bath's Tale, in THE RIVERSIDE CHAUCER 116-17
(Larry D. Benson ed., 3d ed. 1987).
232. Id. at 117.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 121-22.
235. See PAGLIA, supra note 226, at 2 (emphasis in original). The relationship between sex
and power is surely best understood through Henry Kissinger's famous dictum: "Power is the
ultimate aphrodisiac." Henry A. Kissinger, quoted in THE QUOTABLE QUOTATIONS BOOK 207
(Alec Lewis ed., 1980).
236. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
237. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 93, at 83.
238. The expression of weakness is merely a seduction device. If my sources are
representative, most of us revel in abandoning the struggle for control, in laying down our
burdens, in being on the bottom. If sex is ultimately the pursuit of power alone, how can we
understand Flaubert's Rodolphe? See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Emma has yielded
herself completely to him, yet, far from being attracted to her, he is repelled. See FLAUBERT,
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But even this discussion does not capture the fast shifting, even
contradictory nature of the human personality which is responsible for
so much intra-couple conflict. Bonnie Raitt expresses this aspect of
sexual/romantic life when describing the tortured message so many
partners have for one another: "One part be my lover; one part go
away. 239 Consider, moreover, some of the conflicting emotions
associated with sexual behavior that have been recorded by experts in
this area. Simon and Gagnon describe the "not uncommon experience
[of parties] wanting to express [sentiments] that were consistent with
stereotyped gender-role postures, while simultaneously experiencing
feelings intensely incongruous with those very gender-role postures, e.g.
simultaneously to take possession of the object of desire (the male role)
and to be the object of desire (the female role): to seduce and to be
seductive, to conquer and to surrender, to desire and, to be desir2 4° When these oppositions are combined with all others between
able.""
sexual partners, what are the chances of lovers finding something
beyond a symbiotic moment? Must we not very often be tempted to
agree with the great French epigramist, La Rochefoucauld, that "[i]f love
is judged by most of its effects, it resembles hate more than friendship. ' 24'
supra note 61, at 162-64. If power leads to sex, it seems fair to conclude, it also leads to
contempt.
239. BONNIE RAITT, One Part Be My Lover, on LUCK OF THE DRAW (Capitol Records
1991).
240. William Simon & John H. Gagnon, Sexual Scripts: Permanence and Change, 15
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 97, 109 (1986). Are the drives of homosexuals any less oppositional?
"Our bodies are tired of all the stereotyped cultural barriers, all the physiological segregation .... BAUDRILLARD, supra note 93, at 24 (quoting Judith Belladonna Barbara Penton). "We
are male and female, adults and children, fairies, dykes, and gays, fuckers and fucked, buggers
and buggered .... We refuse to limit ourselves to what society demands of us, that we be either
hetero, lesbian, gay, the whole gamut of promotional products." Id. at 224.
241. LUDWIG, supra note 129, at 99 (quoting La Rochefoucauld). Will Durant offers a
simple and particularly cogent image for the interaction between sexual partners: "Love, which
has always been a combat and a chase," he writes, "becomes a war in which the night's embrace
is but a passing armistice." Id. (quoting Will Durant). And you do not, like Durant, have to be
a historian or married to the same individual for 68 years to arrive at this conclusion. "Every
creature on earth," writes (fortyish) biologist Matt Ridley, "is in a [dynamic] struggle with its
parasites (or hosts), its predators (or prey), and above all, with its mate ...." MATTHEW RIDLEY,
THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE 19 (1994).
Is this a message of despair? Would life be fuller and richer without the continuous conflict?
Or is conflict a prerequisite for the good life? W.B. Yeats has supplied an answer:
"Fair and foul are near of kin
And fair needs foul," I [vent] ...
"For nothing can be sole or whole
That has not been rent."
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If this is the case, is it any wonder that the dialogue between even
the most intimate of sexual partners cannot always be relied on to be
sincere?242 To hold that a mortal enemy (albeit of the moment) has the
same claim to truth as the friend is mere cant.243 Indeed, though some
may wish to limit the principle, no one proposes to repeal the notion
that exceptional stratagems, presumably including lying, are fair game
in war.
But if, with her idealized view of human relationships, Larson hardly
deals with this reality, even less does she consider the perverseness that
characterizes human sexual beings at play. "Love is a child of Egypt; hie
has never, never recognized any law," sings the leading lady in one of
the best known arias in all of western opera, "If you don't love me, I
love you, and if I love you, watch out for yourself."2' An American
movie drives the point home: A guy follows a street-walker, prudently,
in the appropriate manner. The woman swings around, responding
aggressively: "What do you want? Do you want to jump me? Then
change your approach! Say, 'I want to jump you!' " The guy, troubled,
repeats, " 'yes, I want to jump you.' " " 'Then go fuck yourself.' 24
E. Games People Play
Love, sex, seduction-and, by extension, writing about such
phenomena-offer the joy of playacting, challenge, intrigue, and

William B. Yeats, Crazy Jane Talks with the Bishop, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF MODERN
POETRY 178-79 (Richard ElIman & Robert O'Clair eds., 2d ed. 1988).

242. D.H. Lawrence warned of the dangers of trusting both love and trust. " 'The greater
the love, the greater the trust,' " he writes " 'the greater the peril, the greater the disaster...
since each human being is a ship that must sail its own course ....Two ships may sail together
to the world's end. But lock them together inmid-ocean and try to steer both with one rudder,' "
he continues," 'and they will smash one another to bits. So it is,' "he concludes," 'when one
individual seeks absolutely to love, or trust another. Absolute lovers always smash one another,
absolute trusters the same.' " Simon Leys, Lawrence of Australia, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 21,
1994, at 29, 34 (quoting D.H. Lawrence). Adding the forces of culture to those of nature, as
Larson's proposal would do, would only seem to sink any survivors.
243. For a good discussion of the issue of lying to enemies, see BOK, supra note 137, at
131-45. Bok believes that lying to enemies is overrated as a strategy because it tends to
perpetuate rather than eliminate the hostilities. Maybe so. But if La Rochefoucauld, Durant,
Ridley, and Lawrence are right about marriage, the parties will and must battle it out to preserve
their sense of self; and this will at least involve hiding the truth that otherwise would be
revealed. Even Bok recognizes the Allies' need to mask the time and place of the D-Day
invasion. See id. at 131-45.
244. GEORGES BIzET, CARMEN act 1, sc. 4.
245. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 93, at 42, provides this illustration though without
identifying the movie. Perhaps feeling in control of the situation or sorry for the guy, the
street-walker later tells him "I'll make coffee, and then you can jump me." Id.
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reversal.2 46 And we should not infer from any aspect of Larson's work
that this play therapy is important only for men, since, notes D.H.

Lawrence: "[T]he greatest triumph an American woman can have is the
triumph of seducing a man, especially if he is pure. .

,247 We may

not wish to join in all the revelry, but the seduction drive, because it
draws48its power from an elemental source, ordinarily will come to the
fore.

2

What is this source? "It is not from some libidinal investment, some
energy of desire, that this passion [i.e. to seduce] acquires its intensity,"
Baudrillard persuasively argues, "but from gaming as pure form and
from purely formal bluffing.

249

Seduction "is what remains of [an

earlier] magical, fateful world," he explains, "a risky, vertiginous, and
predestined world; it is what is ... effective in a visibly efficient and

stolid world."25 How do we know we are alive? "Nothing exists
naturally," Baudrillard writes, "things exist because challenged, and
because summoned to respond to that challenge."25 ' We are condi-

tioned to think (especially in academia?) that "those who can no longer
produce are dead. In reality," Baudrillard concludes,
"only those who do
252
dead.
are
seduced
be
or
seduce
to
wish
not
In sum, our examination of sexual relationships has revealed that
lying is a pervasive, and perhaps even desirable, element whose origin
lies in the never-ending conflict between the need of Homo Liber to
decide for himself or herself what to do and say, and that of Homo
Ludens, to play with others. But surely our inquiry cannot end here,
246. See id. at 82; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 224, at 86-87 (describing love games).
247. Quoted in ELIZABETH HARDWICK, SEDUCTION AND BETRAYAL: WOMEN AND
LITERATURE 181 (1974) (without reference to the original source). The attentive reader will note
that the picture of women drawn thus far is a composite of pieces largely produced by (notable)
men. I have tried to remedy this shortcoming in the remaining sections of this Article.
248. See id. at 181.
249. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 93, at 82. "Oh, the pleasures of intrigue," writes Susanna
Centlivre, the seventeenth-century English playwright (through her character Belair), "it finds
employment for every sen[s]e, [s]harpens the wit, and gives a Life to all our Faculties." Love
at a Venture, in 1 THE DRAMATIC WORKS OF THE CELEBRATED MRS. CENTLIVRE 267 (John
Pearson ed., 1872).
250. See BAUDRILLARD, supra note 93, at 180.
251. Id. at 82 (emphasis in original).
252. Id. at 84. Blanche Dubois understood the connection between sex and death-perhaps
too well for her own good. Asked by admirer Mitch about reports of her promiscuity, she wants
to defend herself. Invoking images of the long period of decline and ultimate death of her
mother, whom she was caring for, and of the local army base full as it was of lusty young men,
she explains: "Death-I used to sit here and she used to sit over there and death was as close
as you are .... We didn't even admit that we had heard of it! ...The opposite is desire ....How could you possibly wonder!" TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A Streetcar Named Desire,
BEST AMERICAN PLAYS 86 (3d ed. 1945-51).
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since, after all, most sex-based lying probably falls into that most
objectionable class of falsehoods-those which benefit the perpetrator
while harming the victim." 3 Lying for personal gain in this conception
is more objectionable than what Roth might have done to shelter
Malamud's pride.' And among this class of lies, perhaps sex fraud
is the most pernicious."zs To illustrate, if Andrea Dworkin is right that
sexual relations for a woman represent an annihilation of the self,"6
or if Jane Larson is right that when based on fraud, they can represent
a gross violation of a woman's autonomy and "dignity interests,"5 7
something would have to be done. So the question arises: Should we
think of sexual fraud as a kind of ritual symbolic murder of a class of
people who, because of a lopsided distribution of power, are in no
position to protect themselves? Or should the law ignore sexual fraud
as behavior not so different from masturbation; full of delusion but of
no great moment?
V. MEN VS. WOMEN AS VICTIMS

Your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule
over you.
-Genesis 3:16
How fortunate we are that women defend themselves so
badly. Otherwise we would be only their timid slaves.
-Pierre

Choderlos de Laclos258

A. The Pain of Love
Do sexual relationships gone bad hurt so much that, at least in the
context of sex fraud, the law ought to intervene? The question is an

253. See BOK, supra note 137, at 79-80. This distinction was perhaps originally drawn by
Augustine. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 133, at 21.
254. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
255. See Larson, supra note 14, at 417-19.
256. See ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 138 (1987); see also infra notes 273-75 and
accompanying text (discussing negative aspects and consequences of seduction from the female's
viewpoint).
257. See Larson, supra note 14, at 460 n.374.
258. PIERRE CHODERLOS DE LACLOS, LES LIAISONS DANGEREUSES 15 (1782) (Lowell Bair
trans., New Classic ed., 1992).
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important one." For at the heart of the case for actionability is a
serious problem. The technical measure of damages in fraud actions is
the amount of money that would have accrued to the innocent party if
the fraud had not taken place.2" There being (usually) little or no
monetary loss in sex fraud cases, advocates of tort for sexual fraud must
stress, as Larson does, the uniqueness of the damage in these cases.26 '
Consistent with this position is Carole Pateman's assertion that
"[s]exual services, that is to say, sex and sexuality, are constitutive of
the body .... Sexuality and the body[,]" she adds, "are ... integrally
connected to conceptions of femininity and masculinity, and all [of]
these are constitutive of our individuality, our sense of self-identity."262
Autonomy, i.e. basic personal dignity, for Jane Larson requires, among
other things, "bodily integrity" and "sexual self-possession."263 This
latter category "includes a person's interest in sexual self-expression
through acts and with partners that satisfy her present desires and
purposes. Nonconsensual sex is an act of bodily and sexual dispossession..... ""
Implicit in these notions would appear to be the idea that sex is
"closer to personhood," or "considered more priceless," than, say,
ordinary wage contracts, to go back to the economic model on which
Larson premises her case,26 and thus sexual expectations should
receive even more protection under the law than the latter. But, as
Raymond Belliotti has argued, to say these things is only to repeat in
conclusory form what must be proved."6 Furthermore, he suggests, "If
what we do affects directly who we are, it is certainly arguable that the
more enduring character of wage labor is more central and crucial to
personal identity than temporary sexual activity." '67 Recent studies on
the effects of joblessness would seem to assign at least an equally
central psychological importance to employment.268
259. See Larson, supra note 14, at 416-19.
260. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) ("One who fraudulently makes
a misrepresentation of fact .. . for the purpose of inducing another to act . . . is subject to
liability ... for the pecuniary loss caused to [the other] by his justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation.").
261. See Larson, supra note 14, at 461.
262. Carol Pateman, Defending Prostitution:ChargesAgainst Ericsson, 93 ETHICS 561,562
(1983).
263. Larson, supra note 14, at 425.
264. Id. (emphasis in original).
265. Id. at 436, 438.
266. BELLIOTrI, supra note 189, at 123.

267. Id.
268. See JOSEPH T. HOWELL, HARD LIVING ON CLAY STREET (1973); MELVIN KOHN &
CARMI SCHOOLER, WORK AND PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL
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But perhaps combining the sexual experience of men and women and
comparing such experience with that of other activities, as we have
done, does not do justice to the actual experience of sex for women.
Perhaps differences in wealth and social power, in physical strength, and
in the nature of the sexual organs and mechanics of sex lead to greater
vulnerablility of women. Surely the most fully developed, if extreme,
case for the destructive power of sex on women is made by Andrea
Dworkin, for whom all intercourse seems to be, in an important sense,
nonconsensual.269 According to Dworkin sex means social inferiority,
sexual subordination, obedience to man, and surrender to male force or
violence.27 "What is taken from [a woman] in that act is not recoverable, and she spends her life-wanting, after all to have something-pretending that pleasure is in being reduced through intercourse
to insignificance .... She learns to eroticize powerlessness and
self-annihilation.""71 While few feminists will go as far as Dworkin,
many, including Larson, would seem to agree with her that even outside
the context of classical rape, where force is applied or threatened,
women
are exposed to far greater sex-based emotional harm than are
272
men.

Do we have to accept the notion? 273 Would Sol Wachtler? When
considering writing about sex fraud some years back, this author asked
a then intimate friend whether she thought she needed more protection

STRATIFICATION (1983); MICHAEL L. SCHWALBE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
NATURAL AND ALIENATED LABOR (1986).
269. DWORKIN, supra note 256.
270. Id. at 137-38.
271. Id.
272. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Linda LeMoncheck offers a reason for why
women might be more vulnerable to sex-based harm than men. "Sex," she writes, "is a less
effective vehicle for dehumanizing men than it is for women. Men typically have no rape
mentality .... " DEHUMANIZING WOMEN 92-93 (Rowman & Allanheld 1985). (We can recognize
but must put aside fear of homosexual rape here.) The view that women are the primary victims
of sexual relationships is not confined to women. Irving Kristol argues for a new male sexual
code. See Irving Kristol, Men, Women and Sex, WALL ST. J.,
May 12, 1992, at A24.
273. Kant apparently did not. "If then a man wishes to satisfy his desire, and a woman hers,
they stimulate each other's desire," he writes anticipating Dworkin: "their inclinations meet, but
their object is not human nature but sex, and each of them dishonors the other." IMMANUEL
KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 164 (Louis Infield trans., 1963).
Compare also the findings of a study on suicide 15 years ago. "[I]nterestingly," writes the
author, "divorce or separation was mentioned as a cause of suicide attempts only for male
suicide completions and younger female nonfatal attempts." RONALD MARIS (with Bernard
Lazerowitz), PATHWAYS TO SUICIDE 272 (1981). But see Shelley Levitt, What Women Don't
Know About Today's Men, READER'S DIGEST, Oct. 1995, at 57 (Myth #4: Men Cope with
Breakups More Easily than Do Women).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

55

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 47

against sex fraud than the men she knew. Her proud, almost contemptuous response: "Can't I hurt you as much as you can hurt me?"274
Let us now shift our focus from the pain produced by our more or
less conscious interactions with one another to that produced by the
sexual act itself, which is rarely faced directly. If we are successful at
doing so, must we conclude that the experience of sex strikes closer to
the woman's sense of self-worth than the man's, that she is at greater
risk of emotional harm? To be sure, as Dworkin emphasizes, the woman
can feel invaded (and befouled),2 7' but does the man emerge unscathed?
Bristling at the notion that women are the victims of sexual
intercourse, Camille Paglia highlights the emotional high-wire experience that sex is for the male. Will he be able to perform? (Does he have
the requisite will?) If he can, will he measure up or is his fate to be
ridiculed? (Does he have the requisite forces?) If he enters her, will he
get out intact? (Is she lying in ambush?) In our earlier hypothetical,
Bryan failed the first of these tests and we can only imagine what
happened to him.276 But even when the man passes, Paglia suggests,
he fails (his victory is pyrrhic and exceedingly shortlived.). 2" His vital
force is taken from him, she notes (mocks?); "[m]en enter in triumph
but withdraw in decrepitude."2 '78
Surely it is this vulnerability that is a major source of man's
enduring hostility to woman. But man's vulnerability-and thus his
hostility-also stems from deeper sources than the physicality of the
sexual process, and it is here that the reductive empowered/disempowered, patriarch/victim, hegemonic/subordinated dualities
that characterize Larson's work are most distressing. For if men have
the edge over women in some areas, in another, as we shall now see,
men are regularly and roundly humiliated.

274. Indeed.
275. "By definition, she [has] a lesser privacy, a lesser integrity of the body, a lesser sense
of self since her body can be physically occupied and in the occupation taken over. [T]his lesser
privacy ... this lesser self, establishes her lesser significance. She is defined by how she is
made, that hole which is synonymous with entry ... [with] consequences to her that may be
intrinsic." See DWORKIN, supra note 256, at 122-23.
276. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
277. PAGLIA, supra note 235, at 20.
278. Id. Are these images of loss and potential dismemberment any less powerful in
explaining sexual behavior than ones of colonization and defilement? Who is to say?
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B. Beggars and the Beggees
"I only beg for sex," says the Woody Allen character in trying to
save a nubbin of dignity before or after some new self-debasement 9
Why, since the beginning of human memory, have even his most
fortunate fellow males dissipated their energies in wheedling, cajoling,
propitiating, and otherwise prostituting themselves for sex? In Sex and
Reason, Richard Posner provides a simple answer: the male sex drive
is stronger than that of the female.28 Posner's argument, however, has
been heavily criticized and, because there are other ways in arriving at
his conclusion, will not be pursued further here. 8 '
Of more help in evaluating the relative sexual power-and thus
vulnerability-of men and women may be Donald Symons' classic, The

279. The author asks to be taken on faith on this one; memory fails.
280. See POSNER, supra note 122, at 91-92. This position would seem to be confirmed by
recent findings that three times as many men as women-54% vs. 19%-think about sex at least
once a day. See ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA 156 (1994). But see Nussbaum,
infra note 281 and accompanying text. At a conference I attended not long ago at Brown
University, Posner highlighted his conclusion. When Catherine MacKinnon's turn to speak came,
a roar of approval erupted from the audience as she countered: "Yes, but we come and we come
and we come." The observation, of course, as Posner points out in his book Sex and Reason, is
simply not responsive. POSNER, supra note 122, at 92.
281. Posner relies for his conclusion principally on reports of heterosexual and homosexual
activity, specifically, that male homosexuals are most sexually active, heterosexuals are next,
while female homosexuals are least active. See POSNER, supra note 124, at 91. The criticism is
that he has failed to consider the nature and environment of homosexual interactions. See
Ruthann Robson, Posner'sLesbians: Neither Sexy nor Reasonable, 25 CONN. L. REV. 491,497
(1993).
Martha Nussbaum has attempted a fuller critique of Posner and a defense of womanhood.
See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Only Grey Matter: Richard Posner'sCost-Benefit Analysis of Sex,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1689, 1715-16 (1992) (criticizing Posner's conclusion that men have stronger
sex drives than women). To understand Nussbaum's view, we need to think of Posner as
likening the male sex drive to an unopened bottle of soda that is constantly being jostled. Id. at
1715. There is increasing disequilibrium within the bottle until the the cap is twisted open or
blows off. Id. (For a stunning and heart-wrenching account of the slow journey into hell of a
male deprived of sexual and emotional intimacy, see DENNIS POTrER, PENNIES FROM HEAVEN
(Faber & Faber 1996) (1981)).
Nussbaum contrasts this "push" aspect of sexuality with that experienced by women: "It is
simply not true," she writes, "that the state of arousal and desire in a human being is a function
only of biology..... Id. at 1716. For women, a "pull" factor operates under which arousal takes
place when there is a perception of special value in the object. Id. And when that object-Mr.
Right-is discovered, she suggests, women can be just as sexually driven as men. Id.
Coming back to our analogy, what Nussbaum is saying is that while men are content with
soda, women are interested only in Chateau Lafite, but when they get it they need to drink at
least as much as men do soda. Id. But how useful is this observation? If a woman rejects all
offers of soda, and drinks only vintage wine, given that the latter is not always available, how
meaningful is it to say that the woman is just as thirsty as the man?
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Evolution of Human Sexuality.282 In his chapter entitled, "Copulation

'
as a Female Service"283
Symons begins by asking the more limited

question of why it is that

[a]mong all peoples it is primarily men who court, woo,
proposition, seduce... [and] give gifts in exchange for
sex.... Everywhere sex is understood to be something that

females have that males want; it constitutes a service or
favor that females in general can bestow or withhold from

males in general, although "favorless" intercourse also
occurs, and the exchange may be reversed in certain
circumstances.284

What a blow to the male ego, that in the scales of romance his
affection is found so wanting that female affection has to be bought!
Symons does not arrive at his painful conclusion lightly, but only after
careful review of the anthropological literature.285 It might be suggested that only men give gifts because only they have property to give, but
this seems too farfetched, since it requires that the women literally never
owned anything of value.
If in the economics of sexual behavior gifts flow from males to
females, Symons wants to know why.286 It is not that sex pleasures
men more than women, he argues; indeed, he points out, the Judgment
of Tiresias suggests otherwise. 87 The view that copulation is a female,
282. See DONALD A. SYMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SEXUALITY (1979).
283. Id. at 253-85.
284. Id. at 253 (emphasis added). This pattern is not unique to humans. In species after
species, Darwin noted, the female is "less eager than the male." Quoted in Robert Wright, Our
Cheating Hearts, TIME, Aug. 15, 1994, at 47.
285. SYMONS, supra note 282, at 257-58. In a review of the Human Relations Area Files,
Symons finds that in 15 of the societies only the men give gifts; in one both the men and
women give gifts but the men's gifts are more valuable; and in three men and women exchange
gifts but the indeterminate values of the gifts prevents analysis of possible disequilibrium.
Symons informs us that he used the "extramarital sex" heading in his search, but that his
conclusion was based on all the evidence of sexual gift giving he found in that section. Id.
286. Id.
287. See id. (quoting OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 1078 (2d ed. 1970)). Tiresias "saw
two snakes coupling and [repelled at the breach of public etiquette?] struck them with his stick,
whereat he became a woman; later the same thing happened again and he turned into a man.
Being asked by Zeus and Hera to settle a dispute as to which sex had more pleasure of love, he
decided for the female; Hera was angry and blinded him, but Zeus recompensed him by giving
him long life and power of prophecy." Id. at 261-62 (quoting OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY
1078 (2d ed. 1970)).
Why did Hera feel compelled to punish Tiresias? According to Symons, not for learning the
truth, but for revealing it. He elaborates:
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rather than a male service, or an even exchange, he suggests, rests on
other grounds, a few of which are offered here.288 First, males are
more aroused by visual stimuli, which tends to give females more
leverage.289 Second, males display greater "sexually appetitive behavior" than do females.' Third, females are better able to deal with abstinence than are males.29' Fourth, males have need for greater sexual
variety.2"
Symons' conclusions seem persuasive. Moreover, for men, even
where sex does not have to be bought, it has to be earned.293 In our
romantic traditions it is men who slay dragons or swim the Hellespont
to win the hearts of their ladies.294 It is the men who stand on the
street side of the sidewalk to protect their ladies from the slop produced
by passing vehicles. And it is the women who bestow or withhold their
"favors."295 But perhaps most persuasive of all in establishing Symons'
point, more than the science, the literature, and the linguistic usage, is
our personal experience as it informs our imagination. In Aristophanes'
Lysistrata, the women, distraught over continuing call-ups to the front
by political leaders, resolve to stop sleeping with their husbands and

In an interaction between two people, the relative value of the interaction to each
participant determines which, if either, is providing the service; but value and
pleasure are nonobservable states of mind, and goods and services are worth
whatever one can get for them, hence Hera's anger and Zeus's satisfaction: were
Tiresias' decision to become generally known, it would give males added leverage
in sexual transactions with women and very likely in nonsexual transactions with
women as well.
Id. at 262.
288. See id. at 253-85 (discussing copulation as a female service to males).
289. See id. at 264.
290. See id.; see also Carrie Gottlieb, DiminishedDesire,NEWSDAY, Sept. 12, 1994, at B 15
(discussing factors influencing diminished sex drives in women). One would think that thousands
of years of experience with prostitution would have settled the issue of whose sex drive is
greater as would increasing evidence that men masturbate much more frequently than do women.
See MICHAEL ET AL., supra note 280, at 158-59. The authors themselves, however, urge some
caution in evaluating this latter data because in their minds masturbation is more of a social
construct than an expression of physical need. See id. at 159.
291. See SYMONS, supra note 282, at 265.
292. Id. at 266. You do not need the training of a Donald Symons or a Jane Larson to
understand these matters: "La chocha tiene mas fuerza que una junta de bueyes," goes an old
South American folk saying. Clhefemale genitaliaare more powerful than a yoke of oxen.) To
this author's knowledge, male counterparts have never received such recognition for their
drawing power.
293. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
294. See ACKERMAN, supra note 224, at 54.
295. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
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lovers until they refuse to fight.296 If women were the warriors, would
even the most resolutely pacifist community of males be able to pull
this off? 9 7 "[W]hile without a minimum of food (or water, or shelter)
people die," taunts a feminist author, "to my knowledge no one has ever
died for want of an outlet for their sexual appetites."2'98 Could a man

have written that?
In short, in the face of claims of powerlessness, women hold a (the?)

key card, one that after being played, moreover, is magically restored to
the holder to be played again and again.299 Does this continuing source
of power help offset political, economic, and social advantages now
decreasingly held by men? Physical advantages? Perhaps this source of
power explains why feminist philosopher Virginia Held writes that "in
their dealings with one another, man and woman discover ... that man
can overpower woman... and woman can overpower man-that is, at
the level of sexual power, as opposed to muscular and other power,"-as if the sexual power can be separated from political and social
powers-"they really are equal."3"
At any rate, we lack a compelling rationale for generalizing about

women's powerlessness and for deeming them emotionally more
vulnerable than men to sexual relationships, and thus, to sex fraud."'

296. See ACKERMAN, supra note 224, at 22.
297. If science has demonstrated that men indeed have greater sexually appetitive behavior,
we must not suppose that women are passive players in all aspects of the courtship process.
Indeed, a recent cross-cultural study of techniques used by women to show interest concludes
that nothwithstanding general assumptions, "in practice women around the world actively begin
sexual liaisons." See HELEN FISHER, ANATOMY OF LOVE 1-36 (1994).
298. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 198 (1988).
299. See supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text. If women in fact hold the key card,
Larson's proposal faces an interesting obstacle, because her argument is that sex fraud should
be treated just like economic fraud. But the law does not necessarily punish fraud in economic
contexts. Consider the case of employees who lie about their credentials to get a job. See Lopez,
supra note 144, at R6. Do employers have a cause of action against them for loss of expected
productivity and training expenses? In an extensive review of the literature on this subject, this
author has found no case in which the employee has been sued, let alone successfully sued. How
can we understand this peculiar state of affairs? To be sure, employees are often judgment proof.
But there are many employees, especially today, who earn enormous salaries and presumably
have the wherewithal to pay. A better explanation, it is suggested here, is a sense by employers
that the law is stacked against them because of a perception that they control the marketplace
and that lying would be seen as merely righting the (im)balance of power. See id. But if,
because of perceived powerlessness in the marketplace, employees are effectively authorized to
manipulate their employers at will, on what basis could our Love Courts discipline men, who,
under our hypothesis, also come as supplicants?
300. Virginia Held, Marx, Sex, and the Transformationof Society, 5 PHILOSOPHICAL F. 168,
175 (1973).
301. See id.
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But then, in what sense might a sex fraud tort be imagined as emerging
from "A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction?" 3"
VI. WOMEN VS. MEN AS LIARS

Sigh no more, ladies, sigh no more,
Men were deceivers ever,
One foot in sea and one on shore,
To one thing constant never.
-Wm.Shakespeare

3

Never was it given to mortal man to lie so boldly as we
women can.
-Alexander

Pope" 4

If men's sexual needs are more importunate than those of women,
and if lying is a means for people to get what they want, then men will
be more likely to lie to get sex. Is this, finally, the feminist basis of
Larson's proposal?3 5

302. See Larson, supra note 14, at 379-80. Once again the subtitle of Larson's article. The
question of whether a sex fraud tort has a fundamentally feminist nature, a question that
continues as the subject of the next part, is of considerable importance. As we have seen
throughout, Larson wraps her tort in symbols that are female-oriented as opposed to
gender-neutral. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. Her plaintiffs are virtually always
sympathetic women victims; her defendants male predators. See id. In addition, her intellectual
sources are drawn almost entirely from the realm of feminist scholarship. See, e.g., Larson,
supra note 14, at 390-91 nn.67-69. Larson's purpose in all this seems absolutely clear-to draw
on the prestige and the power of the feminist movement. Id. at 380. My purpose here is to try
to disentangle the tort from the needs of women so that the tort can be evaluated on grounds that
are less ideologically charged. Deciding whether or not the tort is feminist, of course, does not
resolve the question of whether it is desirable. This issue will be the subject of Parts VI, VII,
and VIII.
303. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING act 2, sc. 2.
304. Quoted inH.L. MENCKEN, A NEW DICrIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 730 (1942). This
sounds suspiciously like Chaucer's Wife of Bath. See CHAUCER, supra note 230. But why
quibble?
305. See Larson, supra note 14, at 379-80 (proposing a new cause of action for sexual
fraud).
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A. The Problem with Men
Leslie Farber offers some support for this idea.3" The author
wonders why it is that, as evidenced by women's persistent complaints
over the years, when the man comes home at the end of the day,
man/woman talk fails.30 7 The woman overflows with descriptions and
analysis of the day's happenings, but when she turns around and asks
the man about his day, he shuts down.
If we wish to understand the man's reticence, Farber suggests we
should think back to the man's adolescence when he was in the throes
of what Midge Decter apparently coined, "undifferentiated lust," a drive
to unite with the entire population of the opposite sex, a sentiment not
shared by his potential women partners.3 8 The only drive they have
that "corresponds to some degree to [his] is an undifferentiated desire
to be desired by anyone and everyone."3 9
Given this difference, asks Farber, "how can there be frank talk?"
"To admit that he is driven by a sexual hunger for anyone or everyone
would, he believes, deprive him of release with a woman who does not
share this extreme hunger.""" He may, by using the egalitarian notions
of the day, try to convince his partner to consider him a sexual object,
as he does her, but common experience tells us this does not work.
The man's partner often will understand the differences between
them and taunt him: "All you want is my body." He quickly learns the
art of disavowal, that the lust that overpowers him must "be concealed
or dissembled in his dealings with women." And as with any success
mechanism, the disavowal spreads throughout his life's dealings "almost
by contagion, to include all manner of experience, both pleasurable and
painful, that has little to do with his undifferentiated lust. At this point
there may be said to be a 'habit of disavowal,' "-a proclivity to lie-to

306. See

LESLIE FARBER, LYING, DESPAIR, JEALOUSY, ENVY, SEX, SUICIDE, DRUGS, AND

THE GOOD LIFE (1976).

307. Id. at 167-68. That this is an enduring problem for women is manifested by the fact
that Deborah Tannen devotes an entire chapter to it in her recent book. See DEBORAH TANNEN,
Put Down that Paper and Talk to Me!: Rapport-Talk and Report Talk, in YOU JUST DON'T
UNDERSTAND: MEN AND WOMEN IN CONVERSATION 74-95 (1990).

308. See FARBER, supra note 306, at 170.
309. Id.at 175 (emphasis added).
310. Id. at 171.
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women generally.3 ' In time, fearing exposure as a liar, but seeing
little gain and much risk in straight talk, the man simply clams up.
Sociobiologically-based evolutionary theory would seem to confirm
the tendency of males to lie. Under the classical version of this theory,
since men can never know that they are the fathers of any given baby,
they gain evolutionary advantage when they impregnate the largest
number of women. With fewer potential offspring, by contrast, women
gain more when they induce the fathers of their children to stick around
and provide nurture for the young so that they will survive.3" 2

311. Id.; cf. RICH, supra note 6, at 186. "Men have been expected to tell the truth about
facts, not about feelings. They have not been expected to talk about feelings at all. Yet even
about facts they have continually lied." Id. Farber's and Rich's observations are even more
compelling if we accept the proposition that copulation is a female service, not the culmination
of any process where two similarly situated persons get together. In this context men would be
motivated to avoid any disclosure that might upset the delicate mood.
312. These notions, longstanding in biology, and accepted for the most part by Posner, have
come under attack in recent years. See, e.g., PHILIP KITCHER, VAULTING AMBITION:
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE (1985); Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Letter, N.Y.
REV. OF BooKs, July 14, 1994, at 54.
I was the first to propose that female primates may mate with multiple males so
as to confuse information available to males about paternity and thereby enhance
the survival of subsequent offspring, since former consorts might be more disposed
to help, or at least not to harm, possibly related offspring.
Hrdy, supra, at 54. Feminist legal academics, responding to Posner's book, Sex and Reason,
have been especially critical. See, e.g., Jane Larson, The New Home Economics, 10 CONST.
COMMENTARY 443-63 (1993); Robin West, Sex, Reason and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO.
L.J. 2413 (1993) (review); Gillian Hadfield, Flirting with Science: Richard Posner on the
Bioeconomics of Sexual Man, 106 HARV. L. REV. 479 (1992) (review).
That feminists should respond so harshly to Posner should not be surprising. Sociobiology
with its essentialist emphasis on female nurturing and sexual passivity can be read to counteract
the central feminist message that it is exciting to be a woman. It is perhaps for this reason that
Larson writes wishfully that "[i]n the past decade scientists have disproved this prediction of
passive females and promiscuous males as having been based on evidence gathered using
distorted observation methods." Larson, supra,at 456. West longs for the day when sociobiology
will go the way of phrenology." West, supra, at 2438.
This is not to deny the real contribution of critics to the discussion of such matters. Larson,
like Posner before her, forces our attention to changes in the direction of a freer and more active
sex life among Swedish women in response to a social welfare system (broadly defined) that
makes women less dependent on men. See Larson, supra, at 4. Hadfield suggests that if classical
sociobiology were on target, women would spend time only with monogamous males. Hadfield,
supra, at 489. Thus, even allowing for mistakes in evaluating specific males, the monogamous
males could not dominate the population. Hadfield, supra, at 489. In this view, since the Don
Giovannis are successful as a class, it must be because a purely sexual drive, i.e., one
independent of concern for protection of the young, must be asserting itself. Happily, the validity
of the classical sociobiological position on this issue does not need to be resolved here.
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Matt Ridley draws out the implications. "In courtship, as in the world
of advertising," he writes, "there is a discrepancy of interests between
the buyer and the seller. The female wants to know the truth about the
male [the seller for Ridley as well as for Symons]-his health, wealth
and genes. The male wants to exaggerate the information. The female,"
Ridley adds, "wants the truth: the male wants to lie. The very word
3 3
seduction implies trickery and manipulation.""
That a major function of human speech is to advertise one's self,
including one's sexual self-as opposed to passing along name, rank,
and serial number-should not be surprising. Indeed as Ridley notes,
manipulating the listener may be at the heart of all animal communication. Citing a major study, Ridley writes that "a nightingale does not
sing to inform potential mates about himself; he sings to seduce them.
'
If that means lying about his true prowess, so be it."314
But what about the female nightingale and by extension the human
female? If she "wants the truth," is she prepared to give it?315
B. What's Sauce for the Gander
At the turn of the seventeenth century it was women, not men, who
were performing Elizabethan bed tricks.3 16 In the culture of late

eighteenth-century France it was Madame de Merteuil who was
orchestrating the greatest assault on sincerity in romantic discourse since
Ovid.317 In the nineteenth century women were known to deliberately

313. See RIDLEY, supra note 241, at 154.
314. Id. at 158 (citing Dawkins & Krebs, Animal Signals: Information and Manipulation,
in BEHAVIOURAL ECOLOGY 282-309 (1978)). Compare this observation with that of Anatole
France, supra note 133.
315. "Natural selection," writes Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, "has produced women who are
assertive, sexually active, or highly competitive, who adroitly manipulated male consorts ..
Hrdy, supra note 312, at 54.
316. Lionel Trilling explains this phenomen best. " 'I am not what I am [or say]' could
have been said not alone by lago but by a multitude of Shakespeare's virtuous characters at
some point in their careers.... Helena is not Diana, Mariana is not Isabella-the credence the
Elizabethan audience gave to the ancient bed-trick in which a woman passes herself off as
another during a night of love, suggests the extent of its commitment to the idea of impersonation [or misrepresentation]." LIONEL TRILLING, SINCERITY AND AUTHENTICITY 13-14 (1971).
We should not, however, make too much out of Elizabethan women's manipulations, Marliss
Desehs tells us. See MARLISS C. DESENS, THE BED TRICK IN ENGLISH RENAISSANCE DRAMA

140 (1994). In the mostly male-written dramas she examined, fully 60% of the bed-tricks were
orchestrated by men, while in the remaining cases the device usually was used by women only
to regain wayward husbands. Id. For more on the bed trick, see infra notes 402-13 and
accompanying text.
317. See LACLOS, supra note 258.
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misinterpret a squeeze of the hand as a proposal of marriage." ' And
it is of twentieth-century America that, as we have seen, D.H. Lawrence
writes that the "greatest triumph an American woman can have is the
triumph of seducing a man, especially if he is pure. 3 9
It is easy to imagine Lawrence creating a paradigmatic seductress for
the ages. But if he even tried, he failed, and the model we are left with
is not an American at all, but the central character in the eponymous
opera, Carmen. 3' Because of Carmen's importance-she is probably
the best-known female opera character-close attention will be given to
her here and later in this Article. In the first act Carmen is entertaining
the crowd while Corporal-of-the-guard Don Jose is cleaning his gun, the
only person paying her no mind whatever.321 Piqued, she throws a
flower at him, which he, intrigued, picks up. 3' Later Carmen instigates
a fight with her co-workers. 3z When she is locked up and put into
Don Jose's custody, she pleads for her freedom, offering a relationship
with him when they next meet.324 Don Jose is an innocent, the only
one in town, it seems, who does not know of Carmen's devil-may-care
sexuality, and his guilelessness is perhaps best evidenced by his
relationship with his hometown sweetheart, the virginal Micaela.325
Don Jose, however, is savvy enough to know that letting Carmen go
free will have serious professional consequences for him, but Carmen,
sensing Don Jose's weakness for her, taunts him.326 In response he
asks her: "If I surrender, if I give in, will you keep your promise? And
if I love, Carmen, Carmen, will you love me?" "Yes," she says.32 He
318. See William Satire, Jimmy Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1994, at A17. One could
argue that squeezes of the hand could come to be understood through custom as proposals of
marriage. Safire, however, speaks of women "deliberately misinterpreting" the act. Id. I take this
to mean that no claim is being made based on social convention.
319. HARDWICK, supra note 247, at 181. Recall here the connection made by Baudrillard
between seduction and "systematic simulation." BAUDRILLARD, supra note 93, at 19.
320. See GEORGES BIzET, CARMEN (Ellen H. Bleiler trans., 1983).
321. Id. at act I, sc.2.
322. Id. We might conclude from her behavior that Carmen has an "undifferentiated" need
to be loved. See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
323. BIZET, supra note 320, at act I, sc.2.
324. Id. at act I, sc.2. The Carmen case involves a reversal of sorts. In most of the cases
examined here a promise or statement is made to induce romance or sexual services. Carmen,
by contrast, is offering romance and sexual services in order to induce other action. But from
Larson's standpoint the reversal should be irrelevant, since any damage to Don Jose as a result
of misrepresentation will-if we accept the proposition that sexual fraud is equally damaging
to both sexes-be no different from that suffered by, say, Don Giovanni's victims. See Larson,
supra note 14, at 378-79.
325. BIZET, supra note 320, at act I, sc.2.
326. Id. at act I, sc.2.
327. Id. at act I, sc.2.
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frees her and is temporarily imprisoned himself for neglect of duty.328
Later, after Carmen threatens to withdraw her affections, Don Jose
32 9
deserts his regiment to begin a life of crime as a smuggler with her.1
Not long thereafter Carmen tires of Don Jose's dependence on her.
Don Jose is devastated, for he has given up not only an honorable
career, but an honorable and long-standing relationship as well. Feeling
the sting of loss and humiliation, he longs to make sense of the
shambles of his life and begs Carmen for a word of encouragement. °
With self-righteous, proud, and arguably justified indignation, she says
no, adding, "Carmen has never lied,"33 ' a statement which, because it
leaves him fully responsible for his own downfall, costs Carmen her life,
probably Don Jose his, and Micaela perhaps effectively hers.
C. Women Speak
If there are elements of Don Giovanni in every man, is it not
conceivable that every woman is part Carmen? As it turns out, we need
not look to long deceased male authors, composers, and librettists'32
conceptions of women to extend to them the indictment for lying.
"Naturally good until now, I had never lied, for nothing tempted me,"
writes Diana Cooper.333 "But now with the advent of the young
'
men-benign serpents--came the apple .... Childhood was over."334
Scarlett O'Hara tells Frank Kennedy that her sister is no longer available
for marriage because Scarlett, anxious to get money to maintain Tara,

328. Id. at act I, sc.2. & act II, sc.l.
329. Id. at act II, sc.4.
330. Id. at act IV, sc.2.
331. Id. at act IV,sc.2. The argument that Carmen is blameless in this matter is grounded
in the notion that sexual relationships-especially new ones-are inherently unstable so that
promises to continue relationships are meaningless.
Would Larson allow a cause of action against Carmen's estate? Since she cheered Sharon
Wildey on for bringing her breach-of-promise case, see Wildey v. Springs, 840 F. Supp. 1259
(N.D. II. 1994) and supra note 106, one wonders whether she would support Don Jose here. To
be sure, Carmen did not promise to marry Don Jose, but she did coax him with her favors into
leaving his military position, knowing that for him there was no going back and that the chance
of any but the shortest relationships between them was nil. BIzET, supra note 320, at act I, sc.2
& act II, sc.. It is this knowledge on her part that leads to the conclusion that Carmen is a
seductress and not merely a sexually free woman.
332. Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest that Carmen was modeled on a real
courtesan who became a writer. See SUSAN MCCLARY, GEORGES BIZET: CARMEN IN
CAMBRIDGE OPERA HANDBOOK 39 (1992).
333. DIANA COOPER, THE RAINBOW COMES AND GOES (1958), quoted in THE NEW
QUOTABLE WOMAN 301 (1993).
334. Id.
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wants Frank for herself.335 "[W]omen," admits Larson in a recent
interview, "are just as inclined, it seems to me,
336 to be deceitful and to be
sexually exploitive of partners as men are."
Even more instructive is the Table Talk of a leading poetess of
contemporary feminism, Adrienne Rich.3 37
We have been expected to lie with our bodies: to bleach,
redden, unkink or curl our hair, pluck eyebrows, shave
armpits.... We have been required to tell different lies at
different times depending on what men of the time needed
to hear. The Victorian wife or the white southern lady who
were expected to have no sensuality, to "lie still"; the
twentieth-century "free" woman who is expected to fake
orgasms.338
"In the struggle for survival we tell lies," Rich continues, "[t]o... men
who have power over us, who legally own us and our children, lovers
who need us as proof of their manhood. 339
The devil made me do it. Is this what today's feminism is, at bottom,
all about: avoiding responsibility for women's actions?3" Is it so

335. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (MGM 1939).
336. Jane Larson, All Things Considered(National Public Radio Broadcast, Aug. 1, 1993),
available in LEXIS, News library, APR file.
337. RICH, supra note 6.
338. Id. at 188. "Who knows," Baudrillard asks, challenging the prevailing wisdom, "if
women, far from being 'despoiled,' have not from time immemorial been playing a game of
their own by triumphantly asserting a right to sexual reticence? If they have not, from the depths
of their sexual impassibility, been throwing down a challenge, challenging men's pleasure to be
but the pleasure of men alone?" See BAUDRILLARD, supra note 93, at 18.
Is this so farfetched? Worried that after they deny their lovers sexual comforts they would
be beaten into submission, the community of women ask Lysistrata for her counsel. LYSISTRATA,
IN ARISTOPHANES: THE ELEVEN COMEDIES 237 (1943). 'Then yield to their wishes," she urges,
"but with a bad grace; there is no pleasure for them where they do it by force. Besides, there
are a thousand ways of tormenting them." Id.
339. "I want to reiterate," emphasizes Rich, "that when we talk about women and honor
or women and lying, we speak within the context of male lying, the lies of the powerful ......
RICH, supra note 6, at 189.
Rich is not the only one who, noting women's flight from truth, nevertheless proclaims their
innocence. Harriet G. Lerner compiles a list of women's complaints: "I pretended I was in love
with him because I was desperate to get married"; I pretended to want sex"; "I pretended to
enjoy motherhood"; "I pretended to be happy in my marriage." "Patriarchy," concludes Lemer,
"schools women to pretend as a virtual way of life. .. ." HARRIET G. LERNER, THE DANCE OF
DECEPTION 121 (1993).
340. Alas, there is evidence to support such a view. See, e.g., Deirdre English, Raising the
"New Daughter," N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV. 11 (Oct. 10, 1993). The authors want to know why
mothers and daughters are so often at odds with one another. "Their thesis," writes English, "is
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difficult to acknowledge, "I am human, therefore I lie"-and then to
speak of special burdens on women?341
3 42 Is Rich articulating the core of
women's future defense to sex fraud?
D. The Contemporary Scene
Whatever the case, women's lies and their legal effects have been at
issue in two recent civil actions. How shall we evaluate them? In 1988
Anita Singh placed an ad in the India West and India Abroad magazines, advertising her availability for marriage and describing herself as
a third-year student at the University of California in electrical
that traditional mothers betray daughters by their subservience to male patriarchal authority. In
male-dominated families, mothers are generally in charge of keeping girls from rebelling, and
daughters are so indebted to mother love that they ... submit," she adds, "but not without
lasting, half-repressed resentment." Id.
341. Compare one of the confessionals in the Jewish liturgy: "We abuse, We betray, We
are cruel .... We falsify .... We lie .... We pervert. We quarrel." MAHZOR FOR ROSH
HASHANAH AND YOM KIPPUR 715 (2d ed. 1981).
342. Rich, to her credit, is at least embarrassed by women's manipulations; there would be
no point otherwise in seeking to deflect responsibility to others. The same cannot be said of the
latest school of feminist critics of Bizet's opera. See, e.g., SUSAN MCCLARY, FEMININE
ENDINGS: MUSIC, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY 59-60 (1991) (noting Carmen's disdainful treatment
of Don Jose: "She continually resists his attempts at possessing her, manipulates him
pitilessly ...

talks back, makes sexual demands, takes other lovers ...

and even persuades him

to desert the army, to become an outlaw for her sake."); Nelly Furman, The Languages of Love
in Carmen, in READING OPERA 175 (Arthur Groos & Roger Parker eds., 1988) (characterizing
Carmen as a shameless manipulator); Michael Rabaud, A Tragedy of Love, Sun and Death, in
13 ENGLISH NATIONAL OPERA GUIDE (1982) (same). In their eyes, a suit against Carmen would
be absurd since she was not even owed an apology. It appears that for these critics, as Jennie
Cavilled put it, "[t1ove means not ever having to say you're sorry." ERICH SEGAL, LOVE STORY
91 (1970).
If anyone is indebted to anyone in this context, these scholars go on, it is Don Jose who
owes a profound measure of gratitude to Carmen. Sure, Carmen manipulates her lover's desire.
But Don Jose is actually better off with the infusion of vitality he receives from her. "The Jose
who is in love with Carmen ... is infinitely preferable to the pasteboard soldier Micaela
encounters at the beginning." See MCCLARY, supra, at 66; see also Rabaud, supra. (Is Dona
Elvira similarly better off for letting Don Giovanni into her life?) Jose is also better off without
his "black-and-white" values, MCCLARY, supra,at 66, and his "ideology of possession," Furman,
supra, at 175. Unlike Don Jose, we are to understand, Carmen is "in love with love itself." Her
love is based on feminine "jouissance" for it is "not necessarily mutually shared or even
reciprocated," but is rather "an energy in constant motion." Id. Carmen, in short, has achieved
an "assured place in the pantheon of feminist idols." See id. at 172.
That Don Jose may not find happiness, indeed may suffer immeasurably in this brave new
world, is of little concern. Here is the point. The very qualities Larson reviles in Don Giovanni,
the new critics revere in Carmen. See, e.g., MCCLARY, supra, at 66. Unlike Larson, this school
of thought does not dream of a world without Don Giovannis, but rather of a world full of
them-as long as they are women. See id. Larson's imaginable denial notwithstanding, the
manipulative woman has become a hero.
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engineering and a believer in traditional Indian values.3 43 Raghvendra
responded to the ad, and after a courtship of several months, the two got
married.3" Some time later a child was born to the couple.345 By
1991, however, the marriage was in serious trouble and Anita filed for
divorce.346
After the divorce was granted and Anita won custody of the child,
Raghvendra sued for damages in fraud on the grounds that she had lied
about her schooling and her values, that is, that she had been only a
first-year student at a community college and that by virtue of her
petition for divorce had proved her indifference to traditional Indian
norms of behavior.3 47 His marriage to his wife under these circumstances, Raghvendra alleged, had the effect of damaging his reputation
in the Indian community. 48 Are349we ready to see someone like Anita
wiped out for her transgression?
Or consider Askew v. Askew."s In an effort to mediate serious
marital difficulties, Ronald and Bonnette see a marriage counselor.
After thirteen years of marriage and two children-and with presumably
little, if any, sense of foreboding-Bonnette makes a stunning revelation.3 '2 Here is Ronald's testimony about the session:
Bonnie stated to me that she had been living a lie through
her marriage with-to me. And that she had deceived me,
and that she had at the time of our marriage, and at the
time that she entered into the marriage, that she had never
had any desire or any passion for me. That she had never
loved me, never loved me in the way-way that she knew
I wanted to be loved. That she-she-was wrong, and she
knew if-that if she had told me the truth, I would not have
married her....

343. Raoul v. Mowatt, Man Sues Ex-Wife for Allegedly Filing Phony PersonalAd, Hous.
CHRON., Nov. 4, 1992, at A9.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. No opinion of this case has been reported officially. The Supreme Court of California,
however, recently denied Raghvendra's petition for review of an adverse divorce ruling by the
Sixth Appellate District. In re Marriage of Anita & Raghvendra Singh, 1996 Cal. LEXIS 494.
350. 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
351. Id. at 287.
352. Id. at 286.
353. Brief for Appellant at 8-9, Askew, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (Nos.
G014021, G014610. G014892).
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While Bonnette's version of the session was different, her deposition
demonstrates the truth of the underlying statement.3 4 Some time after
the counseling session, Ronald Askew brought his action in sexual fraud
seeking monetary damages and the restitution of property taken in joint
tenancy with Bonnette 5 Bonnette countered that giving Ronald relief
would undermine the community property law. 356 The appellate court,
reversing the trial court, found for Bonnette on the grounds that the
heartbalm statute precluded relief. 357 Are we really ready now to
reverse that decision and grant Ronald relief for what he at least
considered the lie of his whole marriage and what surely is the
wreckage of his life?
VII. THE MIND GAME

Honesty is such a lonely word
Everyone's so untrue
Honesty is hardly ever heard
But mostly what I need from you
-Billy

Joel 358

354. Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Askew, 28 Cal. Rptr. 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (Nos.
G014021, G014610, G014892), as follows:
Q. Is it fair to say that you lost sexual desire for Mr. Askew priorto your marriage
to him?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it your opinion that had you told Mr. Askew of your lack of sexual desire for
him before the marriage, that he still would have married you?
A. I can't be certain of that.
Q. Do you recall Ron asking you before your marriage if there was anything that
he should know about before the two of you were married?
A. I believe so.
Q. Were you of the opinion that your lack of sexual desire for Ron was something
you did not need to tell him?
A. Yes.
Id. (emphasis in original).
355. Askew, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285.
356. Id. at 286.
357. Id.
358. Billy Joel Ballads, Honesty 32 (Hal Leonard Publishing 1993).
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We could make believe I love you/ Only make believe that
you love me/ Others find peace of mind in pretending/
Couldn't you?/ Couldn't I? Couldn't we?
-Jerome

Kern and Oscar Hammerstein I39

That women are full members in the community of liars and thus
equally vulnerable as men to charges of sex fraud, does not, of course,
require rejection of Larson's proposal."6 For even if sex fraud is
practiced equally and regularly by men and women, a sex fraud tort still
might be desirable.361 Two sets of questions arise at this point: To
what extent do speakers understand what they are saying and listeners
what they are hearing? And, to what extent are our answers to these
questions dependent on the gender of the speaker, listener, and evaluator? In other words, can we understand the language of romantic/sexual
partners? Can we even "Be sure it's true when [we] say 'I love
you?' 7362

Daniel is telling his friend about his date the previous evening and
how, after the most satisfying experience ever with her, he had told her
that he loved her-again a potentially actionable event for Larson.363
Yet, the morning after, Daniel has his regrets. 3 6 No, not the usual
ones; but did he lie?
A. From Head to Tongue
"I felt the love," Daniel reports, "I even felt myself wanting to love
her, and I was thinking about my future with her in it. '365 According
to Nyberg, Daniel wanted Nora to believe that "which he thought he
believed (though perhaps not completely) but which, as it turns out, he
does not now think he believes.,,3 ' The key question for Nyberg, then,
is, did Daniel believe "I love you, Nora' at the time he spoke. 367 The

359. MAKE BELIEVE, on SHOWBOAT (Columbia Records 1962).
360. See Larson, supra note 14, at 379-81.
361. See id. Tax evasion is, in this author's opinion, at least as pervasive and no
serious-minded individual advocates a laissez-faire policy as a response to that problem.
362. BILLY MAYHEW, IT'S A SIN TO TELL A LIE (1936). According to a recent study, this

is the second most common lie told to women. The first? "I'll call you." See HOLLANDER, supra
note 1, at 345.
363. NYBERG, supra note 141, at 51; see also Larson, supra note 14, at 466-67 (discussing
the elements of Larson's proposed sex fraud tort).
364. NYBERG, supra note 141, at 51.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. In terms of the definition of sex fraud, the question here is whether there has been
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problem, Nyberg points out, is our inability "to know exactly and
completely what we believe at any given time, especially at times of
'
heightened emotion, speculation, optimism."368
Asks Nyberg, who
provides no answer: "Does believing 'I love Nora' feel enough like
believing 'I want to love Nora; I hope I can' so that you might honestly
confuse the two states of mind?"3'69

Might a speaker be similarly confused about a misrepresentation of
fact, when he tells a potential romantic partner, for example, that he
does not have an ongoing relationship? Might he not want to believe
that he is physically and emotionally separated? And if such thoughts
are swirling around his head about his own relationships, might they not
with respect to other matters?
The problem is not only one of knowing, but also of communicating
that knowledge. "There is a treacherous transition from believing
something, thinking it through in one's own mind, to saying it out loud
to someone else," writes Nyberg.37 "Even though we may not always
experience fully the complexity of this transition, to speak a simple truth
is an impressive mental accomplishment."37 ' Karl Scheibe puts the
problem in a somewhat different way. "Speech is a misrepresentation of
psychological reality," he writes, "not because everyone is a malicious
liar but because that inner reality is fugitive and only poorly fits the
devices of expression it finds."37 Which brings us to the heart of the

poststructural message-that we do not create language, that grammar,
vocabulary, and syntax are but imperfect tools language offers us for our
a "fraudulent ... misrepresentation of fact, opinion or intention" and by extension whether there
can be justifiable reliance on it. Larson, supra note 14, at 453. "Fraudulent," of course, implies
knowledge of falsehood, scienter. Whether such scienter can be found in the Daniel/Nora case
will be dealt with (briefly) below. See infra note 383 and accompanying text.
368. NYBERG, supra note 141, at 51.
369. Id. Cheryl Merser expands on the difficulty of translating love talk. "Saying 'I love
you' can mean 'I like you,' 'I am having a good time, aren't you?,' 'Yes, we're lovers.' Or it
can mean the real thing, whatever that is. Early on in a relationship what it most often means
is that we're not in love, but 'in hope.' " CHERYL MERSER, HONORABLE INTENTIONS 26 (1983).
Similarly, my friend Ruth Ann Crowley points out, "we have only the foggiest working
definition of 'love' as in loving broccoli, music, dancing, your horse, etc."
The problem of knowing what we believe is aggravated by the limitations on our powers
of perception. "I start with the fact," writes the well-known scholar, Erving Goffman, "that from
an individual's particular point of view, while one thing may momentarily appear to be what is
really going on, in fact what is actually happening is plainly a joke, or a dream, or an accident,
or a7 mistake, or a misunderstanding, or a deception, or a theatrical performance." Quoted in Jack
Rosenthal, On Language: Frame of Mind, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 21, 1994, at 16.
370. NYBERG, supra note 141, at 50.
371. Id.
372. Karl Scheibe, In Defense of Lying: On the Moral Neutrality of Misrepresentation, 15
BERKSHIRE REV. 16 (1980).
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use. This being the case, we cannot be held responsible for it in the
same way as if we were making it up as we went along. This does not
make a sex tort regime impossible, only that much more difficult to
implement.
B. Speaking and Listening
These problems of knowing and communicating are compounded by
mistakes and biases on the part of the listener. For much of the time we
do not take in what is said to us, but only what we have programmed
ourselves to hear. According to Marcel Proust, "We pack the physical
outline of the creature we see with all the ideas we already formed
about him,... [and] [i]n the end they come to fill out so completely the
curve of his cheeks... the line of his nose.., that each time we see
the face or hear the voice it is our own ideas of him which we recognize
' If human beings did not come gendered,
and to which we listen."373
if there were no biological divide between us, we might be able to
manage fairly easily. But, alas, this is not the case and we are left with
a serious sex-based communication problem. Deborah Tannen, speaks
to this point in her recent bestseller when, following on the work of
Carol Gilligan,374 she claims that women's purpose in conversation is
to create connections while that of men is to establish dominance.375
There also may be epistemological differences. In expecting to find
meaning that is firm enough to be the basis for actionability, Larson
may be acting like a male. Evaluating an article by Richard Posner and
Andrew Rosenfield,376 for example, Mary Joe Frug wrote: "their
response exhibits the weaknesses stereotypically associated with
masculinity: they are arbitrary, rigid and authoritarian. They are unable
to claim [presumably like women can] what Keats called 'Negative
Capability'-the capacity 'of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts,
without any irritable reaching after fact & reason.' ""
Not reaching after fact and reason, enjoying wrestling with language
without expecting to pin it down, Frug takes us far from Larson territory

373. Marcel Proust, quoted in IRVING YALOM, LOVE'S EXECUTIONER AND OTHER TALES
OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 182 (1989). No citation to the original is provided.
374. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
375. DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: MEN AND WOMEN IN
CONVERSATION 24-25 (1990).
376. See generallyRichard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in ContractLaw: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
377. Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine:A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of
ContractLaw, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1039-40 (1992).
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and places us squarely in Wilde's.378 Larson wants to take sex talk,
refine it down to its core, and hold the speaker accountable therefore.3 79 Language for her is, in technical terms, "cognitive" or
"constative," an instrument of knowledge." For Don Giovanni, Wilde,
Cyrano, and so many of the rest of us, by contrast, language is
"performative," a field of play.3"' After Christian expresses concern
about the propriety of having Cyrano supply the lines for him, Cyrano
settles him down. "Call it a sort of lie/ If you like, but a lie is a sort of
myth/ And a Myth is a sort of truth. No reason why Roxan[e] should be
disillusioned."3 2
There is yet another difficulty in this domain. Let us go back to
Nora. It is not only that Daniel was confused himself and lacked
expedient means for sharing his confused state of mind with Nora, but
that he willed himself into a higher level of romantic attachment than
he "naturally" felt: "I even felt myself wanting to love her .... 33
Consider why we so often intoxicate ourselves with drink or drugs
before our sexual encounters. To be sure, it is in part to relax to get
through what is a tense384 and dirty business. 38 ' But might there not
be more?

378. See WILDE, supra note 138, at 261. I do not want to suggest that Frug, whom I knew,
would actually have rejected Larson's proposed tort. Indeed, I am reluctant to even speculate
on this matter. All I wish to do is to highlight the implications of Frug's and others' generalized
writings about the difficulties of squeezing meaning from language without having it slip
through their fingers.
379. See Larson, supra note 14, at 456-71 (delineating the elements of Larson's proposed
tort of sexual fraud).
380. See id. at 456-57.
381. These distinctions, based on the work of J.L. Austin, are nicely drawn in FELMAN,
supra note 39, at 26-27.
382. ROSTAND, supra note 8, at 76-77.
383. NYBERG, supra note 141, at 51.
384. See supra notes 269-71 & 275-78 and accompanying text.
385. "Have you not yet noticed that while pleasure is indeed the sole motive for the union
between the sexes," writes Choderlos de Laclos (through the Marquise de Merteuil), "it is not
sufficient to form a bond beween them, and if it is preceded by desire, which attracts, it is none
the less followed by disgust, which repels. It is a law of nature," adds Laclos, "which can be
changed only by love .... See LACLOS, supra note 258, at 275. If Laclos is right, we would
be depriving ourselves if we did not exaggerate, even manufacture, good qualities in our mates.
It is not my purpose to suggest that the griminess of sex functions only as a depressant of
sexual activity. See, e.g., DAN SABBATH & MANDEL HALL, END PRODUCT 147-65 (1977)
(discussing the sex act in various scatological contexts).
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C. Smoke Gets in Your Eyes386
The culture teaches that smoke gets in our eyes only after our heart
fires up. But, it is suggested here, the smoke often comes first. Before
she gives herself to Christian, Roxane informs Cyrano, "I'll tell
[Christian] to overwhelm me with excess, to rhapsodize, be bril'
And this willful self-delusion continues in the fullness of
liant."387
love. The character Nancy says in a Thirty-Something episode (explaining why she is taking back her husband, Elliot, after he had brought her
such pain): "When we're in love we invest the other person with more
'
glamour... than they actually have; otherwise we'd kill ourselves."388
3
This kind of self-deception Would appear to be universal. "9
"B6same, b6same mucho" begins one of the best known Spanish
language songs, "kiss me, just keep kissing me."" The quantity of
kisses the singer seeks is clear. But what about the quality? Does s/he
want a sincere kiss, a kiss from the heart? Hardly. Rather, a kiss "como
si fuera... la illtima vez;" "as if... for the last time."39 ' Under the
circumstances can we rationally make lies actionable? Daniel, then, may
well have told Nora that he loved her not to move her nor to deceive
her, but rather to move and deceive himself.3"
Diane Ackerman elaborates on the need for these tricks. While "[s]ex
may seem spontaneous, raw, true, and of the moment, because the
sensations are so hotly felt'that the body screams out its own version of
Eureka!' '39 3 She continues, "[e]very sex act, no matter how casual, is
a tangled drama, a piece of pure 'theater.' ,311 It is the result, she

386. JEROME KERN, ROBERTA (1933) (book by Otto Harbach adapted from Alice D. Miller,
Gowns by Roberta or, alternatively, Roberta).
387. ROSTAND, supra note 8, at 99. One could argue that Roxane gets what she
deserves-deception.
388. Once again I ask the reader's indulgence. I cannot provide a citation.
389. A word has even been coined for it. "What I have called crystallization is a mental
process which draws from everything that happens new proofs of the perfection of the loved
one," writes Stendhal (author of The Red and the Black), "[for it] evolves from the feeling that
STENDHAL, supra note
the degree of pleasure is related to the perfections of the loved one ....
15, at 45-46. Who knows? Maybe crystallization is rooted in nature as a means of assuring
survival of the species.
390. CONSUELO VELAZQUEZ, Bf-sAME MUCHO (1943) (1941).
391. Id. "Oh what lies there are in kisses," wrote the poet, Heine. Quoted in NYBERG, supra
note 141, at 51.
392. Id.; see supra notes 363-69 and accompanying text. No wonder that in the dictionary,
before being explicated as "a passionate love affair," the noun "romance!' is defined as
"something that lacks basis or foundation in fact." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 1969 (1971).
393. Robert Stoller, quoted in ACKERMAN, supra note 224, at 246.
394. ACKERMAN, supra note 224, at 246.
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continues, quoting Stoller, "of years of working over the scripts in order
to make them function efficiently-that is, to produce excitement...
' Stoller adds, "the
rather than anxiety, depression, guilt or boredom."395
whole business is a fraud, an act, a masquerade, a disguise-no matter
how much the author ... proclaims about truth. Yet for all that falsity,"

Stoller continues (because of it?), "tissues swell. Fantasy converts to
physiology."39' 6 A story making the rounds bears this out. A longstand-

ing groupie of Mick Jagger's is finally, after much hoping and praying,
invited to bed. When she emerges, her envious friends descend on her
to ask how it all went. "O.K.," she responds, "but he is no Mick
Jagger." Anyone enjoying the story understands that it is, in fact, the
fantasy of union with Mick Jagger that, uh, makes possible (and is the
measure for) actual connection with him. Thus, when a prominent
authority on sex law writes that "I do not suggest that this aspect of
sexuality [i.e., fantasy] is necessarily a 'good' thing," one wants to
comfort him.397

What is the best strategy for heightening sexual response? Take risks;
let go of suspicions, even those that are rationally grounded. According
to Stoller, excitement is possible only when we are navigating between
certain dualities, such as alive/dead, love/hate, strong/weak, control/out-of-control, succeed/fail.39 8 "Excitement is uncertainty; certainty

brings pleasure, pain or no response," writes Stoller, "but not excitement."39' 9 In the same vein, Martha Nussbaum writes that "only a risk
so terrible that it can annihilate makes true joy possible."'"
D. Taking Leave of Our Senses
We now know that self-deception is pervasive in matters of the
heart;4 ' however, we do not yet have a full measure of its depth. So

395. Robert Stoller, quoted in ACKERMAN, supra note 224, at 246. Ackerman, alas, does
not provide citations to Stoller's work. Her bibliography does, however, list titles of some of his
works from which presumably the quoted material derives.
396. Robert Stoller, quoted in ACKERMAN, supra note 224, at 246.
397. See Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 92.
398. See ACKERMAN, supra note 224, at 246.
399. See id.
400. Nussbaum, supra note 281, at 1725. Professor Nussbaum is inspired to this conclusion
by the character Enid in Joyce Carol Oates, You Must Remember This. Enid, Nussbaum asserts,
"knows that deep sexual joy is linked with the extinguishing of the reasoning power, of
language, almost of consciousness-and therefore with the constant risk of death." Id. at
1724-25. Demanding truth in courtship may be to seek a kind of control that Nussbaum suggests
is lost.
401. And in related matters of the flesh. A man writes in his diary on his birthday, recalls
Gershon Legman: "Today I am twenty years old and I can't bend my penis with both hands."
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we turn to the story of Shi Pei Pu and Bernard Bouriscot, Chinese spy
and French foreign service officer, respectively, probably the greatest
sexual deceiver and self-deceiver of all time.' Shi Pei's offense:
Representing to Bouriscot that their twenty-year relationship was based
on love, that he was a woman and that a child had been born of the
union.4 3 When the truth came out about the former's sexual identity,
his partner was inconsolable."°4 Playwright David Henry Hwang was
so intrigued by the story that after interviews with Boursicot, he went
on to write M. Butterfly to try to get at its heart.4 "5 In the play the
judge at the subsequent trial for espionage asks Song Liling, the
male/female character, in disbelief, how he could possibly have
sustained the astonishing hoax on Gallimard, the victim.' Song
responds by giving credit to his mother, an experienced prostitute, who
explained how easy it is to start the chain of dependency." "Rule one
is: Men always believe what they want to hear. So a girl can tell the
most obnoxious lies and the guys will believe them every time-'This
is my first time'-'That's the biggest I've ever seen'-or both.. ."408
But this is Song Liling speaking and he is in a difficult legal-and
ethical-position; not only has he engaged in espionage himself, but he
also has deceived an intimate into collaborating with him. And he has
done what to Gallimard, at least, is even more unforgivable. "You
showed me your true self. When all I loved was the lie. A perfect lie,
which you let fall to the ground-and now it's old and soiled."' By
referring to Gallimard's need to believe, therefore, Song Liling seeks to
deflect the blame from himself. So is Gallimard really to blame for the
fix he is in? Is the woman who discovers that her husband has had a
lover for fifteen years of a thirty-year marriage responsible, at least in
part, for her own fate?410 Did she, like Gallimard, fail to see what was
plainly in front of her? The playwright helps us answer the question.
Near the end of the play Song Liling asks Gallimard whether he could
really accept that Song was a man.4 ' Gallimard says he can, then goes
'"Today I am twenty-five years old and I can't bend my penis with both hands." This goes on
and on: thirty, thirty-five, forty, forty-five, fifty, fifty-five. Finally, at sixty 'I bent it. I must be
getting stronger.' " G. LEGMAN, RATIONALE OF THE DIRTY JOKE 303-04 (1968).
402. DAVID H. HWANG, M. BuTrERFLY, Playwright'sNotes (1989).
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. See id. at 94.
406. Id. at 81-82.
407. Id. at 82.
408. Id. Song Liling goes on to point out how these two messages are contradictory.
409. Id. at 89.
410. See LAWSON, supra note 219, at 222.
411. HWANG, supra note 402, at 87.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

77

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

further. "I knew all the time somewhere that my happiness was
temporary, my love a deception. But my mind kept the knowledge at
bay. '412 "Happiness," concludes Gallimard, "is so rare that our mind
'
can turn somersaults to protect it."413
If because of our limited cognitive capacities we cannot know
ourselves or others well, and if compounding this problem are differences in speaking style414 and self-deception,4 5 is administration of a
sex fraud system feasible? This is the subject of the next part. For the
moment must we not agree with an observation by Baudelaire? "The
world functions only through misunderstanding," he writes. "It is
through universal misunderstanding that everyone agrees. For if by
misfortune
people understood one another," he adds, "they could never
416
agree.

VIII. IS A SEXUAL FRAUD REGIME WORKABLE?

The factual determinations to be made in a sexual fraud
litigation will require nuanced human judgments. But juries
exist for such purposes.
-Jane

Larson

41 7

412. Id. at 88. But here once again we have a male author speaking-and through a male
character at that. Would a woman engage in such self-delusion? "Little by little things were
happening that didn't make sense," writes a woman in describing her reaction to evidence that
her husband was having an affair, "but I can remember making excuses for them myself... I
didn't want to believe there was anything to find out .... You know, I, I, as I said, I made up
a lot of excuses, and really believed them .... I didn't confide in anyone, too, because I was
afraid of what they would tell me.... I was afraid more of the truth than living in the lie kind
of." ROBERT W. MITCHELL & NICHOLAS S. THOMPSON, DECEPTION 296 (1986). Recall in this
connection the Fantasy Man. See supra note 57.
It will not be suggested here that such self-deception is in the same moral category as
deception of others. That would be silly. My purpose is only to highlight that recognition of the
drive to self-deception is important in evaluating the sex fraud tort.
413. HWANG, supra note 402, at 60. Deceivers often need to delude themselves as well. A
woman talks about deceiving her lesbian lover into thinking she was attracted to her: "Part of
the time I pretended to myself that I really wasn't deceiving anybody but that wasn't very
possible really. It was pretty hard because in my heart I knew what the truth was ... I was
fooling myself. I wanted it, I wanted something to be different than the way it was and so I was
fooling myself. I was saying, 'Well, it will change. I'll come around,' even though I think way
deep inside I knew that wasn't going to happen .... MITCHELL & THOMPSON, supra note 412,
at 299.
414. See supra notes 307-08 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 412-13 and accompanying text.
416. MY HEART LAID BARE, quoted in FELMAN, supra note 39, at 29. Every contracts
casebook, I think, should have these words etched into its cover along with the title.
417. Larson, supra note 14, at 467.
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[The Thomas-Hill quarrel] embroiled the United States
Senate in the impossible task of adjudicating alleged
offenses that had occurred in private, of which there were
no witnesses and no evidence.... It was not a hearing,
much less a trial; it was a story-telling contest that was not
winnable by either participant.... Its only result was
damage to all participants and to the nation.
-Wendell

Berry418

A. Proving the Elements
In a sex fraud regime, if Don Jose does not kill Carmen he will
almost surely sue her.4 19 Why? He cannot live with the idea-of which
she is a constant reminder-that he is responsible for his own downfall." But how will he prove that Carmen made a misrepresentation
of fact that was relied upon?42 ' Except sometimes in the movies, the
important declarations are made in private; indeed, in our society it is
a greater breach of etiquette to speak of affection in public than to show
it. If a (false) statement is about something easily refutable, say, marital
status, it is even less likely to be made in public. The result: he said/she
said contests that devastate the parties and perhaps the legal system as
well.
The problems of proving others' declarations in sex fraud settings are
compounded by those relating to materiality.4" Which misrepresentations will be actionable? Larson offers only two safe harbors for those
seeking to embellish themselves in the mating competition. You can say
with impunity, "I am a great and undiscovered poet."4" But the lie
here is obvious. To make such a statement is to disprove it; what poet
would utter such a cliche? The other proves even less useful: "No, I
don't think you're too fat."424 But the question that precedes this
answer is clearly rhetorical. Both the speaker and the listener know that
in an intimate situation the question allows only one answer, regardless
of its truth content. If these are Larson's only examples, then unlike the

418. WENDELL BERRY, SEX, ECONOMY, FREEDOM AND
419. See supra notes 322-31 and accompanying text.
420. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.

COMMUNITY

118 (1992).

421. See id.

422. The word "materiality" actually does not appear in Larson's proposed definition.
Larson, supra note 14, at 453. In importing the term into her analysis, Larson seems to conflate
it with "justifiable reliance." See id. at 462-68.
423. See id. at 462.
424. Id.
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commercial model on which Larson bases her case, 42 a sex fraud
regime offers no room for simple puffery; every misrepresentation can
be material.
Whether or not a representation is held to be material, 4 6 according
to Larson, will depend on the individual circumstances of the case. "To
a person seeking a spouse, for example, a false claim to be unmarried
may be highly material to sexual consent; in a more casual relationship,
a potential partner's marital status may not play a part in the decision
to have sex. ' 427 But, as Larson herself points out, "several layers of
motivation may co-exist., 428 Her solution to the problem of determining materiality is to follow the lead of the Restatement:429
"[M]isrepresentation," she writes, "need only be a 'substantial factor'
influencing reliance to be material. 430
But what does this mean in the setting before us? If a woman claims,
writes Larson, "that she was ready for a serious relationship and was
not, in fact, going to sleep with anyone outside that, and can prove that,
then there's no reason she's not going to be believ[ed]., 43' But is it
possible to prove such things? Is the sex drive not powerful enough to
drive us to distraction? Is Larson describing human beings or robots?
Proving justifiable reliance, another element of sex fraud, is equally
problematic. 432 Let us consider whether Don Jose can win a case
against Carmen's estate based on his reasonable reliance on her promise
of loyalty.433 He is, as we have seen, naive. But should this failing
undermine his claim? After all, is the whole point of Larson's tort not
to protect the innocent? 43 4 Who else needs protection? On the other
hand, Carmen's estate would surely argue that the promise was made in
extremis, while she was in prison; that even an ignorant soldier knows
the power of freedom; that not being tied down for her was the

425. Id. at 413.
426. Id. at 462-63.
427. Id. at 462.
428. Id. at 463.
429. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 546 cmt. b (1977).
430. Larson, supra note 14, at 463.
431. Gold, supra note 11, at N1, N2.
432. For guidance on justifiable reliance, Larson draws on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 537 (1977). See Larson, supra note 14, at 464 n.387.
433. See Larson, supra note 14, at 464. She promised to be true when she had no intention
do so and knew that he would be harmed as a result. See id.; see also supra notes 322-31 and
accompanying text.
434. One of the cases on which Larson relies most heavily in this regard is Parker v.
Bruner, 686 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), affid, 683 S.W.2d 265 (en banc), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 827 (1985), involving a young woman who was every bit the innocent that Don Jose
is-and more. Larson, supra note 14, at 407 nn.142-47 and accompanying text.
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paramount value and that he knew this or should have known it, if only
because he was with her when she sang of the flightiness of love,435
and thus he should not have relied on her declarations; and that if Don
Jose is allowed to successfully counter that he closed his mind to the
truth because of his passion for Carmen, the whole notion of justifiable
reliance goes
out the window. Are these issues that our juries should be
436
debating?

A jury also would have to measure "serious harm. ' 4 37 For Larson
this would mean economic and physical harm, including, no doubt,
psychiatric costs, and emotional harm.4 31 "Compensation for emotional
injury-that most disfavored category of tort damages-should be
treated as an ordinary element of consequential damages," writes Larson,
"subject to no special proof requirements. 439

435. BIZET, supra note 320, at Act I.
436. Recall Larson's paradigm case of Perry v. Atkinson, 195 Cal. App. 3d 14 (1987),
which involved involving a promise by a married man to impregnate his paramour at some
future time even if the couple was no longer together. Id. at 15. Larson acknowledges that
Atkinson's marriage to another should have raised doubts on Perry's part as to the former's
sincerity. Larson, supra note 14, at 459. But, she adds, this doubt is offset by the specificity of
his promise. Id. It seems, however, that Larson is ignoring a central feature in love affairs. Most
of the time, when a relationship ends it is precisely because at least one of the parties wants to
cut, or at least loosen, ties, not preserve them. Was it therefore reasonable on Perry's part to rely
on Atkinson's promise to father a child after the love relationship ended when such action was
likely to enmesh the two lives legally and otherwise for an indefinite future?
437. Larson, supra note 14, at 459 n.368. "Although the loss of sexual integrity is in and
of itself an insult to human dignity," writes Larson, "nominal damages like those available in
an assault action cannot be recovered in an action for misrepresentation." Id.
438. Id. at 459.
439. Id. Larson claims that contemporary jurisprudence no longer disfavors emotional
damages relative to other damages. Id. at 459 n.370. Given the historical reluctance of courts
to compensate for emotional damages, the few cases Larson cites are not sufficient to support
her claim. See id. at 459.
As to how serious "serious" harm must be, Larson says little in her article. Perhaps in
response to readers' questions, she has since elaborated on her position. "We're talking about
people who experience very crippling kinds of emotional and mental distress. It can be sexual
dysfunction, humiliation, rage, loss of an ability to trust other people. These are very much like
the kinds of injuries that are suffered by people who are raped by a date or by incest
victims.. . ." Sonya Live (CNN television broadcast, May 11, 1993 (transcript at 42). Elsewhere,
Larson has written,
Almost any sexually mature person has suffered from some kind of sexual fraud,
but most of us just eat a lot of ice cream, bitch to our friends, nurse our wounds
and go on with our lives. We don't.... suffer the kind of serious harm that would
be a prerequisite for this kind of lawsuit.
GLAMOUR, Apr. 1994, at 174, reproduced infra text accompanying note 449.
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B. The Burden on the Courts
But, as Alan Dershowitz points out using a fraudulent breach of
promise as a model, how a court would measure the amount of damage
a plaintiff suffered from the false promise is questionable:
Would it depend on whether she enjoyed the sex or merely
tolerated it? Would a gold digger be entitled to more
damages than a woman who wanted to marry for true love?
Would the damages be less if the man were a real
sleazebag, since marriage to a loser is worth considerably
less than marriage to a winner? Would the judge have to
hear experts discuss the likelihood of the marriage being
successful? And just how much is a successful marriage
worth?"
Judges and juries would surely have their hands full with all the issues
they had to decide. Would they be up to the job? Larson is convinced
that they would. "The factual determinations to be made in a sexual
fraud litigation," she writes, "will require nuanced human judgments, but
juries exist for such purposes.""' Sheila Kuehl, Director of the
California Women's Law Center, and new Assemblywoman in
California, concurs with Larson's conclusion while offering another
rationale. "Unlike business litigation," she says, "this is the one time
when you might actually get a jury of your peers."'
But can decisionmakers-as opposed to scholars-afford to deal so
perfunctorily with the practical sides of sex fraud? Are not the real
issues whether a jury, judge, general arbitration panel or body of
communications specialists and sexologists can render a satisfactory and
just determination in any given case, and whether our justice system,
already burdened, should be subject to the additional strain of resolving
sex fraud disputes when such cases are so problematic?" 3 To be sure,
the statutes abolishing the heartbalm actions speak of the need of

It is hard to know what to make of this. There was no claim in Perry v. Atkinson of rape-like
or incest-like damages. See supra note 436. On the other hand, it is harder yet to imagine Larson
wanting to compensate Ronald Askew who almost surely is out of commission for years. Askew,
28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286; see also supra notes 350-57 and accompanying text (discussing the
Askew case).
440. Alan M.I. Dershowitz, View from the Top, PENTHOUSE, Nov. 1993, at 28.

441. See Larson, supra note 14, at 467.
442. See Gold, supra note 11, at N2.
443. See Jane Larson, Sex, Lies and the Right to Sue, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1993, § 1, at 19;
see also WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA

UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991) (addressing the major increase in American litigation since
1970).
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avoiding fraud by those claiming to be its victims;'" but is it not
equally likely that the legislatures were anxious to ease the burden on
the courts of handling these troubling issues?
We cannot not resolve this last issue now, fifty years later. But we
can find practical guidance through the problem at hand from the folks
who have not yet been heard from, those who do not make their livings
from law review articles, the folks out there in the real world. And so
we ask them: Is it time for a sex fraud tort?
IX. THE PEOPLE SPEAK
Should an action be available against a sexual partner who
has lied about (denied) a serious attempt at suicide?
-Dan

Subotnik 44

If sexual fraud lawsuits had been possible in the past,
would you have brought one against a partner?
--Glamour 46
Jane Larson has written a tightly argued and emotionally powerful
article that might be expected to appeal to large numbers of women. But
if women are both the Powerful Sex in terms of the sexual act itself"47
and the Empathetic Sex in their preference for conciliation over
will they want to impose Larson's brand of
confrontation,"
gynocentrism on those suffering from serious genital and congenital
disabilities?
In the April issue of Glamour, the readership was asked for its
reaction to various questions under the general heading, "Should the
Law Punish Lovers Who Lie?" The one-page summary of results is
reproduced on the following page."9

444. See, e.g., supra note 52.
445. Dan Subotnik, Sex Fraud Tort Questionnaire,THE RESTATEMENT, Nov.-Dec. 1993,
at 6.
446.
447.
448.
449.

Should the Law Punish Lovers Who Lie?, GLAMOUR, Apr. 1994, at 174.
See Larson, supra note 14, at 392-93.
See GILLIGAN, supra note 374.
Should the Law Punish Lovers Who Lie? 84% Say Yes, GLAMOUR, June 1994, at 133

[hereinafter

GLAMOUR SURVEY RESULTS].
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[this is what you thought]
Should the law punish lovers
who lie? 84 percent say yes
JANE LARSON, A Professor at
Northwestern University School of
Law, has proposed creating a new legal
category of fraud - sexual fraud.
Eighty-four percent of the respondents
to our April survey agree with Larson
that people should be able to sue for
physical damages resulting from a
sexual partner's
lies. However,
respondents were split fifty-fifty as to
whether or not emotional damage
should be grounds for a lawsuit. Sixtyfour percentsay someone has
successfully lied to them to get them to
have sex. For more results of the
survey, read on.
...........................

1. SHOULD PEOPLE BE
ABLE TO SUE FOR
PHYSICAL DAMAGES DUE
TO A SEXUAL PARTNER'S
LIES (E.G., AIDS, ANOTHER
STD OR A PREGNANCY
THAT DEVELOPS MEDICAL
COMPLICATIONS)?
84% say yes.
"Three years ago, I sued the man who
gave me genital warts - and won. The
settlement reimbursed me for my
medical expenses and emotional
distress. I suffered for years because of
his lies. Winning the case was very
liberating."
16% say no.
"We should teach young women to
rely on their own instincts for
protection, not the law. Whatever
happened to responsibility and good
judgment?"
2. SHOULD PEOPLE BE
ABLE TO SUE
FOR
EMOTIONAL DAMAGES DUE
TO A SEXUAL PARTNER'S
LIES?
50% say yes.
"Men have to understand that they
can't take it upon themselves to ruin a
woman's life simply to get her into
bed. It's a form of abuse that they've
been getting away with for too long."
50% say no.
"Dating and intimate relationships have
always involved some degree of
periuasion and misrepresentation.
Learning who we can and can't trust is
something most of us have to learn the

hard way."
"A law like this implies that
women are too naive for their own
good, and I for one don't want to
perpetuate that stereotype."
3. HAS SOMEONE EVER
SUCCESSFULLY LIED TO
PERSUADE YOU TO SLEEP
WITH HIM/HER?
64% say yes.
"I never thought I'd fall for a line, but
some guys act so sincere you don't
realize they're feeding you a line."
"When someone you're crazy
about says he loves you, it's easy to
get caught up in the moment and say
yes to sex. How are you supposed to
know about the other two girlfriends
who think he loves them?"
36% say no.
"I've had guys say all kinds of things
to me to get me into bed. No matter
what, it's ultimately my decision
whether or not I have sex with
someone. Women must stop allowing
ourselves to be labeled as victims and
start taking responsibility for our own
choices."
•

4. IF YES, WHAT WAS THE
LIE?

88% say "I love you."
"On New Year's Eve, my boyfriend of
three months told me he loved me. We
spent the night in a hotel room making
love and talking about the future.
Afterward, he stopped calling, and I
learned from a mutual friend that he
just wanted to have sex on New Year's
Eve-after that, I was history."
58% say "I'm not seeing
anyone else."
"One guy told me he and his girlfriend
broke up because she wanted to get
married and he didn't. I found out two
weeks later that they got engaged the
day after I slept with him."
39% say other.
"A man I was dating told me he'd had
a vasectomy and discouraged me from
using birth control. When I got
pregnant, he denied the baby was his."
28% say "I'm disease-free."
"I asked my boyfriend what the sore
on his penis was and he told me he'd
caught his penis in his zipper. Two
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weeks later, I was diagnosed with
herpes. I never saw him again, and I've
been living with this disease for ten
years.,
20% say "I'm going to marry
you."
5%
say "I'm heterosexual/homosexual."
5. IF YOU ANSWERED YES
TO NUMBER 3, WHAT WAS
YOUR REACTION AFTER
THE FACT?
56% say they were hurt, but
got over ilt.
"I was embarrassed that I had been so
gullible. Now I'm a lot stronger and I
no longer count on a man to make
certain promises before deciding
whether or not I'll sleep with him. I
make that decision based on my own
desires."
42% say they suffered longterm damage.
"I'm still not over a boyfriend who lied
about wanting to marry me three years
ago. I was totally committed to him,
and he was just in it for the sex. I feel
demoralized and haven't been able to
trust a man enough to have another
relationship."
2% say they were indifferent.
6.
IF SEXUAL-FRAUD
LAWSUITS HAD BEEN POSSIBLE
IN THE PAST, WOULD YOU
HAVE BROUGHT ONE AGAINST
A PARTNER?
67% say no.
"People have to learn that the world
isn't a nice-nice place and you can't
legislate it into one."
"Who needs a lawsuit? Personal
revenge can be much sweeter."
33% say yes.
"As far as I'm concerned, someone
who knowingly exposes a partner to an
STD should be held as accountable as
someone who willfully assaults another
person.'.'
Please turn to the next page and give
us your responses to this month's
survey, "Are 'Three Strikes' Laws the
Answer to Violent Crime?"
C
y GL-mo
1.
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What sense can be made of these reactions? 50 On the face of things
Larson's tort has widespread support; eighty-four percent of Glamour's
respondents want a remedy for those who suffer physical damages as a
result of fraud.45 ' But, as we have seen, such damages are already
actionable.452 As for the fifty percent who wish to compensate emotional harm as well,453 consider what they identify as most common
and, we might presume, ultimately most hurtful: the "I love you"
lie.4" But the case of Daniel and Nora has demonstrated the difficulties of making such statements actionable. And Stephen Schulhofer
that devoting itself to such matters may not be worth the
has suggested 456
judicial effort.

"I am not seeing anyone else": should this be the basis for a cause
of action? The problem here is that sex offers an excellent way for
individuals to test out their sentiments; the body knows. Consider A who
is choosing between B and C, both of whom she has feelings for.
Should the tort system be forcing a disclosure that might precipitate a
premature and thus potentially bad decision for A? Or consider Eliot S.
who, after his wife becomes seriously ill, gets involved with a "call girl"
in order to cope.45 Should the law induce him to abandon his wife?
Or, in this latter case, should the law create a new defense of "justifiable
misrepresentation"? Similarly, if A chooses B and the relationship later
begins to sour, should A have to give up B entirely before experimenting
with D? In an ideal world perhaps yes, but this seems not to be the way
many-particularly the young-currently lead their lives.
But who cares, you might think, about A or Eliot's needs? How can
we live in a world where liars go unpunished for the damage they have
done? In his much celebrated work, Singled Out: A Civilized Guide to
Sex and Sensibility for the Suddenly Single Man-or Woman,458
450. Author's telephone conversation with an editor of Glamour.
451. The overwhelming number of responses to Glamour questionnaires come from women,

an editor informed me.
452. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
453. GLAMOUR SURVEY RESULTS, supra note 449, at 133.

454. Id.
455. See supra notes 363-64 and accompanying text.
456. Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 93.
[There does not appear to be a clear social consensus about the circumstances in
which misrepresentation in matters of sexual intimacy is improper. Particularly
where statements about feelings and commitments are concerned, there are few
pervasively -shared intuitions about what is material and what is "misrepresentation," as opposed to puffing or "story-telling."
Id. at 92. Schulhofer goes on: "Statements about emotions and commitment seem the most
material, but their significance can be elusive." Id. at 93.
457. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
458. RICHARD SCHICKEL, SINGLED OUT: A CIVILIZED GUIDE TO SEX AND SENSIBILITY FOR
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Richard Schickel discusses the problems of the newly single (NS) who,
because they are still grieving the loss of the prior relationship, become
blocked up emotionally. 459 He suggests that at some point they break
the logjam by forcing themselves to look for a new relationship.4
Because of their disequilibrium, Schickel writes, and because they may
be out of practice in finding suitable partners, the NS male will likely
gravitate towards a "Transitional Woman," someone whom he likes and
who likes him, but who he knows does not offer possibilities for an
enduring relationship.46 ' The NS male recognizes at the same time,
however, that the transitional woman may well be contemplating an
open-ended relationship. Is this a time for guilt? Should the NS male
terminate the relationship before it really begins? "[D]on't worry,"
comforts Schickel, "you'll get your chance to redeem your debt,
because, just as sure as you're born, some lady is going to make you
into her 'Transitional Man' and break your heart at the end of the
process. 462 Under this new, enlarged, karmic definition, justice is
done.
The misrepresentation of fertility or birth control use can produce
among the most distressing consequences to the innocent party when a
child is subsequently born. Should a cause of action be available to the
deceived? Larson says yes.463 There is a problem with compensating
for such lies. A lawsuit may in a costly fashion draw resources from the
misrepresenter that could be used to support the child. It is to encourage
both parents to invest in their child and thus bond with it that the courts,
as we have seen, seem never to hold for the victim." In any event,
since allowing such suits to proceed might well create many more male
plaintiffs than female ones,
465 one would be hard pressed to label the cause
of action as "feminist.,
"I'm disease-free," after which the speaker infects his partner, has

already been dealt with; passing a serious sexually transmitted disease
is already actionable. 46 What about "I'm going to marry you"? For all
of Larson's efforts, there is almost no support for actionability.467 In

THE SUDDENLY SINGLE MAN-OR WOMAN (1980).

459. Id. at 16-17.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 17-18.
463. See Larson, supra note 14, at 462.
464. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
465. If we can believe one recent study, "women who cheat on mates tend to do so around
ovulation, when they are most likely to get pregnant." Wright, supra note 284, at 48. (No
citation to the original study is provided.)
466. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
467. See supra note 53; Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 91. But see Note, Heartbalm Statutes
and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1770, 1773 (1985) (suggesting that causes of action based
on fraudulent promises to marry should not be abrogated by heartbalm statutes).
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any event, here, as in the case of misrepresentation of fertility and birth
control use,4" allowing an action for breach of promise might also
produce an abundance of female defendants.
Lying about sexual orientation will be dealt with below.469 For the
moment consider what is perhaps the bottom-line of the Glamour
survey: two-thirds of respondents say that they would not make use of
a sexual fraud tort if it were available."7 As for the other third, if
sexually transmitted disease is representative of their concerns, and it is
supposed to be, there is no need for a new cause of action. Why do
women evince such lack of interest in a tool Larson is so anxious to
give them? One of the respondents spells it out. "Dating and intimate
relationships have always involved some degree of persuasion and
misrepresentation. Learning who we can and can't trust is something
most of us have to learn the hard way. A law like this implies that
women are too naive for their own good, and I for one don't want to
' In fact, abstract principles of this nature
perpetuate that stereotype."471
are always suspect when applied to questions directed at the heart.
Perhaps Sherren Leigh, publisher of Today's Chicago Woman, is even
closer to the mark when she writes: " 'I'd be embarrassed to let people
know that I've dated some of the Uerks] I've gone out with, let alone
taken them to court.' ,472
As useful as the Glamour questionnaire is in helping to evaluate the
need for a sex fraud tort, it does not begin to capture the wide range of
sexual/romantic deception and responses thereto. To accomplish this
purpose, the author prepared and distributed a questionnaire to Touro
Law School students. The questionnaire and a tabular summary of
results are reproduced on the following pages.

468. See supra note 106.
469. See infra note 474 and accompanying text.
470. GLAMOUR SURVEY RESULTS, supra note 449, at 133.
471. Id.
472. See Gold, supra note 11, at N1. Larson expands on this point when she writes that
many women will not want their sexual biographies written in court, something that might be
inevitable in the absence of "shield" laws analogous to the ones available in the rape area. See
Larson, supra note 14, at 440-42 (discussing the tension between accountability and privacy

interests).
Does this reticence undercut any "floodgates" argument? Perhaps. And yet, is there any way
to know what might happen under a sex fraud regime when a few brave souls have shown the
way? The great surge in sexual harrassment cases in recent years may help provide a glimpse
into the future.
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Sex Fraud Tort Questionnaire
Memo to: Touro Students
help in this regard. What I ask of you
Re: Sex Fraud Tort
is first to carefully read the
In an article appearing in a recent questionnaire in its entirety and then to
issue of the Columbia Law Review (93 fill it out indicating which, if any, of
C.L.R. 374-472), a law professor the lies specified below should give
advocates establishing an action for sex rise to a cause of action. Please feel
fraud. Premised on the notion that free to discuss these matters with
fraud in commerce is actionable, as is anyone (or as many people as) you
intentional infliction of emotional choose to help clarify and develop your
harm, this tort would allow recovery position. (You might want to bear in
for the primarily psychic injuries mind that whether or not sex-based
a r is i n g from sex-based lying becomes actionable,
but
misrepresentation. By providing a especially if it does, parts or all of this
remedy in these cases, the professor questionnaire may come into general
argues, the law would help ensure that use.)
sexual relationships arebased on true
Explanatory comments for both
consent. (Under current law sex-based yea and nay responses are especially
misrepresentation
is only rarelyappreciated; please write these neatly
actionable.)
in the space provided or on separate
I am in the process of writing a sheets of paper. (For those who lose
law review article on the subject of sex their Restatement copies I will be
fraud and would much appreciate your replicating the form on regular 8 1/2

by II paper and leaving it in the
receptionist's office.)
Preliminary instructions: You are
to assume in the questions below that
the innocent party relies on the
misrepresentation
and begins or
continues a sexual relationship. Also, in
responding to the questions you are to
consider the point in that relationship
when the statement would most like be
made. Finally you are to assume that
one way or another the underlying
request for information has been made
directly.
In return for your help. I promuse
to present the results and evaluate them
for you assoon as I possibly can.
Please note: I have deliberately
not provided hypotheticals based on
HIV and herpes infection.
Thanks very much for your help.
Professor Dan Subotnik

(Please tear this page out and I leave it with the receptionist.)

:<

----------------------------------------------------------------------I"I
I Please indtcateyourlevlof agreement
1)Lies about (denies) conviction for
Ir
taxevasion:
wit thenumber
following
statements
treement)
by m 12345;fI2345
circnng
theappropriate
where
5= stongly
agree;
ties about(affirms)
current
sexual
4
atagree;
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2somew
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1345; f12345
2 = sonwhat disagreeand
at
K) Lies about (denies) a serious attempt
disagree.
I strongly
suicide:
I
m 12345 f 12345
I AN ACTION SHOULD BE AVAILABLE
13
;a2tal
AGAINST A
L) Lies about (denies) pattcipation in armed
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I A) lies about (denies) drug use: mlbe2W 4 5: f t2 3 4 5
mArepaesentation by males
I
2345: byfmales(f) 2345
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1 3 45:

or

I C) Lies about marital status (claims to be
2I 4 312f4I
sinle):
2I32445
I
D) Appreciably overstates level of affection (I
12345
'Au): f
lMove
r12345:f12345

8<
n

Please erovide the following
information. (Bear
mind that all data
t be
kptbeconr
erntialI
[excepby
fwho
evaluating
them, that e
youate
notmittbeing
asked to
tdentify yourselves by name.)
Age

Gender
(circle) M or F
enrcil)Mr
status (circle): Stnglenever married:
divorcedsepatated: Domestic partner
If separated or divorced indicate number of I
years
stnce divorce or separaton
I

m 312ee 3m)A

tndes-ta345
Ethniy
rcle)
African-Amenican;
Asian
Am&ea. 11sp
aclat-o
WlueIupa
b
e
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N Lies about (denies) same sex inclinations.

to led etirosdxual ives.
Icannot
cm u
withananaloousncustion for gay intdviduas

m12345;f12345

Religious Affiliation (circle), Catholic; Jewish. I
Protestant; OtherOristian.Muslim: None; Othee

0) lies about (denies) tnterest in whipsand
cbains:
123 4 5:f 1 234 5

Comments:

P) Lies about true e atnil of children
(of

E)Appreciably
understaIes
numberofpreviouscourse youarethe fatherof
euldrn.
in ater
seXpatners:
suit for reimbursement for support payments
i 12345: f12345
F)A
m

345;

understates age:
12345

ma1)345

Q) Lies about (denes)medi
incipient
multiple sclrsis:

condition. say.

G)Lies about
retigiouspesuasion:
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im1234 f5;f
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R) hes
about (denies) smoking
ogareses.
Lies
about
(denies)
undergoing
an
abortion:
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MEAN RESPONSES BY MALES AND BY FEMALES
TO QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS'

Males

Females

Unweighted Means

1.

2.9

2.9

2.9

2.

1.8

1.8

1.8

3.

3.4

3.3

3.35

4.

1.6

1.6

1.6

5.

2.6

2.6

2.6

6.

2.4

2.6

2.5

7.

1.9

1.9

1.9

9.

1.9

1.9

1.9

10.

2.9

2.9

2.9

11.

2.0

2.0

2.0

12.

2.3

2.3

2.3

13.

2.2

2.1

2.15

14.

3.0

2.9

2.95

15.

2.0

2.0

2.0

16.

-

-

17.

3.0

3.0

3.0

18.

1.7

1.8

1.75

8.--

Responses to items 8 and 16 are omitted. The sample size of 54 consists of 29
women, 24 men and one person of unspecified sex. Fifty-nine percent of respondents
were single, 83% were white, and 43% identified themselves as Catholic.
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A number of interrelated conclusions emerge from the study. First,
for all the examples of misrepresentation provided, it is with respect to
one class only-lies regarding marital status-that a sex fraud tort finds
some support. 47 3 Even here, however, respondents come down closer
to neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the proposed cause of action
than agreeing with it. One might suppose that an honest answer to item
14-lies regarding homosexual inclinations-might be enormously
important to sexual players. After all, same sex inclinations on the part
of one's heterosexual partner would diminish the likelihood of a
long-term relationship with him/her and perhaps increases a woman's
fear of contracting AIDS froms a male partner who is gay. 74 Here
again, however, the results do not support a call for action.
Second, men and women essentially evaluate particular misrepresentations the same way. 75 In an ironic historical twist, due perhaps to
fear of sexually transmitted diseases, women were readier to punish
understatements of sexual experience. 76 Third, there was virtually no
difference in the culpability respondents attached to any given lie based
on the gender of the liar.477 That is, where men and women believed
that a specific lie should be actionable, they were no more willing to
accept such misrepresentation among their own than among others. 7
Last, while in general, racial and religious differences of respondents
were not important factors, Catholics were least likely to be tolerant of
lies about marital status and smoking.
Under a sex fraud regime, questionnaires directed to potential
partners might well become the rage, for at some level we want to know
everything about our romantic/sexual partners. But even if they do not,
we can anticipate that at some point during our sex/romance talk a voice
will well up within us, shattering the perfection of the moment: "Watch
out now, you are in contract mode." Or perhaps that jolt will be
provided by our partners, who simply declare a state of contract to be
in effect. That such sudden shifts can change the essential character of
a relationship by throwing everything into question should be apparent.
In Jerry Sterner's Other People's Money, the President of New England
Wire and Cable is talking to investment banker Larry Garfinkle.47 Out

of the blue, he asks, "Can we speak frankly?) 480 "I don't like people

473. See supra pp. 398-99 (Subotnik's sex fraud questionnaire).
474. See generally Gabriel, supra note 210 (discussing how marriages are destroyed by a
revelation that one spouse is a homosexual).
475. See supra pp. 398-99 (Subotnik's sex fraud questionnaire).
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. JERRY STERNER, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 14 (1989).
480. Id.
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who say, 'Can we speak frankly?' "responds
Garfinkle. "Means they're
481
bullshitting me the rest of the time.
Will sex fraud bring other losses as well? Will fear keep the
Cinderellas and Aladdins with their own kind, thereby locking the
princes and princesses into their stale preconceptions of life and love?
One thing will almost surely be lost: that sensuous striptease in which
we slowly and deliriously reveal our indissolubly entangled real and
imagined selves to our partners-and then hope for the best.48 2
X. CONCLUSION

Love is the world's infinite mutability; lies, hatred, murder
even, are all knit up in it; it is the inevitable blossoming of
its opposites, a magnificent rose smelling faintly of blood.
A dream which makes the world seem.., an illusion. The
art of illusion is the art of love, and the art of love is the
blood-red heart of the world.
-Pierre

483
Corneille (and Tony Kushner)

Man's brain, like the rest of him, may be looked upon as a
bundle of adaptations .... We are anything but a mechanism set to ... the truth .... Rather we have evolved a
nervous sytem that acts in the interests of our gonads ....
-Michael

Ghiselin48 4

Where does this leave us? On the one hand, we have heard the pain of
sexual deception, recognition of which has led both men and women to
propose social control.485 We also have heard the arguments rejecting
the notion that lying is an inevitable part of the sexual order.486 And,
finally, we have listened to the claim that regulation of sex fraud would
not only prevent unwanted relationships from beginning, but also would
481. Id.
482. See supra notes 181-200 and accompanying text.
483. PIERRE CORNEILLE, THE ILLUSION 158 (Tony Kushner trans., 1994). Comeille (and
Kushner) should not be read here as advocating murder. Rather, what we hear in this passage,
which comes at the end of a gripping play, is Corneille's unflinching insistence through his
character, Alcandre, that the noble qualities of love are never fully extricable from those we
deplore, if not despise.
484. MICHAEL T. GHISELIN, THE ECONOMY OF NATURE AND THE EVOLUTION OF SEX 263
(1974). Gonads, it should be recalled, are not unique to males.
485. See supra note 63.
486. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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lead to48better
relationships because of the atmosphere of trust that would
7
result.

On the other hand, there are questions. Speaking of the
sex-is-contract view (in the context of arrangements regarding pregnancy), Martha Fineman elegantly spells them out:
Are whispered, passionate nuances of the language of love
to be given legal content and consequences when individual
expectations are frustrated? What would it mean for
society... ? Would there be a state contract that governs
such interactions unless explicitly altered by the parties?
How many of us would be comfortable with the "scripts"
legislators and judges write for the circumstances in which
promises are not explicit, but only to be implied from the
surrounding circumstances?48
"To state some of the questions which flow from the initial premise that
sex is an occasion for contract," Fineman concludes, "is to
4 9 reveal the
underlying absurdity and inherent danger of that concept., 1
Having over fifty years of experience with antiheartbalm regimes,
moreover, we have come to understand that since the law offers few
effective remedies, we must shoulder responsibility for protecting
ourselves. We should now also understand the immense obstacles in the
way of establishing a sex fraud regime: our deep need to trump up our
accomplishments;4 ° our need for privacy; 4 1 the interplay in our
mental lives between fact and fancy; 492 the difficulties of interpreting
language, particularly in high-tension contexts; 493 the burden that the

487. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
488. Fineman, supra note 79, at 135 (footnote omitted).
489. Id. at 13. Once sex-is-contract is established regarding consequences of the sexual act,
Fineman goes on to ask "will state and federal legislatures be free to define and confine... the
sexual act itself?" Id.
490. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
491. See NYBERG, supra note 141, at 128-34.
492. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. For Drucilla Cornell, this aspect of the
sexuate personality should not be tampered with by a system as crude as the law. Changing the
environment which produces such suffering
is under my definition a project that demands the space for the renewal of the
imagination and the concommitant re-imagining of who one is and who one seeks
to become. Hence, my insistence on the imaginary domain as crucial to the very
possibility of freedom ... to transform itself....
Quoted in Goodrich, supra note 191, at 666-67.
493. See supra Part VII.A. & B.
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determination of sex fraud would impose on our judicial or
quasi-judicial systems;4" the positive obligation to lie in some circumstances.495
Some, to be sure, will dismiss these "problems"-along with this
entire Article-for being grounded on anecdote and other minor cultural
artifacts. Drawing their moral creeds from the secular and religious
teachings of Montaigne, Kant, Bok, and Augustine,496 these skeptics
will only scoff at Cyrano and Christian's travails. They will meet the
assertion that lying is closely bound up with the sexual experience, or
that it is morally neutral, with a demand for the scientific or religious
authority to back it up.
Four distinguished individuals in their fields have-however
inadvertently-provided the science. In the most comprehensive study
of sexual behavior ever conducted in this country,497 and under the
titles Sex in America" (the popular version) and The Social Organization of Sexuality499 (for the elite), these authors have probed our
deepest sentiments about sex. As a result of interviews with over three
thousand respondents, we now have answers to such questions as: Did
sex with a partner make you feel satisfied, sad, loved, anxious, worried,
wanted, scared, thrilled, guilty or otherwise?5" More important for our
purposes is an entire class of findings, of which the following is but one
example: Men report that they received fellatio at a far greater rate than
women report providing it.5°1 Is there anyone who will not be surprised by this paradox? Does it suggest a fundamental design flaw?
Were questions misunderstood? Were there mistakes in compilation?

494. See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text. Some of these factors suggest that
contrary to Larson's dualities, those who suffer harm, may, in other circumstances, end up
causing it. That there is no necessary virtue produced through suffering is demonstrated in the
findings of a recent study of the secondary schools: The large majority of students who have
been harassed also have harassed someone else at some point during their school life, and over
half of all students (boys as much as girls) have experienced harassment as victims as well as
perpetrators. V.E. Lee et al., The Culture of Harassment in the Secondary Schools, AM. EDUC.
REs. J. (forthcoming 1995-96). These same factors may also suggest why, nothwithstanding its
insistence that there be full consent for every stage of sexual play, Antioch College has not
sought to regulate sexual fraud as we have used the term.
496. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
497. See Anthony Lane, Lay People,THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 19, 1994, at 110 (reviewing
EDWARD G. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY (1994) and ROBERT
T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEx IN AMERICA (1994)).
498. See MICHAEL ET AL., supra note 280.
499. EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY (1994).
500. See id. app. C, at 4, 15.
501. See MICHAEL ET AL., supra note 280, at 140.
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Perhaps, though none of these possibilities seems to have even been
considered. In a recent review, Anthony Lane has supplied what is
probably the best explanation:
[T]hese books are not about sex [at all]. They are about
lying. They are constructed with admirable clarity, but they
[display] the unalterable fuzz of our duplicity, the need to
hide the truth from other people in the hope that we will
cease to recognize it in ourselves .... This is not a question
of inefficient research, or of culpable hypocrisy, or even of
that much loved villain of the piece, the male boast; it is
simply what T.S. Eliot called bova sme, "the human will
to see things as they are not....
If Lane's analysis is correct-and Ockham's Razor suggests that it
is-the authors of the sex books (and we might add Larson to this
group) have failed to distill a critical message of their own work-that
it is absurd to take as gospel what people say about their sexual
experiences, hopes, and fears. And indeed, The Social Organization of
Sexuality offers so much contradiction, so much inappropriate scientism,
that the work, according to Lane, stands as "one of the comic masterpieces of our age."5°3
The books in question have demonstrated that we lie to researchers.
But no one is suggesting (yet) that such lying be the basis for tort. So
back to our primary focus: should lying to a sexual partner be actionable? An old story is instructive. "Wait a minute," you say. "There you
go again promoting anecdote as truth." The charge will not hold. First
of all, in the moral realm anecdote can be truth or at least it can bring
us as close to truth as we can possibly come;5" what we can suppose
is the very best science, as we have seen, has its limits. More important,
far from being anecdotal, this particular story is Biblical gospel, for
many the very definition of truth and the basis for truth-telling in the
courtroom.
The Patriarch Jacob was traveling in the East when he encountered
his cousin Rachel, whom he had apparently never seen before."' He
fell in love with her and asked Laban, Rachel's father, for her hand in
marriage."° Laban readily agreed on condition that Jacob serve him
Lane, supra note 497, at 113.
Id. at 111.
"[C]ertain truths about human life can only be fittingly and accurately stated in the
and forms and characteristic of the narrative artist." MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S
KNOWLEDGE 5 (1990).
505. Genesis 29.
506. Id.
502.
503.
504.
language
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for seven years, which Jacob did.5" On the wedding night, however,
Jacob was duped." 8 Laban induced his elder daughter, Leah, to
substitute for her sister in the marriage bed. 9 When Jacob realized
what had happened, it was too late.510 To earn Rachel, Jacob was
forced to serve Laban for an additional seven-year period. No penalty,
it should be emphasized, was imposed on Leah, the Foremother (or on
Laban) for the sexual fraud. This being the case, can we justifiably
impose sanctions on Leah's successors in these mattters?
One could argue that the moral dimension is more obscure than it
has been made out to be, that the events described took place at a time
when families were dominated by fathers. In this view, having been
given no choice in the matter, Leah is not morally culpable. Because we
cannot be sure one way or the other, we turn to another story. Tamar
was a widow, her husband having been killed by God for his evil
ways.5 ' Pursuant to custom, i.e., levirate marriage, she was entitled to
be taken in by either her brother-in-law, or under some circumstances,
her father-in-law.1 2 The latter, Judah (son of the Patriarch Jacob, and
his wife, Leah) fearing a similar fate for his surviving son, was reluctant
to authorize a marriage between him and Tamar.513 So Tamar took the
initiative by removing her mourning outfit, dressing up as a harlot and
waiting for Judah on the side of the road. 14 Not recognizing her,
Judah asked her for sex, offering gifts in return.15 Later, having been
informed that his daughter-in-law was pregnant through harlotry, he was
horrified.516 But when Tamar advised him that he was the father and
that her purpose was only to remarry, his anger abated and he acknowledged fault for not allowing the marriage with his son.5 17
If sexual fraud is a violation of "dignity interests," should Tamar
have been allowed to go unpunished? Did this incident, which is the
only information we have about her, at least taint her or her line in
507. Id.
508. Id.

509. Id.
510. Id. It should be mentioned that Rachel herself may have participated in the fraud. See
"Rashi" commentary on Genesis 29:25 in THE SONCINO CHUMASH 171 n.25 (The Reverend Dr.
A. Cohen ed., 1983). Pitting the language of the parties against custom, and the custom of one
party against that of the other, the foregoing story makes for a wonderful contracts hypothetical.
Id.
511. Genesis 38.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

95

406

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

some way? It seems not. For, as it turned out, through this one union
with Judah, Tamar came to be an ancestor to King David and through
Joseph, to Jesus as well.518
Read narrowly, the story of Tamar permits a woman to lie for the
sake of finding a husband. Because of the complication introduced by
levirate marriage, however, and because sex-based liars often have other
objectives, we cannot close our enquiry here. Pursuing a different path
towards resolution of the sex fraud issue, this author wrote to Harriet
Lerner, Staff Psychologist at the Menninger Clinic, strong feminist and
author of the principal and best-selling treatise on sexual/romantic lying
and the psychology of women. Asked to comment on the possibility of
a sex fraud tort, Dr. Lerner, who in general rejects claims of justifiable
deception, responded:
The idea of creating a tort for sex fraud doesn't strike me
as a terrific idea ....[D]eception, in its countless manifestations, is woven into the fabric of everyday life, so it
seems wildly absurd to try to regulate lies, secrets, silence,
faking, exaggerating, minimizing, pretending and the whole
gamut of ways we show the false and hide the real....
More to the point, a tort for sexual fraud would narrow, not
widen, the likelihood of truth-telling between two people.
If men and women could sue each other for misrepresenting
facts and feelings, the resulting emotional climate would be
so anxious that it would be increasingly difficult for people
to spontaneously be themselves or take risks in uncovering
old lies and coming clean .... What a subject. What a
world." 9
In highlighting the ironic consequences that would follow adoption of
a sex fraud tort, Lerner is clearly on target. If we are looking for legal
and maybe even moral guidance through the sexual thicket, then, does
it make any sense to stop our search at Larson? If Martha Nussbaum is
right that "only a risk so terrible that it can annihilate makes true joy
possible,"5" shall we follow Larson into her effete new world? There
is an alternative vision. It is provided for us by another woman, Susanna
Centlivre, the highly regarded English playwright. Writing almost three
hundred years ago, Centlivre invented the vibrant character, Belair, who

518. Matthew 1:3-16.
519. Letter from Harriet Lerner, staff psychologist, Menniger Clinic, to Daniel Subotnik,
Professor of Law, Touro Law School (June 20, 1994).
520. See Nussbaum, supra note 400, at 1725 (describing a common theme in Wuthering
Heights, You Must Remember This, and Maurice).
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like many of Shakespeare's creations, takes on a disguise to win
love. " ' Belair rationalizes his deception by citing a principle which
Centlivre formulates, if not originates; which she seems to accept as
necessary, if not ideal; which she offers the Don Giovannis to save their
miserable lives, if not their souls (and which in its contemporary form
has become one of the most widely known maxims of justice in the
English language): "All Policy's allow'd in War and Love. ' "
But even this principle, however helpful, cannot ultimately provide
the solution to the question of the desirability of the sex fraud tort.
Because we need something of a law of war and a law of love,5" it
should be taken only metaphorically to mean that the law ought to allow
wide discretion in these areas. How much discretion? Another old story
is instructive. It concerns a powerful man who had a secret, and a
woman "friend" who, unbeknownst to him, was out to do him harm. 24
She was certain that uncovering the secret would achieve her purpose.
She first asked him directly. 5 Rather than refusing to answer and risk
losing the relationship, and fervently hoping she would not test his
response, he lied to her not once, but twice and then a third 'time.526
When this pattern became clear to her she stepped up the pressure,
reproaching him," 'How canst thou say I love thee, when thy heart is
not with me. .. ' [S]he pressed him dally with her words, and urged
him [by withdrawing immediately
before his climax] so that his soul
' 527
death.
unto
vexed
was
Though he had his suspicions, he wanted to tell her everything as it
really was, to give her the sense of intimacy she seemed to crave and
to enjoy the peace and the exhilaration that come when two people are
as one." We might even say today that he aspired to become a New
Man unafraid of showing vulnerability, to create the kind of sincere and
forthright relationship that Larson holds out for all of us as ideal.
Finally, his warrior pride giving him confidence, he capitulated. 29 But

521. See CENTLIVRE, supra note 249.
522. Id. at 273.
523. Only a few would argue, for example, that the law should not intervene when an
individual, knowing he has a serious STD, does not inform his sexual partner of such, and, as
a result, the disease is passed to the partner. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
524. Judges 16.

525. Id.
526.
527.
528.
529.

Id.
Id.; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Sotah 9b (Soncino 1985).
See Judges 16.
See id.
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there were no blessings to be had from this act of faith, for what ensued
was catastrophe. 3°
In retrospect, of course, we know Delilah's purpose. 3 ' Samson,
however, did not. 3z If we ignore her actual purpose, and assume that
she was as Samson hoped, does she have a cause of action against him
for the lies he told?533 If not, what lesson should we draw? Might it
not be that we are all Samsons with hidden weaknesses, and that a rule
precluding
the cover-up of our faults, as we perceive them, is simply
53 4
inhuman?
Giving out too much information about one's self-of which the
paradigm might be telling someone you love them before the time is
ripe--can thus be destructive. But what will dissuade information
seekers-say, those who ask whether you love them at the wrong
time-from confusing intimacy with full disclosure? Delilah's fate is no
deterrent because it is unknown. Don Giovanni cannot help us here.
530. Id.
531. See id. Believing that there is a big difference between keeping secrets and lying, a
colleague has asked whether I have inappropriately conflated the two here and elsewhere in this
Article. I think not, for I do not find the distinction particularly useful. If the secret is important,
it is likely to affect the behavior of the secretholder, and the partner will, more often than not,
sense this. He or she will then start asking questions and these questions, if the secret is to be
kept, will have to be met with a lie.
Now let us suppose that the the partner does not sense the existence of a secret, that the
secret is Samson's special power (not its source), and that we are in a sex fraud regime. Would
Samson have an affirmative obligation to reveal it? Presumably even Larson would say no
because, not knowing the secret, Delilah cannot have relied on it. See Larson, supra note 14, at
453-54. On the other hand, Larson would presumably want to impose such a burden on a man
whose female friend believes him to be unmarried (although he has never said anything about
his marital status) and he is aware of her belief. In sum, the sex fraud regime proposed by
Larson would require an entire set of rules for when affirmative disclosure is required, a burden
that she does not even begin to undertake in her article.
532. Judges 16.
533. Larson might argue that information of this potentially destructive nature does not
constitute a basis for justifiable reliance. The problem with this assertion is that Samson was not
merely volunteering information to Delilah. Judges 16. He was responding to a specific question
after she had made it clear that she was not interested in pleasuring him until he demonstrated
his trust in her. Id. If Delilah is not entitled to a honest answer under these circumstances-that
is, if she is not entitled to choose her own criteria, reasonable or unreasonable, for sexual
consent---can Larson fairly claim that a woman is entitled to sexual autonomy?
Biblical law, in any event, would seem to deny recovery to both partes under the foregoing
assumption. See Exodus 22:16-17 (requiring compensation to minor virgin's family for seducing
her). For if seduction were generally actionable, there would be no reason to explicitly provide
a cause of action in the narrow case of the under-age and virginal victim. See id.
534. While agreeing that a sex fraud tort is highly problematic, Professor Paul Heald wants
boundaries. He proposes that sex fraud be actionable where it is unconscionable. See Heald.
supra note 91, at 26-27. Not believing that a community standard will, without more (in fact,
much more), produce results that are reasonably consistent or cost-effective, I must disagree.
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Happily, another operatic leading man can. 35 Lohengrin comes into
town on a boat drawn by a magic swan. 36 His purpose is to protect
the princess Elsa from the false charge that she had her brother, the
537
Duke, murdered so that she could take control of the Duchy.
Lohengrin proves her innocence through trial by combat with the
accuser.53 He asks Elsa for her hand in marriage, which she readily
agrees to, but he warns her that "You never once shall ask me/ Nor
even care to wonder;/ From whence I journeyed here/ Nor what my
name and race." '39 Elsa again agrees."
Though happy in her marriage, in time, worried that the mysterious
origins of her stranger/husband might put her at risk, and maddened by
the thought that Lohengrin might not love her enough to trust her, she
breaks trust with him by asking the unaskable.541 Not being the kind
of man to delude or even put off his wife-and, unlike Samson, having
no reason for concern about his personal safety-he readily provides the
answer.542 In so doing, the longstanding traditions of the Knights of
the Grail, the secret society of benefactors from which he came, force
him to leave.543 As he sails away, Elsa collapses and dies.51 Is the
message not clear by now that sexual players need space from one
another, and that if they do not get it, they and all around them should
watch out for falling pillars?

535. See generally RICHARD WAGNER, LOHENGRIN (Stewart Robb trans., 1963).
536. Id. at 4.
537. Id. at 5.
538. Id. at 6.
539. Id. at 5.
540. ld.
541. Id. at 17.
542. Id. at 20.
543. Id.at 21.
544. Id.The archetypal story in this area is surely that of Cupid, the god of love, and
Psyche. See HAMILTON, supra note 224, at 92-100. It should not be supposed, however, that not
only women who in the world's great stories cross the forbidden line in seeking information
about their partners. See 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRflTANICA 134 (1959) (defining the mythological
character Melusine).
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